

the second place, by reason of his special knowledge as an organizer, he knows better than people in other lines of business how to beat down and keep down the wages of workmen in his particular line. His income from that source is wages also, not his own, but theirs, which the stress of conditions forces them to forego. And in the third place, there is an uncertainty about the expense of every job. Gambling upon this, the contractor often wins a stake, though he sometimes loses. On the whole, however, contracting is profitable to the contractor, or he would have to quit the business; and on the whole it is economical to the parties with whom he contracts, or they would stop contracting with him. Yet in the absence of fraud it is not exorbitantly profitable to the contractor, or his competitors would underbid him. For these reasons it should be evident that no body of workmen could successfully underbid contractors without hiring a competent man to do for them what the contractor does for himself. Such a man would be expensive, and they could not afford to take jobs at what they mean by "cost"—that is, for workmen's wages and expense of materials.

It is told of George D. Herron, professor of Applied Christianity in Iowa college at Grinnell, that he was once the cause of the dismissal of a clergyman for reading in that clergyman's pulpit the Sermon on the Mount with proper emphasis. Now it seems not improbable that he may himself be dismissed from the faculty of Iowa college for teaching the Sermon on the Mount to his class. A dead set has evidently been made against Prof. Herron, in which at least one of the college trustees is engaged. This trustee is John Meyer. He elaborates his views in a letter to the Iowa State Register. As one critic of Mr. Meyer observes, he has much to say in this letter about the integrity of Congregationalism, but nothing about the integrity of Christianity. Mr. Meyer's long letter is of the kind which cannot be answered

in limited space except by a general denial. Any more specific reply would necessitate the reproduction of the long letter, and a straightening out of nearly every one of its multitude of sentences to conform them to the facts. Of Mr. Meyer himself, however, one thing is evident from his letter, and that is that he tests Christianity by business principles, instead of testing business principles by Christianity.

Prof. Herron has not Meyer alone to fear, assuming that he fears anyone in such a matter. The governor of the state publicly denounces his teachings; and the republican papers, as if by preconcert, are united in attacking him. A staff letter to the Marshalltown Times-Republican collects data to prove that Herron is injuring the college. This collection of data shows how difficult it is for any teacher or preacher hailing from Grinnell to get a job at his profession, lest he may be "tainted with Herronism." From that letter it appears also that a school board member at Union will vote against any Grinnell graduate for school superintendent who may be "tainted in the least with Herronism." In another Iowa town a Grinnell graduate upon being ordained as a minister was told, so the Marshalltown paper says, that "they did not want and would not have a minister in sympathy with this movement"—meaning Herronism. Another young minister from Grinnell was advised not to show any recommendations from there, as it would prevent his ordination. It is said also that at New Hampton "there is a general understanding among the Congregationalists not to send their children to Grinnell college;" and the writer of the letter in question adds that upon information, and presumptively upon belief also, "the children of many Congregationalists in northwestern Iowa are sent to Northfield, Minn., where Herronism is not taught." How very much all this reminds one of the days when teachers and preachers were not wanted, even at the North, if "tainted in the least"

with abolitionism. Then it was heresy to teach that slavery was un-Christian; now it is heresy to teach that monopoly is un-Christian.

That Prof. Herron will have to leave Iowa college is almost a foregone conclusion. Christianity and churchianity do not thrive together, and churchianity owns the edifice. The principalities and powers which Christianity rejected twenty centuries ago, churchianity received gladly; and the sulphurous donor steadily exacts his tribute. When there is to be an eviction, therefore, it is Christianity not churchianity that has to go; and Herron, in this instance, represents Christianity. Herron is clearly marked for expulsion. But as in all similar cases, he will be turned out of his university chair only to be called to work in a larger field. The pious apologists for social wrong who drive him out, will but the more widely extend his usefulness. Thus it is that in the divine economy even the pharisee is made to serve the Lord. Look at Munkacsy's picture of "Christ before Pilate." See there, sitting near the dais of the Roman governor, the fat pharisee who sought the Nazarene carpenter's life. He thought he was silencing a disturber. How could he have known that he was helping to establish upon earth the religion of religions?

#### TRAMPLING UPON NATIONAL IDEALS.

There come times in the history of nations when events compel them to bring their actions to the test of first principles. Such a time has now recurred in the history of the American people. We are being forced into a searching and momentous comparison of our immediate national purposes and policies with our national ideals.

Specific problems confront us, upon the decision of which measurably depends our national future—whether we shall rise toward our ideals or sink away from them. These problems cannot be ignored. For better or worse, for good or evil, for growth or decay, for advance or retreat, in har-

mony with our ideals or in defiance of them, they are problems which we must decide.

Similar critical moments come also in the lives of individuals. There are times when they, too, brought face to face with some conflict between their purposes and their ideals, are forced to choose. These are the best periods of a good man's life. Well may such a one exclaim: "Thank God for sin!" Resisting temptation, he comes out of the struggle better and stronger. He is then nearer to his ideals, though not abreast of them.

No man is as good as his ideals, if he has ideals. Still, it is not to be inferred that all men are hypocrites. Given moral ideals, a man is to be judged not by the closeness with which he commonly lives up to them, but by the willingness with which he makes them his standard in times of temptation. If he then squares his purpose with his ideals, he grows toward his ideals; if he modifies his ideals to suit his purpose, he grows away from them.

To illustrate, let us imagine a born thief, who nevertheless accepts as one of his moral ideals the eighth commandment. He believes it wrong to steal, he tries not to steal, and on the whole he virtuously refrains from stealing. But now and again he awakes to a realization of the fact that acts which he had not before understood to be larcenous are larcenous. His decisions when tempted to repeat these acts will determine whether he is growing toward his ideal or away from it—whether he is becoming less of a thief or more of one. If, holding to the ideal, he struggles against the temptation, then he gains in moral strength and invites further moral enlightenment. But if, giving way to the temptation, he modifies his ideal—calls the eighth commandment a glittering generality, construes it in the light of the larcenous precedents he himself has made, and interprets out of it its moral force—then it were better for him never to have had an ideal.

As with an individual in this respect, so with a nation. When events bring its purposes into open collision with its moral ideals, and the necessity is admitted of altering the one or

modifying the other, the decision of that nation determines the direction in which it is going. If it decides for its ideals, it is advancing; if it decides against them, it is declining.

This suggests the test by which to determine the policy of the United States in the present crisis. Whether our nation has always been true to its moral ideals, is of minor importance. Whether it is even now true to them in many of its customs is, in connection with the crisis before us, of no importance at all. The vital question that confronts us is whether the new policy we are urged to adopt, the new customs we are asked to establish, the new national habits we are advised to form, are in harmony with our national ideals. If they are not, then their adoption would be not merely inconsistent with our ideals; it would be equivalent to their deliberate repudiation.

The ideals of the United States are summed up comprehensively in the first clause of the declaration of independence. This describes as a self-evident truth the proposition that "all men are created equal," which means, of course, not that they have equal physical and mental qualities, but that they come into the world with the right to equal consideration under the law.

Supplementary to that fundamental proposition, the declaration further asserts that all men "are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights," among which "are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;" and that for the security of these rights "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." But these clauses and those that follow them are only elaborations of the first clause. That states the whole principle. The proposition that "all men are created equal"—with equal rights—includes not only the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness;" not only the principle that governments derive their "just powers from the consent of the governed;" but also that right by means of which alone the governed can peaceably give their consent to the government,—the right to the ballot.

That the laws and institutions of

the United States have not always been and are not now completely consistent with these ideals, is true.

When the ideals were proclaimed, the African slave trade was a recognized occupation; and it continued for ten years or more under the sanction of our fundamental law. Slavery itself was protected by our fundamental law for three-quarters of a century. Here were plain denials of liberty.

In many states the right of men to vote unless they had property was long legally denied; while in all the states the right of women to vote was denied until recently, and in most it is still denied. Here we find another bald inconsistency. Equality of rights under the law implies, and government only by consent of the governed virtually specifies, the ballot as a right. To deny the ballot to any person is to deny him the power of even protesting against the manner in which he is governed. The right of consultation is inseparable from the right of self-government; and no right of consultation can be enjoyed by a ballotless man. Even the lives of members of a ballotless class are dependent upon the good will of their political superiors.

These violations of the right to life, liberty and self-government were indeed inconsistent with American ideals; but they were not denials of those ideals. The inconsistencies were in vogue when the ideals were proclaimed. The ideals have survived; most of the inconsistencies have been repudiated.

The slave trade was taken out of the category of legitimate occupations and denounced as piracy. Slavery was abolished, its reestablishment forbidden, and the former slave armed with the ballot. The ballot has been extended in most of the states to all men and in some to all women. The history of slavery and of ballot restriction goes to prove, not that the nation has been deliberately untrue to its ideals, but that it has been growing steadily toward them.

But we have now come to a time when we are asking ourselves as a nation not whether we shall struggle to throw off some ancient custom which is inconsistent with our ideals, not whether we shall make a further advance toward our ideals, but whether

we shall adopt a new policy which denies, and is on all hands admitted to deny, those ideals flatly and affirmatively, positively and aggressively. We are asking ourselves whether we shall flout our ideals and consciously and deliberately recede from them. It is this that we propose, when we contemplate the acquisition of 8,000,000 people whom Senator Teller, with no less accuracy than brevity, describes as our "subjects."

To make conquests and establish over the people we conquer a government which they do not voluntarily accept, and in the management of which they are to have no voice, a government that is under no constitutional obligations to protect their lives and liberties, but which according to the senators and college professors who advocate it, could dispose of all their rights in its discretion, would be to deny the fundamental right of self government in a new relationship. Thus we should not merely remain inconsistent with our ideals; we should be turning our backs upon them. This is perfectly well understood by the advocates of imperial colonization, and they brazenly urge us to turn our backs upon those ideals, arguing that the ideals are illusory.

Their argument is most plausible when directed against the ballot right as an inherent right of the citizen.

Men of common sense are not misled very readily by the pettifogger's plea of precedent. To them it is no argument against the right of all to the ballot that in practice the ballot has been extensively withheld, or, more correctly speaking, not fully extended. As well argue against the right to life and to liberty because both rights have been denied. That we have not realized our ideals is easily seen to be no sane reason for abandoning them. Because only have in fact been allowed to vote is clearly a weak excuse for denying the soundness of the American ideal that all are entitled to vote. To allow precedents thus to overrule principles, would be to make fetishes of precedents; or to use them as bushels to put candles under, instead of lights to illumine the pathway.

But regardless of precedent there are apparently inherent objections

to universal suffrage. Troublesome questions necessarily arise. We ask: Who shall vote? What shall determine a man's right to vote? What about children, idiots, lunatics, convicts, Indians, negroes? Children are too young; idiots and lunatics are incapables; convicts are social enemies; Indians are savages; negroes, if permitted in the south to "express their wish through the ballot and to have it counted," to quote an objector, "would ruin the country." Are all these entitled to vote? If not, they are governed without their consent, and then what becomes of the American ideal? Such is the drift of the questions.

With children there is a debatable line. No one can say exactly when they mature. Each individual differs. But every normal person does mature at some time between his first day in the world and his one hundredth year; and if the voting age be fixed reasonably, none but a logic-chopper could persistently object that deprivation of the voting right prior to that age is essentially inconsistent with our national ideals.

As to idiots and lunatics, they are in abnormal states. Disease makes them incapable of performing any social function; and as consultation regarding government is a social function, it is their disease and not a legal discrimination as to social rights, that really excludes them from voting. Idiots and lunatics, like children during immaturity, are naturally—not through legal discrimination, but naturally—under guardianship. So long as their social rights are secured them upon their emerging naturally from that state, their equality of rights is not essentially denied.

Convicts fall into a different class. By preying upon society they have forfeited social rights. To outlaw a man for his crimes is not to deprive him of equal rights under the law. It is punishing him for depriving others of those rights.

As to Indians, it will hardly be claimed that resistance to their aggressions is governing them. A people may certainly defend themselves against savages without being seriously charged with attempting to govern without the consent of the governed. In so far, however, as we have governed the Indian without his consent,

what success have we had? Would either he or we be worse off if we had invested him with the suffrage, or left him alone to govern himself?

And then the negro. We are told that if he had his ballot counted in the south he would ruin the country. What is meant by the country? White men, of course. Whether he would really ruin the white men of the south if he voted upon an equality with them, we have no means of knowing. The experiment has not been fairly tried. But we do know as matter of history that the white men of the south with all power in their hands ruined the negro—kept him a slave, which is about as near ruin as a live man can be driven to. Shall we, therefore, infer that the white men of the south are unfit to be trusted with the ballot? By no means. Yet upon the facts it is a more legitimate inference than the other.

Sweep away these hypercritical objections to the ballot right, and no plausible objections remain. When mature men and women are denied the ballot they are not only denied a fundamental right, but are prevented from performing a fundamental duty—that of advising and participating in government. All adverse arguments lead logically to monarchy, and if adopted as sound in principle will lead there practically. Not a single one that has ever been put forward against voting by the poor, by the "unintelligent," by "inferior races," by women, by any social class, but is a legitimate corollary of the arguments for divine right. Grant the premises of those who argue for a restricted suffrage, and the prerogatives of the Tsar of Russia become as unassailable logically as they are legally.

This is true not alone of the right of voting among ourselves, but also of the principle of government by consent of the governed in that broader sense in which we use the words when we refer to the policy of imperial colonization. We cannot impose our government upon alien peoples against their will, without lining up our government alongside of the autocratic powers of the earth. It is only by assuming some fanciful divine right in derogation of their obvious natural rights that we can make them our "subjects."

Nor is it any answer to say that the alien peoples are incapable of self-government. No one is capable of self-government, in the eyes of those who wish to govern him. What is our warrant for declaring a people incapable of self-government? Any people are far better able to govern themselves than are any other people to govern them. Super-imposed government may exterminate a people; it cannot elevate them.

One of the greatest as well as most delightful of American writers, a man who in the guise of a humorist has given us much sound philosophy—we refer to Mark Twain—satirizes the assumption of superior ability to govern, in "A Yankee at the Court of King Arthur," and then moralizes in this admirable way:

There is a phrase which has grown so common in the world's mouth that it has come to seem to have sense and meaning—the sense and meaning implied when it is used; that is the phrase which refers to this or that or the other nation as possibly being "capable of self-government;" and the implied sense of it is, that there has been a nation somewhere, sometime or other, which wasn't capable of it—wasn't as able to govern itself as some self-appointed specialists were or would be to govern it. The masterminds of all nations, in all ages, have sprung in affluent multitude from the mass of the nation, and from the mass of the nation only—not from its privileged classes; and so, no matter what the nation's intellectual grade was, whether high or low, the bulk of its ability was in the long ranks of its nameless and its poor, and so it never saw the day that it had not the material in abundance whereby to govern itself. Which is to assert an always self-proven fact: that even the best governed and most free and most enlightened monarchy is still behind the best condition attainable by its people; and that the same is true of kindred governments of lower grades, all the way down to the lowest.

Neither is it an answer to the objection to American imperial colonization to cite American precedents in its favor. As we have already said, they prove nothing at the worst but that we have been at times indifferent to our ideals. Their best use is to show, by those we have set aside, how far we have advanced toward our ideals.

It is not now with us a question of indifferently allowing old national customs or laws to prevail against our

national ideals, nor even of clinging stubbornly to those questions. We are proceeding with knowledge, with deliberation, with intention, to set up a new policy which is confessedly hostile; and in doing so we seek justification not in an attempt to elevate the policy to the level of the ideals, but in an attempt to pull down the ideals to the level of the policy.

It is true that heretofore we have permitted government by consent of only some of the governed, while asserting the broad principle of government by consent of all the governed. But we are now about to amend the principle itself, and establish government by consent of some of the governed as the American ideal. This is also the Russian ideal.

We cannot make that decision under existing circumstances without going backward in the path of democracy. With a nation, as with an individual, it were better that it have no ideals than that having them it should deliberately cast them aside. Let us in this crisis but choose to substitute the Russian ideal of government for the American, and we shall not be long in descending to the Russian mode. It is not only the liberties of our "subjects" that are at stake; the liberties of our citizens also hang in the balance.

But if we decide for our ideals instead of against them, if at this crisis we determine to be true to the principle of self-government, we may then be grateful for the temptation which will have made it possible for us to become stronger in our love of liberty and to draw closer to our national ideals. For we may be sure that even in so far as by disregarding the liberties of others we imperil our own, we shall by recognizing theirs make ours more secure and perfect.

## NEWS

Most important among the events of the week was the passage by the United States senate, on the 21st, of the Morgan bill for the construction of the Nicaragua canal. This bill is in the form of an amendment to the act of congress approved February 20, 1889, entitled "An Act to incorporate the Maritime Canal Company

of Nicaragua;" and it provides for the immediate construction of a ship canal across Nicaragua.

The passage of the Nicaragua canal bill by the senate appears to be the beginning of the end of a series of events which connects the problems of the present with those of the time of Columbus. It is matter of school-boy knowledge that when Columbus discovered the American continent he was in search of a passage westward to Asia; and that navigators who succeeded him sought diligently for a natural waterway through the continent. When it had been demonstrated that there was none, propositions were made to pierce the isthmus of Panama with a canal. These propositions are traced back as far as 1513. In 1550 four different routes were suggested, one being across the Isthmus of Panama and another across Nicaragua. The second was recommended as most practicable. An actual attempt was made late in the seventeenth century by an English company to cut through the Isthmus of Panama, but Spain interfered; and for one cause or another all the plans proposed prior to the present century were dropped.

The subject was revived in 1827 by Simon Bolivar, president of New Granada, now the United States of Colombia; and in 1838 New Granada gave a concession to a French company to cut a canal through the Isthmus of Panama. That company did nothing more than to make a survey; but at the time of the gold excitement in California a company under the leadership of Gen. Aspinwall built a railroad across the isthmus along the line of a canal survey that had been made under the auspices of President Bolivar. In the early '80s the United States of Colombia granted another concession for a canal across the isthmus—this time to a French company under the management of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the father of the Suez canal. Work was begun, but was soon suspended. It was out of this enterprise that the French Panama scandals grew. The United States had opposed this enterprise as calculated to infringe upon the Monroe doctrine by giving control of the waterway to France, and that had caused the French government to withdraw its aid. The company was reorganized, however, and it now claims to own valuable concessions and property, with a half-finished canal.