

much to employ the medical aid which he wisely or unwisely thinks he needs, as it is to employ the plumber, the barber or the horse-shoer whom he wisely or unwisely prefers. That the Massachusetts legislature took this view and refused to pass the doctors' exclusion bill, which Prof. James opposed, is matter for congratulation.

Gold standard men who are also protectionists should be interested in that part of the address of President Diaz to the Mexican congress in which he speaks of the so-called depreciated Mexican dollar as a powerful factor in promoting protection. By discouraging foreign trade, so says Diaz, this dollar stimulates Mexican manufactures; and that is the prime object of protection. Silver coinage free traders, also, should be interested in this part of Diaz's address, and for similar reasons. If silver coinage is in truth a protective measure, both protectionists who oppose it and free traders who advocate it will need to revise their opinions somewhat, either as to coinage or customs.

#### HENRY GEORGE'S LAST BOOK.

Every one of Henry George's books is vital with intelligent and honest thought. He never wrote perfunctorily. Yet in the last twenty years of his life—years devoted also to making a living, for books like his, though they circulated widely, could in the nature of things yield to their author but scant pecuniary returns—he prepared for publication no less than eight volumes. "Progress and Poverty" came first. Begun in 1877, it appeared in 1879. This was followed by "The Land Question," which was written with especial reference to the "no rent" agitation in Ireland; by "Property in Land," a controversy with the Duke of Argyle; by "Social Problems," "Protection or Free Trade," and "The Condition of Labor," the latter being an open letter to the pope in reply to his encyclical on labor; and by "A Perplexed Philosopher," an exhortation of Herbert Spencer for his surrender to aristocratic attractions. These were published in the order in which they are named. Finally comes "The Science of Political Economy," the unfinished manuscript of which almost literally dropped from the author's hands when he died. Considered by itself, each volume is a great book; any of the eight would have perpetuated Henry George's memory had none of the others been written.

But his monumental books are the first and the last.

"Progress and Poverty," laboriously thought out as a pioneer work, was in sober truth what inferior publications are sometimes said to be, an epoch-making book. Prior to its appearance Americans when asked by supercilious foreigners, "Who ever reads an American book?" could point in dumb reply to but one book, and that a novel. This situation was changed by "Progress and Poverty." The extent to which the world has read that American book is indicated by its large circulation in all English-speaking countries and the great number of alien tongues into which it has been translated.

Nor was "Progress and Poverty" merely circulated and read. It did and is still doing the work for which its author intended it. While in one sense the sneer of the "aristocracy of culture," that it has not influenced the universities, may be true, yet in another and an important sense it certainly is not true. The book has failed, indeed, to convert the professorial cult in political economy. How could it help but fail, when the professor who should become an outspoken convert would be pushed out of his university chair? Nevertheless, it has forced that cult to abandon old fallacies and invent new ones. We say this advisedly. Though other writers had previously protested against some of the old fallacies, Henry George did more than protest; he tore them all up by the roots. The "about face" movement of the professors of political economy dates from the time when George's book made its impress upon the public mind. That book forced the professorial cult to try to turn political economy into an occult science and its professors into economic mahatmas.

But better still than its influence upon the universities—for universities are at the best but mummy cases of thought; they preserve old wisdom but seldom give birth to new—has been the beneficent influence of "Progress and Poverty" upon the masses. This influence and its effects, though they do not lend themselves to statistical expression, are evident in a thousand different ways. He who is not cognizant of them must be intellectually blind. They appear in all circles, being usually shown in a better attitude toward

industrial questions, but not infrequently in unqualified acceptance of the doctrines of the book. Neither pulpit nor bar, counting-room nor factory, court nor legislature, congress nor parliament, has wholly escaped this influence or is wholly free from its beneficent effects. Even socialists who oppose the book as individualistic, and individualists who condemn it as socialistic, have caught inspiration from it. Social problems are better formulated in the public mind than they could possibly be if "Progress and Poverty" and its influence were obliterated. Already this volume stands out in bold relief, to minds capable of passing judgment upon the great events of their own time, as the most influential and enduring book of the century.

But "Progress and Poverty" is not a treatise. While it does recast political economy in some vital particulars, it does not systematize the science. The intention of its author was to leave that work to other hands. He assumed that if this book should command wide attention, professors of political economy, recognizing the truths it put forth, would undertake the task of harmonizing those truths with the science as a whole. But his assumption proved unfounded. Though "Progress and Poverty" instantly commanded wide attention; though it has become more famous than any other work on political economy—Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" alone excepted; though its influence in less than twenty years has been greater than that of even the "Wealth of Nations" in a century; though it is the only economic work except Smith's and Mill's which the man of general culture needs to have read, yet the professors of political economy, when they have not misrepresented have ignored it. So the work which Henry George expected them to do, he having pointed out the way, fell at last upon himself.

Setting about his task as far back as 1888, he continued it, with frequent interruptions—now to lecture at the antipodes, again to write a book or two upon subjects requiring immediate attention, and at other times to deliver lectures and write magazine articles urgently sought for—until the historic mayoralty campaign of Greater New York in the autumn of 1897, near the culmination of which he suddenly died. The result of this labor is "The Science of Political Economy," recently published

by the Doubleday & McClure company, New York, as a posthumous work.

In this book, more noticeably even than in "Progress and Poverty," George assumes the role, not of a tutor giving instruction in mysteries, but of a guide who points out what may be seen merely by looking. He did not regard political economy as a body of esoteric knowledge, in respect of which ordinary men must unquestioningly accept the dicta of authority. He held, on the contrary, that those who would understand political economy must distrust mere authority and use their own faculty for observation and their own reason. And this he considered it easier in respect to political economy than to any other science, for ordinary men to do. For political economy, to quote his own language, "requires no tools, no apparatus, no special learning. The phenomena which it investigates need not be sought for in laboratories or libraries; they lie about us and are constantly thrust upon us. The principles on which it builds are truths of which we are all conscious and on which in everyday matters we constantly base our reasoning and our actions. And its processes, which consist mainly in analysis, require only care in distinguishing what is essential from what is merely accidental."

These processes, however, demand precise definitions for distinguishing words. Not that there is any magic in definitions, but that unless the meaning of distinguishing words is so fixed and so clear that the same word always makes the same distinctions, confusion is inevitable, not only in the mind of the person reasoned with, but also in that of the person who reasons. Accordingly, George begins by defining the nature and scope of political economy itself.

This is really done by the earliest definition, which he fully accepts, namely, that political economy is "the science that treats of the nature of wealth and of the laws of its production and distribution." But as that definition has never been quite understood by the professors, and has lately been abandoned by them, he directs attention to the very beginnings of things, and leads on step by step until the most obtuse reader, be he professor or peasant, may see for himself just what political economy is.

Turning for this purpose to the whole system of things of which man

is cognizant and is himself a part, George observes that this system, as it is presented to our perceptions, exhibits three factors, which, though possibly in essence one, are clearly distinguishable in thought as three. He distinguishes them by the terms spirit, matter and energy. Spirit is that which feels, perceives, thinks, wills; matter is that which has weight and form; energy is that which, acting on matter, produces movement. Of these three factors, spirit comes first. It is the factor which initiates. So evident is this that every attempt to account for the origin of our system culminates in the assumption of a Great Spirit, or God. If atheistic theories admit no such assumption, it is because they avoid the question of origin altogether and assume the world always to have been.

Spirit being the factor which initiates, it is therefore the factor which distinguishes man from the other animals. Of all the animals, man alone initiates. Though other animals produce—some of them with surpassing perfection—it is not as originators, nor even as imitators. They produce by an instinct—under the direction of spirit from without—which prompts them unflinchingly and unalteringly to go so far but no farther. Not so with man. He directs his activities by spirit from within, by a power that we call reason. It is this that makes man so vastly superior to the other animals as to take him out of their class. He differs from them not in degree but in kind. George admits in this connection that there are differences between savages and civilized men so great as to seem also to be differences of kind; but he does not consider these as residing in the individual. He argues that they are traceable to differences in civilization.

Civilization he attributes to the welding together of individuals, by cooperation, into a social or economic body. It is at this point that he regards political economy as having its beginning. Man is a social animal, so his argument runs, formed to live and cooperate with his fellows; and as individuals adapt themselves to this relationship they merge "into a social body, a larger entity, which has life and character of its own, and continues its existence while its components change, just as the life and characteristics of our bodily frame continue though the atoms of which it is composed are constantly passing away from it and as constantly being replaced." To the development of this

larger entity, and not to individual development, George attributes the differences between savage and civilized men; and this development he regards as synonymous with the development of political economy. By cooperation, however, he alludes neither to socialism nor to any other consciously directed system of profit-sharing, but to something which lies deeper in, and is of the very nature of, the social organism. He does not allude even to the state. But, taking a hint from Hobbes, who in writing of the state named it Leviathan, George names the social or economic body to which he does allude a Greater Leviathan, thereby implying not only that this body is a combination, as distinguished from an aggregation, of the constantly changing units which compose it, but also that it is prior to and greater than the state—the state being merely one of its outgrowths or expressions. It is in this Greater Leviathan, this larger man, that, in George's estimation, civilization is secured and perpetuated. And, just as he regards the economy of one individual, or of more than one but less than the whole number of individuals that constitute the Greater Leviathan, as personal or private economy, so he regards the economy of the Greater Leviathan itself as political economy.

Thus the cooperation meant, which is regarded as marking the beginning of political as distinguished from personal or private economy, is caused by the same faculty that makes man the only producer among animals—by that faculty, possessed by man alone among the animals, which has been distinguished as spirit. His reasoning faculty enables man to see what the animal cannot, that by means of trading a net increase in satisfaction is obtainable; and it is along the line of trading so generated that the Greater Leviathan, or body economic, is evolved and developed. Individual desires, seeking satisfaction through trade, operate like "the microscopic hooks which are said to give its felt quality to wool, to unite individuals in a mutual cooperation that would weld them together as interdependent members of an organism, larger, wider and stronger than the individual man."

Having thus indicated the kind of economy that political economy is, namely, the economy not of individuals as such, nor of the political organization called the "state" or "nation," but of that natural economic organism which he calls Greater Leviathan,

George advances to a consideration of the nature of science, his purpose being the more clearly to point out the foundations upon which political economy, as a science, must rest. Here he digs down to the rock bottom of natural law.

Some sequences, he observes, are invariable, certain results always following certain antecedents. The connection between the cause and the effect in these invariable sequences, which are rightly called consequences, we call a law of nature. In tracing laws of nature we are apt to discover that the first cause found which explains an effect is not the first cause in the sequence, but is itself an effect of some preceding cause, which in turn is an effect of still another cause. Our search is thus extended from one link to another in the chain of causation until we come to what we apprehend to be the first cause in the sequence—the sufficient cause for the effect.

This sufficient cause involves that factor or element which has been distinguished as spirit. For the human reason is satisfied with no explanation of an effect which does not set forth a cause that may be conceived of as acting in itself. We should not be satisfied, for illustration, with a theory of the death of a man killed with a club, which explained that he died because a club struck him; we must know what will was behind the club. Nor are we satisfied even with that. We must also know the motive which moved the will to action. So, when we go beyond the domain of human will and motive, and enter the field of natural law, we are not satisfied with knowing the effects, nor with knowing that the effects have causes which cannot be conceived of as acting in themselves. We are constrained to push our speculations back to spirit—to a will and a motive sufficient to account for the universe.

When we do this there grows upon us "the apprehension of an order and co-relation in things, which we can understand only by assuming unity of will and comprehensiveness of intent—of an all-embracing system or order which we personify as Nature, and of a great 'I am' from whose exertion of will all things visible and invisible proceed, and which is the first or all-beginning cause." Indeed, this all-beginning cause is suggested by the very phrase, "law of nature." Though used to express merely the fact of invariable relation, that phrase involves the idea of a causative will. To such

recognition of spirit, George concludes, our reason must come before it can rest content, and beyond that it cannot go. And it is in the knowledges which relate results to this will, to the law of nature, that science really consists. There is no basis for scientific knowledge in human laws, which are merely expressions of the mutable will of man; but upon natural laws, which are expressions of the immutable will of God, and upon these alone, true science rests.

Attentive readers of George's book will observe that up to this point he has established two propositions: First, that political economy is the economy of Greater Leviathan—of the body social or economic, as a whole; and, second, that if it is a science it must, in accordance with the rules of all science, seek for causes in that supreme will and motive which in science goes by the name of natural law. Having also shown that the natural laws with which the science of political economy is concerned, begin to operate when that cooperation which evolves and develops the body economic or Greater Leviathan sets in, he then proceeds to define the scope of political economy.

Since this science treats of the production and distribution of wealth, he finds it to include or involve "almost if not quite the whole body social, with all its parts, powers and functions, and the natural laws under which they operate," for wealth is to the Greater Leviathan very much what blood is to the individual men who compose it. The scope of the science might be roughly indicated, he continues, if we called it the science which explains how civilized men get a living. But this would need modification. For political economy does not undertake to explain how some civilized men get a living; that is the function of private, or personal, or family economy. Some men may get a living either by rendering service or by extorting service. But men in general can get a living only by rendering service; and it is with men in general, not with particular men, that political economy is concerned. We might say, therefore, that political economy is the science which explains how civilized men in general, or as a whole, get a living. It is related, that is to say, directly, at any rate, only to the natural laws which govern the production and distribution of wealth in the social organism.

This distinction between private economy and political economy has peculiar importance in connection with nearly all the vital points upon which George differs from the economic professors. What they teach, as George very clearly shows, is not political economy at all, but private economy. Their science, instead of explaining the laws of general "wealthiness," as George calls it, is best characterized by the spirit of that aphorism of the old man who advised his son: "Get rich, my son; honestly, if possible, but get rich." When a so-called science of political economy presumes to treat the value of houses, which adds to the aggregate of values, as economically identical with the value of land, which enriches the owner only as it impoverishes others, George is entirely justified in his conclusion that the university economics of to-day have slid out of political economy and into the field of personal economy, a field in which things that enrich the owner may do so by impoverishing some one else.

As regards methods of study, George advocates seeking first principles and tracing out main lines, so as to comprehend the skeleton of their relation and understand their intent. Details are more readily understood, he explains, when the clew of intention is once gained.

Adopting this method, he finds that all the complex movements with which political economy is concerned originate in the exertion of human will, with the desire for material satisfactions as its motive, and have for their means the matter and energy which nature offers to man, and the natural laws which these obey. The phenomena that political economy explains, therefore, are human actions intended for the attainment of material satisfactions; and the laws it seeks to discover are those laws of man's own nature which affect his actions in changing natural materials—in place, form or relation—so as to satisfy his wants. And inasmuch as the three factors already distinguished as spirit, matter and energy are conjoined, both in man and in his natural environment—man himself embodying all three, and his natural environment consisting of matter and energy directed by superior spirit or natural law—the three original factors of the world may be reduced in political economy to Man and Nature, Man being the active factor and Nature the passive. From these two fac-

tors proceed all things with which political economy has to do.

It must not be assumed, however, that by desire for material satisfactions George means animal satisfactions exclusively. Much that we are accustomed to call immaterial, he explains, is in fact bound up with the material. We can have no cognizance, for instance, even of such spiritual things as love, knowledge or happiness, except through the material; and when we consider how universally, on this plane of our existence, the spiritual is thus linked with the material, the importance of material desires and satisfactions becomes clear.

It only remains, in this connection, to state the fundamental law of political economy which George postulates. Since man, the active factor, can satisfy desire only by action, and since action tends to weariness, men invariably seek to satisfy their desires with the least exertion. That is the law. It does not mean that they always adopt the least irksome method, nor that the law itself is an expression of selfishness; but simply that men "will always seek the way which under existing physical, social and personal conditions seems to them to involve the least expenditure of exertion," and that "men always do this whether their desires be selfish or unselfish." The law is simply an expression of a fact, the fundamental fact of the science of political economy. By it the subsidiary laws of that science—those of the distribution as well as those of the production of wealth—are governed and explained.

Such in outline is the first or introductory division of Henry George's last book. It is followed by three others. To present these even in the barest outline would overrun our available space; but, reserving for future discussion the controversial matters with which they largely deal—such as the money question, the question of socialism, the law of diminishing returns, the doctrines of value, and the various conflicts of the economic schools—we shall here attempt simply to state George's position on the leading points.

As the result of an extended discussion of value, one of the conceded characteristics of wealth, in which he finds value to be of two radically different kinds—value resulting from the production of wealth, which adds to the aggregate of values, and value from obligation, which adds nothing to the aggregate of values, because,

as in the case of debtor and creditor, for example, what the owners of such value gain other units of the body economic must lose—he concludes that only those things are wealth within the purview of the economy called political, which have value from production. This is the only kind of value that implies an increase of the wealth of the Greater Leviathan or body economic. And this value comes exclusively from the application of man's energies to nature. "Wealth, therefore, in political economy, consists of natural products so secured, moved, combined, or altered, by human labor, as to fit them for human satisfaction." In short, it is "labor raised to a higher or second power, by being stored in concrete forms which give it a certain measure of permanence, and thus permit of its utilization to satisfy desire in other times or places."

And as wealth is stored labor raised to a second power, so capital "is stored labor raised to a still higher or third power, by being used to aid labor in the production of fresh wealth, or of larger direct satisfactions of desire." For capital is not a different thing from wealth, but is a part of wealth, differing from other wealth only in its use. Its function is not to satisfy desire directly, as is the case with other wealth, but to satisfy desire indirectly, through its use in the production of further wealth.

From these definitions it is obvious that money may or may not be wealth, and therefore may or may not be capital. Money which derives all its value from production, such as gold coin, Mr. George puts in the category of wealth; but that which derives its value partly from production and partly from obligation, such as silver, copper and bronze coin, he regards as partly wealth, while that which derives its value wholly from obligation, such as paper money, he does not regard as wealth at all. Yet money has to do with wealth and it must be defined in that connection, and George defines it as "anything which in any time and place is used as the common medium of exchange in that time and place." Its essential quality he holds to be not its form or substance, but its use, which is not that of being consumed but of being continually exchanged, nor that of being exchanged as a promise of something else, but as a finality.

Following his examination into the nature of wealth, George explains its production. This consists not in creation but in alteration. It has three

modes: Adaptation, which is the altering of existing things in place, form, condition or combination; growing, which is the utilizing of the vital or reproductive forces of nature; and trading, or exchange. In classifying exchange with production instead of distribution, George departs from the usual order; but upon reflection it will be seen that his classification must be adopted before the study of political economy can be said to rest upon logical foundations. Exchanging or trading so evidently increases the aggregate of wealth that its assignment to the department of production must be conceded to be sound. The factors of production which George enumerates are the familiar ones of land, labor and capital. But these factors are so carefully and accurately defined by him—"land" excluding everything that is not natural, "labor" excluding everything that is not comprehended in the term "man," and "capital" excluding everything that is not a product of labor from land—that the terms no longer seem to belong to that mumbly-cum-spludge, as a shrewd Canadian dubs it, which the university professors call "economics."

From production, George carries his inquiry over into the department of distribution. He does not regard this as separate and distinct from production, but as a continuation of it, the two things being two mentally distinguishable parts of one thing. He defines it as the division, not among persons or classes, but into categories corresponding to the factors of production, of the results sought for in production. Thus one share of products goes into the category "rent," corresponding to "land;" another goes into the category "wages," corresponding to "labor;" and a third goes into the category "interest," corresponding to the capital used. This distribution human law is utterly powerless to alter directly. To decree that rent, for illustration, should go to laborers, would not increase their income as laborers. Distribution is determined under existing industrial conditions, by natural law; and nothing but an alteration of those conditions can alter the operation.

In this department, distribution, and only here, George assigns a place to morals. The natural laws of distribution, he says, unlike those of production, are moral laws. The moment we consider distribution, the idea of justice becomes primary, for distribution underlies the assignment

of ownership of wealth. After some elaboration of the moral phases of distribution, the division of the book on that subject abruptly terminates, and except for the supplement on money, also abrupt in its ending, the book itself comes to a close.

Evidently George's death prevented his finishing his work. The chapters on distribution and those on money, are little if any more than introductory; and there are indications throughout the body of the work that the magic touches of his pen were lacking in the finish. Defects appear of which the hypercritical—too indolent to pick up the chain of reasoning where verbal links are missing, too malicious perhaps to overlook occasional sentences which from lack of finish are crude or obscure, too much lacking in generosity to assume that the master mind which could produce a "Progress and Poverty" would have left no such defects could he have put this last book through the press, and withal unable to answer George's arguments—will doubtless avail themselves gladly to belittle both the book and its now voiceless author. It is to the credit of Henry George, Jr., who with excellent taste and judgment has edited the manuscript, that he did not attempt to perfect it, but confined his corrections to evident verbal errors. He has given to the world Henry George's manuscript as Henry George left it, and for that, whatever supercilious critics may say, the world will be grateful. For in substance this manuscript is a priceless legacy. Incomplete though it be, and in some places crude for such a master of thought and of English expression as Henry George, the book is nevertheless both complete and sound as well as lucid, in its exposition of general principles; and from these an intelligent public will have little difficulty in making just deductions regarding current social problems. It is a contribution to economic science, moreover, which cannot be ignored, and which may be expected in a short time to give direction and character to economic study.

## NEWS

Spain and the United States, as this issue of *The Public* goes to press, are upon the verge of war. Diplomatic negotiations appear to have come to a deadlock, and both countries are in suspense pending the delivery of President McKinley's message on the

subject, which is expected Monday next.

As is well known, this situation has developed out of the Cuban struggle against Spanish dominion. Cuba, lying hardly 100 miles south of our own territory of Key West, and almost the last of the Spanish possessions in America, having for one year in the last century passed under the control of the English, was returned to Spain in 1763, in exchange for Florida. Under the oppressions of severe taxation and of government by captain-generals, the people there became increasingly discontented with Spanish rule; but no uprising occurred—except a brief negro insurrection in 1844—until 1868.

The United States had become concerned with Cuban complaints during the administration of President Polk, who offered \$1,000,000 for the sovereignty of the island. This offer, which Spain indignantly refused, was made in the interest of the extension and perpetuation of southern slavery, as was the publication six years later of the Ostend manifesto by our ministers to England, France and Spain, who thereby joined in demanding that if Spain would not sell Cuba we should seize and forcibly annex it. Failing of its purpose, that manifesto became one of the factors in producing our civil war, during which the question of Spanish dominion in Cuba ceased to interest us. But the oppression still felt by the Cubans, had led up, by 1868, to the rebellion of that year, known as the "ten years' war."

This rebellion was under the military leadership of the West Indian officer who now commands the insurgent forces—Maximo Gomez. The United States became involved in 1873, when 52 Americans, captured upon the ill-fated *Virginius*, were shot by the Spanish authorities as pirates. War with Spain was then with difficulty averted; but it was averted, and the Cubans were left to make their own fight. This they did so successfully that in 1878 a treaty was made at Zanjón, in what is now the province of Puerto Principe, between Gomez, for the revolutionists, and Captain General Campos, for Spain, which granted a large measure of self-government to Cuba and promised the abolition of slavery within ten years.

The Spanish insist that the Zanjón treaty has been sacredly observed. Slavery, they say, was fully abolished

two years before the time stipulated, while the suffrage was promptly extended, the principle of self-government was recognized, and all the other promised constitutional reforms were carried out. This the Cubans deny. They claim that slavery had been virtually killed by the war, and that the royal decrees of abolition were consequently only perfunctory; that taxation without Cuban consent was persisted in; that Cubans were still excluded from all influential offices; that the Madrid customs laws were deliberately made oppressive to Cuba; that most of the Cuban deputies to the cortes owed their places to Spanish influence, while others were rendered powerless to accomplish anything; that the enormous taxes imposed upon Cuba were used, not for the benefit of the island, but for the enrichment of Spanish favorites sent to the island as officials; and that, in brief, the treaty of Zanjón had been made a hollow mockery.

These complaints grew until the revolutionists renewed hostilities by formally declaring war on the 24th of February, 1895. They were able at that time to maintain the rebellion only in the extreme western province of Santiago de Cuba. But by the middle of the year they were in possession of the adjoining province of Puerto Principe, and by its close had carried the war still farther west into the province of Santa Clara. The victories of the revolutionists caused the recall of the Spanish general, Campos. Gen. Valeriano Weyler was sent out to supersede him.

At the opening of the year 1896, the revolutionists pushed westward across the province of Matanzas, destroying the rich sugar growth as they passed, and menaced Weyler as soon as he landed in Havana. About the same time, another detachment of revolutionists entered the most westerly province of the island, Pinar del Rio, destroying the tobacco crops there, as the first detachment had destroyed the sugar crops in Matanzas.

All the provinces, except Havana, were thus occupied by the revolutionists; and, owing to their policy of avoiding pitched battles, in which the greater numerical strength of the Spaniards might have overwhelmed them, Weyler was unable to put down the rebellion by military means. He thereupon adopted a policy of terrorism, arresting and shooting revolutionary suspects, and, to starve out the revolutionary forces, hustling non-