

which would have cost us but a trifle in comparison with the amount necessary to maintain a large standing army, which could be brought into the field upon a day's notice, which would quickly make a better fighting force than any standing army that had not been furnished with frequent wars for practice, and which meanwhile would neither be an influence for war nor an instrument of tyranny. Such a system, held up to a high standard, is the solution of the military question for a democratic people. It is only autocratic governments, or governments that are ambitious to become autocratic, that need large standing armies.

When William J. Bryan offered his services to President McKinley in any military capacity in which the president might think him useful, he indicated the disinterestedness of his patriotism; and he proved it when, his offer to the president having been ignored, he enlisted as a private among the volunteers from his state. The president's action in the matter, however, is not to be condemned. He could not have offered Mr. Bryan a position of low grade, or suggested that he enlist as a private, without seeming, however unintentionally, to intend an insult to a political adversary with a following of only 600,000 less voters than his own in a total of 14,000,000. Neither could Mr. McKinley properly have offered him a position of military responsibility in anywise corresponding to his political standing without jeopardizing the interests of the service; for Mr. Bryan was deficient in military education and experience. But the president in ignoring Mr. Bryan's offer, would have appeared less ungracious had he not at the same time appointed to military positions of importance so many civilians whose military education and experience were no better than Mr. Bryan's.

The action of the Universal Peace Union in sending a letter of sympathy to the queen regent of Spain cannot

but grieve every member and friend of that society who is not a mere apologist for tyrannical government. The American authorities were right in refusing to allow the letter to go through the mails; and the president of the society exposed his personal partisanship in behalf of the Spanish government when he boasted of having sent it through other channels. It is one thing to stand up for peace under all circumstances and at any cost, and those who do so in sincerity and without partisanship are worthy of all possible consideration. Loyalty to unpopular principles is not such a drug in the American market that we can afford even to sneer at those who genuinely possess it. But sympathy with the Spanish government in connection with the Cuban question is quite a different thing from loyalty to peace principles. A peace man may condemn the United States for making war upon Spain in behalf of Cuba, without thereby in any wise approving Spanish government in Cuba or in the slightest degree withholding generous sympathy from the outraged Cubans; but he cannot communicate to the Spanish government such sentiments as those which were embodied in the Peace Union's letter to the queen without approving Spanish government in Cuba and in effect condemning the Cubans for resisting it. That letter was not a peace letter. It was a war letter—a letter which appears to have been intended, and certainly could only have had the effect of encouraging Spain to maintain her tyrannical grasp upon Cuba, and to resist the offers of the United States to establish freedom there. From the point of view of a sincere peace advocate—a peace advocate as distinguished from a Spanish sympathizer—it should be as much the duty of Spain to prefer withdrawal from Cuba to war, as of the United States to prefer Spanish tyranny in Cuba to war. This was not the point of view of the Peace Union's letter. Its point of view was distinctly that of unadulterated sympathy with Spain. The Philadelphia councils, therefore,

acted wisely in cancelling the privileges of the authors of the letter to occupy Independence Hall. And unless the Peace Union repudiates this letter which its president says he has smuggled into the palace at Madrid, it will deserve that withdrawal, which it will assuredly experience, of public confidence in its sincerity as an instrument for promoting peace.

From a source commanding our respect we are in receipt of a letter the burden of which is that this country ought to retain any territory which the fortunes of war may bring into its possession. In support of its position the letter argues that in that way the area of real free commerce would be extended, which would more than counterbalance any evils growing out of race questions; and it urges that by bringing the natives of the conquered territory into our Union and giving them all the rights which we ourselves enjoy, we should be doing them no wrong. Then, as to Cuba, the letter recalls that we have made no contract to establish there a separate government, our obligation being only to establish a "stable" government. And it insists that as all Cubans would have a right to a voice in the settlement of the affairs of the island, and a large proportion are too illiterate to be trusted with that right, a full generation under the advantages of schools must pass before our forces should be withdrawn. This is described as a condition which would be equivalent to full possession on our part. While admitting that there is much to be said on both sides, the letter finally asks if it is not best to take possession of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and as soon as possible to admit them as states into the American Union; and it takes positive ground in favor of doing so, as a means of more certainly bringing on the Parliament of Man.

For ourselves, we feel constrained strenuously to oppose any such policy. Let it be remembered, in the first place, that the admission of con-

quered territory into the federal Union is not contemplated by those who advocate its retention. We shall not have the choice of making conquered islands states in the Union or of withdrawing from them. Our choice will be either to withdraw, or to enter upon a career like that of Great Britain in India. Precedents to justify such a policy are not lacking; but from the conquest of Peru to the spoliation of India, and on down even to the partition of Africa, they are precedents which put our so-called Christian civilization to shame. Give this policy any pretty name you please—"expansion," or what not—it is nevertheless a policy of outrage and plunder.

But even if this country were to have the choice of admitting into the Union, Cuba and the other islands mentioned in the letter to which we have referred, it would have no right to retain possession unless the people whose liberties were involved gave reasonable indications of their desire that we should do so. The theory that we have a right to force even so good a thing as American intra-territorial free trade upon people who don't want it, is unsound. Every people must decide for themselves upon the kind of liberty and the measure of liberty that they will have. That is their right. Any attempt to force conditions upon them, though better conditions than their own, injures not only them but those who engage in the coercion. The British occupation of India, for example, and the British conquest of Ireland, have operated to the injury of the British as well as of the Hindoos and the Irish. This is a law of human progress.

So much for what "practical" people may regard as the sentimental end of the question. As to the practical end, we cannot bring Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Hawaiian and the Philippine Islands into the American Union, either as states or dependencies or conquered provinces, without, like England, so gorging our nation with

outlying territory as to make it a prey to warlike nations, unless we also put on full armor and become a warlike nation ourselves. Expansion, even with the consent of the people over whom we expand, would involve the establishment of a great navy, a large standing army, an aggressive foreign policy, frequent wars, and the erosion of the liberties of our own people. Expansion and Jingoism are fellow adventurers whom it behooves America to shun.

Aside from all other considerations, so far as Cuba is concerned in the matter, we are under the most solemn obligations, upon expelling Spain, to leave the Cubans free to establish their own government in their own way. Two years ago, both houses of our congress by overwhelming majorities recognized the independence of the Republic of Cuba, that republic of which Maso is now the president and Gomez the commander in the field; and before entering upon the war with Spain we made the independence of Cuba our ultimatum. To retain possession of it, then, after having driven Spain out, would be a lasting disgrace. When we shall have relieved the Cubans of their brutal tyrants from across the Atlantic, we shall have nothing to do, in good morals and good sense, but to leave the island to its own people. If after that they should petition for admission to the Union, the question of receiving them would be properly before us for decision. Until then we shall have no more right to take Cuba to ourselves than we should have to take Mexico.

Preliminary to the discussion of the justifiableness of the war, in the 4th issue of *The Public* we classified all honest views of the subject as follows: Those of the peace man absolute; those of the ideal anarchist; those of the "patriot" who is for his country right or wrong; and those of men who, believing in government and that the war-making power is a function of government, have a greater horror of some things which cannot be put aside without war than they have of war it-

self, though their horror of war is as great as anyone's. To this classification it has been objected that it omits one point of view which deserves mention: "There are some folks in this neighborhood," says a Philadelphia objector, "who . . . hold that in order to preserve self-existence, wars for defense may be at times necessary, but that government being supported by those having a common interest goes outside of its true function when it uses the public funds to carry on a humanitarian or any other movement outside of the sphere of its taxing power, even though such a movement is concurred in by a majority of its citizens." Our Philadelphia critic concludes: "According to this view, no matter how great the provocation of the Cubans to resist the tyranny of the Spaniards, our government commits a virtual aggression upon its citizens when it uses the common treasury for the benefit of any outside people." The criticism, though acute, does not impress us deeply. According to the principle our critic lays down, all expenditures of common funds for extra-territorial purposes, without unanimous consent, are aggressions. Nothing is gained in the argument by his limitation of the objection to humanitarian matters. A humanitarian expenditure of common funds abroad, no less than any other foreign expenditure of such funds, may be for the common good at home; and whether it is or not, is a question not of fundamental rights but of administration, the decision of which can be denied to majorities only upon the basis of the anarchistic theory. If every public expenditure requires the individual consent of all who are interested in the common fund, anarchists are right in holding that no common action at all can rightly be taken without the individual consent of all who engage in it. For these reasons we regard the Philadelphia view to which our correspondent calls attention as having been included in our original classification, among the views of the ideal anarchist.