cities where the work was undertaken, and supervised the work in all of its phases—the holding of public meetings for the discussion of street values, the computation of lot values, and the review of the computed values. There is a local Maricopa County Taxpayers' Association in Phoenix, of which Mr. Dwight B. Heard, capitalist and newspaper owner, is the head, which has taken the initiative in bringing about equity in assessments in that state.

The policy of the State Tax Commission of Ohio, which under the Warnes Law has the full power of direction and control of the methods of assessment, has been to make few changes in the real estate valuations this year. However, Tax Commissioners William Agnew and John D. Fackler of Cuyahoga County, in which Cleveland is located, have used the Somers System for revision of the land values in practically all of the suburban towns and cities adjoining Cleveland, including Lakewood, East Cleveland, Chagrin Falls, Berea, Rocky River and other places. They have very successfully used the Somers principles in the valuation of farm lands, holding public meetings at which the relative values of lands located upon the various highways were discussed.

In Dubuque, Iowa, at the April election two proposals were presented at a referendum vote affecting the question of assessments. A year ago an Equitable Assessment League was organized in Dubuque, with Dr. Eugene Lewis at its head. The City Council, preferring that any radical change in the assessment situation should first have the definite approval of the citizens, submitted two questions. The first question was as to whether a scientific assessment of the real estate of the city should be made. This question carried with a vote of 3,678 for and 947 against. The second question was whether the Somers System should be used for a re-assessment. The vote on this question was 3,627 for and 940 against. There was no agitation at the time of the election, and the decisive result was a very great surprise, even to the members of the Equitable Assessment League.

WALTER A. POLLOCK.

Why We Oppose Pockets for Women.

1. Because pockets are not a natural right.
2. Because the great majority of women do not want pockets. If they did, they would have them.
3. Because whenever women have had pockets they have not used them.
4. Because women are expected to carry enough things as it is without the additional burden of pockets.
5. Because it would make dissension between husband and wife as to whose pockets were to be filled.
6. Because it would destroy man's chivalry toward woman if he did not have to carry all her things in his pockets.
7. Because men are men and women are women. We must not fly in the face of nature.
8. Because pockets have been used by men to carry tobacco, pipes, whisky flasks, chewing gum, and compromising letters. We see no reason to suppose that women would use them more wisely.—New York Tribune.

NEWS NARRATIVE

The figures in brackets at the ends of paragraphs refer to volumes and pages of The Public for earlier information on the same subject.

Wek ending Tuesday, June 16, 1914.

The Illinois Suffrage Law.

The Constitutionality of the Illinois Woman Suffrage act was sustained in its entirety by the State Supreme Court on June 13 by a vote of 4 to 3. In a suit brought in the name of a Chicago citizen, William J. Scown, December 10, 1913, arguments in which were heard by the Supreme Court on February 13, the validity of the act had been questioned on three principal grounds: (1) That the act violated the Constitution because it amended the general election laws but did not contain the section amended, in answer to which the Court found that—

> This act does not purpose to amend or revise any other act and it is complete within itself. Its only object is to extend to women the right of suffrage so far as the offices and subjects mentioned in it are concerned.

(2) That the Legislature had no power under the Constitution to extend the franchise to women. In answer, the Court replied that—

> If an office is not of constitutional origin it is competent for the legislature to declare the manner of filling, how, when and by whom the incumbent shall be elected or appointed, and to change from time to time the method of election or apointment;

and cited as precedent the two cases of over 20 years ago, namely, People vs. English and Plummer vs. Yost, when the right of women to vote at school elections was questioned, and was upheld as Constitutional by the State Supreme Court. (3) That the granting to women of the right to vote on questions of public policy was unconstitutional, in answer to which the Court ruled that—

> In attempting to give to women the right to vote upon all questions or propositions submitted to the voters or electors in the municipalities or political subdivisions of the State the Legislature exceeded its power. There are many questions and propositions, however, not mentioned in the Constitution which may be submitted by the Legislature to a referendum at which women may be authorized to vote.
>
> It is a well settled rule that a statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional and that in such cases the constitutional part of the act will be given effect and the unconstitutional part disregarded unless the unconstitutional part is of

such a character that it may be inferred that without it the Legislature would not have passed the act.

The decision, therefore, pronounces the act as a whole Constitutional and construes it to mean that women may vote on all offices and public policy propositions, local or State-wide, except those specifically named in the Constitution. The majority opinion was written by Justice Frank K. Dunn and concurred in by Justices Orrin N. Carter of Chicago, James H. Cartwright of Oregon, and Alonzo K. Vickers of East St. Louis, all Republicans. The minority three judges were Justice George A. Cooke of Aledo, Justice Charles C. Craig of Galesburg, and Justice William M. Farmer of Vandalia, all Democrats, each one of whom filed his own dissenting opinion. Attorneys for the appellant were reported as announcing that a petition for rehearing would be filed before the ten-day time limit should expire. [See vol. xvi, p. 584; vol. xvii, pages 11, 178.]

Important additional voting power was decided to belong to Chicago women when on June 3, at the request of the Board of Election Commissioners at Chicago, County Judge Owens ordered that women be allowed to vote for State, Senatorial and ward committeemen of all political parties at the September primaries, that is, that women be treated as possessing precisely the same rights as men in whatever party they may enroll themselves as members. On the next day the question as to whether Chicago woman might vote for county commissioners, upon which Mrs. Catherine Waugh McCulloch had requested a ruling, was taken under advisement until after the Supreme Court decision on the Constitutionality of the suffrage law should be announced.

Woman Suffrage at the Biennial.

The General Federation of Women's Clubs for the first time took official action in favor of suffrage when, on the morning of June 13, at its twelfth bienniel convention, in session at Chicago June 9 to 13, the following resolution was presented by the resolutions committee in a special report and passed by an overwhelming viva voce vote:

Whereas, The question of political equality of men and women is today a vital problem under discussion throughout the civilized world, therefore,

Resolved, That the General Federation of Women's Clubs give the cause of political equality for men and women its moral support by recording its earnest belief in the principle of political equality, regardless of sex.

At the afternoon session of the same day, a telegram announcing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in favor of the Constitutionality of the State equal suffrage law called forth a jubilant demonstration. And that evening, at a banquet given by the Illinois Equal Suffrage League to the visiting club women, the double victory for woman suffrage was joyously celebrated. Miss Jane Addams, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt and Mrs. Ella Flagg Young were among the prominent suffragists who spoke. [See vol. xv, pp. 638, 659.]

Congressional News.

The Panama Toll Exemption bill passed the Senate on June 11 by a vote of 50 to 35, having been amended on the previous day by adoption of the following paragraph known as the Simmons-Norris proviso:

Provided, that the passage of this act shall not be construed or held as a waiver or relinquishment of any right the United States may have under the treaty with Great Britain, ratified Feb. 21, 1902, or the treaty with the Republic of Panama, ratified Feb. 26, 1904, or otherwise to discriminate in favor of its vessels by exempting the vessels of the United States or its citizens from the payment of tolls for passage through said canal, or as in any way waiving, impairing or affecting any right of the United States under said treaty, or otherwise with the respect to the sovereignty over or the ownership, control and management of said canal and the regulation of the conditions or charges of traffic through the same.

Several other amendments had been previously offered and rejected. The Simmons-Norris amendment was adopted by a vote of 50 to 24. On final passage 37 Democrats and 13 Republicans supported the bill and 23 Republicans, 11 Democrats and one Progressive opposed it. The bill went at once to the House, which concurred in the amendment on June 12 by a vote of 216 to 71. The bill was signed on June 15 by President Wilson. [See current volume, page 561.]

According to the House program, June 8 was District day to be devoted to local affairs of the District of Columbia. But, on motion of Congressman Mann, the Sundry Civil bill was taken up instead. This action was denounced by Congressman Bryan of Washington, who intimated that it was part of a plan to postpone consideration of the Crosser bill to municipalize the street railways of the District. The Crosser bill is not yet before the House, but the District committee has decided to report it favorably. Mr. Bryan made clear that postponement of District day meant postponement of the committee's report, and consequently less time for action on the Crosser bill and less chance of bringing it to a vote. [See current volume, page 561.]

Amendment of the La Follette Seamen's bill as demanded by the steamship owners was decided on by the House Committee on Marines and Fisheries