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Now that we have taken Santiago, what of it? If Spain makes terms of peace, it will not be because she has lost Santiago, but because she has lost her navy. It is true, of course, that Cervera forced Santiago upon us as a necessary point of attack, by rushing his squadron into that harbor. We were compelled to attack Santiago because it sheltered Cervera. Otherwise Santiago would have been of no importance to us. It was not, and is not, a key to the situation in Cuba. The key to the situation there is now, as it was at the beginning, the city of Havana. To take that is to take Cuba. To take that is to drive Spain out of the West Indies. To take that is to end the war. Why then was not Havana instead of Santiago attacked before Cervera's squadron got into West Indian waters? Gen. Lee, when he left Havana, said the city could be taken, in its then comparatively defenseless condition, within five days. That was a full month before Cervera's fleet arrived. But the attempt was not made, and now, with Santiago in our hands, we are as far removed from the capture of Havana as ever. We are even farther removed, for Havana has been thoroughly fortified meanwhile, and Santiago affords no better base for attack than Florida did.

Whether Gen. Miles ever becomes lieutenant general is a small matter in comparison with the respect of the American people which he has earned by his generous conduct towards Gen. Shafter in connection with the surrender of Santiago. To a smaller man, the temptation to take command

and reap the military honors incident to the surrender would have been great and probably irresistible. Miles was Shafter's superior; he came upon the ground before Toral was ready to submit; he brought orders fresh from Washington, and he was in every other respect in excellent position to assume command. But if he was for a moment tempted to do so, he restrained himself. By doing that, he at once won popular respect and proved himself worthy of it.

The contrast between Gen. Miles's behavior toward Shafter, and Admiral Sampson's toward Schley is striking. Sampson's opportunity was pretty much the same as Miles's. It was rather better. Sampson, it will be remembered, is only a captain; but pursuant to the policy of favoritism which has disgraced the management of the war at Washington, he was, without reason and upon the flimsiest of pretexts, early raised in temporary rank above all his superiors, including Schley. But the fortunes of war did not favor him as the fortunes of politics had done. While he was watching Cervera in the region of the Virgin islands, Schley was bottling up that suave Spaniard in Santiago bay. Then Sampson came to Santiago and virtually reduced Com. Schley to a captaincy by taking command of the fleet. But the critical moment, when Cervera was slipping out of the harbor, found Sampson far off to the east on his way to a conference with Shafter, and gave to Schley the coveted opportunity to secure the prize of Cervera's fleet. Sampson had not been derelict. Though absent from the mouth of the bay, he was attending strictly to his duty. No possible blame could have attached to him; and though his temporary subordinate Schley won the honor of destroying the enemy's fleet, everybody

would have looked upon Sampson as justly entitled, as the commanding officer, to share the honor, had he been generous about reporting it, as Miles was with Shafter. Everybody would have felt moreover that he was to be more than forgiven for being a favorite of the political powers. But Sampson wanted to appropriate the credit which justly belonged to Schley. So he telegraphed to Washington a report which for two or three days left the public to suppose that the victory Schley's alertness and commanding skill had won, was all Sampson's own. It was he, according to his report—he and his fleet—that gave the American people the destruction of the Spanish fleet for a Fourth of July present. Schley, who had really directed the work, was unnamed; and by Sampson he remains unnamed to this day. The contrast between this behavior and that of Miles, calls for candid consideration.

Senator Teller has told a Chicago reporter that in his opinion "there is no more reason why a republic is not qualified to maintain colonies than a monarchy." But that point no one has disputed. Of the qualifications of the United States to maintain a colonial system there is no doubt. The real question is, in the first place, the moral right of a republic to assume the relation of a monarchy to peoples beyond its borders; and, in the second, the reactionary effect of such a policy upon the republic itself. The Roman republic was qualified to maintain colonies, and it did maintain them; but the Roman republic degenerated and became an empire. Are the American people ambitious to have their republic follow in the footsteps of the dead and buried republic of Rome?