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With the close of the war the United States is to be congratulated, not upon good department service nor good generalship, for it had the benefit of neither, but upon its good luck. Its naval engagements were brilliant and decisive, and the courage of its soldiers was proved beyond cavil; but that would have gone for nothing had not the best of luck redeemed the worst of army management. The Cuban campaign was a series of blunders, or worse than blunders, from the start.

Instead of placing the management of all the campaigns under the commanding general, whose experience, studies, observation and position were calculated to qualify him especially for such a responsibility, the administration ignored him, and virtually gave the conduct of the war to Secretary Alger, who—but as Kipling says, that's another story. The Cuban campaign was planned and directed over the head of Gen. Miles. When he went to Tampa he was promptly and peremptorily recalled; and when later he went to Santiago it was only to prepare for his Puerto Rican expedition—a campaign "on the side." Instead of being held to the responsibility of directing the land campaigns of the war, he was given charge of a minor expedition, while Secretary Alger directed the war and Secretary Alger's particular Michigan chum, a subordinate officer, was given command of the principal expedition. It was deemed bad politics to allow Gen. Miles to administer his own military office, lest he might distinguish him-

self and politically extinguish McKinley.

The declaration of war was followed also by the wholesale appointment of more or less incompetent civilians to important military office. Many were appointed because they were sons or nephews of distinguished men, others because they were able to pull political strings that reached into the white house, and some because they were millionaires. The number of appointments for competency could be enumerated without excessive weariness. The comfort, the health, even the lives of the troops, and the success of the cause, were secondary to the "claims" upon the administration for unearned military commissions. So anxious was the president to serve his senatorial friends in this matter, that when he learned of the enlistment as a private of a son of Senator Elkins, he hastened to assure that exceptionally patriotic scion of American nobility that he would "take care of him."

For a rendezvous, one of the worst places in all the United States was selected, without any other reason, so far as has yet been learned, than that its owner and the owner of the street car and railroad lines in the neighborhood, was another chum to the secretary of war. Here the troops were corralled for weeks, while the Spaniards leisurely fortified Havana and made almost impregnable that vital point of attack which, so Gen. Lee had asserted, could have been taken in five days.

But it is urged that our troops were not equipped. That may easily be believed. The administration was too busy considering the effect of the war upon the next elections to set about procuring equipment. When the fact

appears, as it recently has appeared, that equipment in some most important particulars was not even ordered until two weeks after the war began, it is easy to understand that troops could not have been moved promptly against Havana, for lack of equipment. But the very lack of equipment is only further proof of mismanagement.

At last, however, two months after the declaration of war, our troops, still badly equipped, landed upon Cuban soil. Here the good luck of the United States began to redeem the bad management from which it suffered. Had the Spanish met their enemy at the landing in force, no landing could have been made; and had the Cubans been as useless as they have since been described to be, no landing could have been made except with great loss of life. But thanks to Spanish generalship and Cuban fidelity, a bloodless landing was effected.

Similar good luck attended our advance toward Santiago. Instead of utilizing the strong positions near the coast, and compelling the Americans to assault one after another the lines of natural defenses, which would have exhausted them, the Spanish retired toward Santiago, making their only stand at the last natural defense. When the Americans had taken that, a bold dash would have driven them back and enabled the Spanish to pluck victory from defeat; but that dash was not made. The good luck of the United States secured to Shafter's troops the position they had so desperately won.

This was followed by another piece of good luck, most extraordinary good luck. When the Americans, nominally victors but really in an embarrassing position, were hesitating between

an assault upon Santiago which would have cost thousands of lives, and a retreat that would have cost them the prestige of victory and have prolonged the war indefinitely, Cervera's fleet abandoned Santiago to her fate and rushed upon its own. But for that fateful proceeding our departure from Cuba might have been humiliating.

Disease had already crept in among the American troops. Weakened by hardship and continued exposure, pitiful victims of gross mismanagement in connection with medical supplies, Shafter's army was fast becoming a corps of invalids. It is now evident that its condition was such that it could no more have taken Santiago by storm than it could have taken Gibraltar. But, luckily again, if Shafter's army was about to succumb to sickness, the Spanish army was in danger of starvation. Spanish starvation won the day for us. To escape it, Gen. Toral meekly surrendered.

We were now in possession of a city which was of not the slightest use to us. In the ordinary course of events, luck eliminated, it had not been worth the taking. If the war had continued it would have become a burden. But the luck which took Cervera out of the harbor struck us a second time. The destruction of his ships by our navy forced Spain to sue for peace. Had her plea for peace been delayed a little longer, Spain would have discovered the demoralized condition of our troops in Cuba, and might have tuned her plea accordingly. But she had committed herself before the world knew that our army of occupation must be hustled away in transports to escape the pestilence. Such luck as we have had is unprecedented in military history.

But the luck was only national. It could not come personally to the victims of the bad management which for the nation it had offset. They have sickened and many of them have died, because, as Dr. Senn, Chicago's famous surgeon, charges,

"the precautions outlined by Col. Greenleaf, chief surgeon of the army in the field, were entirely ignored by the commander of the invading force" — Secretary Alger's protege. Not only did the commander ignore precautions, but, according to Dr. Senn, he seems also to have refused his cooperation in stamping out disease. On this point Dr. Senn says:

Major La Garde applied to General Shafter for a detail of a company of infantry to aid him in fighting the disease. His request was promptly denied under the pretense that all of the troops available were needed more at the front than in the rear. This action left the major powerless in checking the extension of the disease. Fortunately Maj. Gen. Miles arrived in the nick of time, and with him Colonel Greenleaf, chief surgeon of the army in the field. Col. Greenleaf made the same request of General Shafter for troops to aid him in gaining control over the disease, but it was ignored as peremptorily as that of Major La Garde. He now turned to General Miles, who placed at his disposal not only a battalion, but a whole regiment of colored troops.

Dr. Senn's complaints of dereliction against Gen. Shafter are confirmed by Assistant Surgeon Munson in an official report to Surgeon-General Sternberg. Medical supplies were sent in sufficient quantity from Tampa, says Dr. Munson, but were not unloaded at Baiquiri. They were carried out to sea on the transports after the troops had debarked. The utter lack of medical supplies thus occasioned was reported to Shafter by the chief surgeon, who requested the assignment of a launch to the medical department to be used in fetching supplies from the transports. But, in Dr. Munson's language, "The exigency of the situation did not apparently appeal to the commanding general, and for two days the medical department was unable to get transportation of any kind to the other ships or to the shore, although there were a large number of naval launches and boats engaged on various other duties." As a result no medical supplies were landed until after the first fighting occurred, at which time, says Dr. Munson, "there were absolutely no dressings, hospital tentage, or supplies

of any kind on shore within reach of the surgeons already landed."

The indifference thus manifested to the comfort, health and life of the American troops continued, exhibiting itself in various ways, until the subordinate generals, encouraged by the temerity of the dauntless Roosevelt, signed an open letter of protest. The situation was not at all misrepresented by the London Times when it said, editorially: "There undoubtedly has been most serious mismanagement in connection with the Santiago forces, and had not public opinion intervened upon the manifesto of the generals, it is not improbable that the war office would have gone on covering up its own mistakes until the Santiago force had succumbed entirely to disease and privation."

For his part in the protest against further subjecting the Santiago troops to the perils of yellow fever, Roosevelt was quickly punished. On the 23d of July he had written a private letter to Secretary Alger begging him to send the Santiago cavalry division to Puerto Rico, and at the close of it had argued that the 4,000 men of the cavalry division who could be landed in Puerto Rico "would be worth, easily, any 10,000 national guards armed with black powder, Springfields, or other archaic weapons." The sting in the tail of that letter was indirectly intended for the department, but Alger cunningly assumed that it was for the national guards. So on the 4th day of August, 12 days after Roosevelt's letter, Alger replied by cable, giving out both the letter and his reply for publication, and in the reply warned Roosevelt against making invidious comparisons. "The rough riders," he said, "are no better than other volunteers; they had an advantage in their arms, for which they ought to be very grateful." This was a neat backhanded blow at Roosevelt: as a candidate for governor of New York. His invidious comparison of the rough riders with the national guards would

be a good weapon against him at the convention in the hands of the party bosses. But an inquiry or two naturally arises. Why did the rough riders have an advantage over the national guards in their arms? and why should they be very grateful for it? Did Providence give them this advantage? or was it the war department? And if it was the war department, would it not be more in order for the national guards to be very indignant than for the rough riders to be very grateful?

In fact, the weakness of the national guard, from its archaic weapons, is another of the blunders or worse than blunders in the long series with which Alger is chargeable. Smokeless powder and its advantages in warfare have long been understood. Yet the department sent troops into battle with old-fashioned powder which disclosed their position to the enemy's marksmanship whenever they fired a gun. And not only that, but within the present week Alger has exposed his incapacity by announcing that "now that it has been discovered" that smokeless powder is the best, orders have been given to furnish the soldiers with it. "Now that it has been discovered"!

The blame for all this mismanagement is concentrating upon the devoted head of Secretary Alger. And justly so. He is responsible even for Shafter's follies, for Shafter is his favorite who was lifted bodily over the head of Miles. But who is responsible for Alger? How came he to be in place to divest our victories of so much glory? Had he, like Miles, won his way by exhibitions of merit to the place he holds? Not at all. In the civil war he wore the shoulder straps of a general; but his name long remained upon the war records as a deserter. He became exceedingly wealthy; but he did it by grabbing timber lands. Every dollar of his millions represents somebody else's sweat; not his own. And he won his place in the cabinet by contributing

magnificently to Mark Hanna's corruption fund.

The same moneyed classes whose contributions made up Hanna's corruption fund are now seeking to avail themselves of the good luck which, in spite of bad management, has brought the war to a favorable close, by fostering a policy which they fondly hope will bring good luck to themselves. To borrow from an old political cry, they are hell-bent for imperialism. Their sentiment is fairly expressed by a newspaper correspondent who sympathizes with them. He describes this class in New York as having come to feel that "we are spending an enormous amount of money and sacrificing many precious lives in the war, and that we should have some more substantial compensation than the consciousness of right!" The idea couldn't have been more pointedly put if the correspondent had intended, as he certainly did not, to bring it into contempt. We should have more substantial compensation than the consciousness of right! And what is it that these people propose? Have they any intention of supplementing the consciousness of right with substantial compensation? Not at all. They propose substantial compensation as a substitute for consciousness of right. For what they brazenly aim to do is to secure, in the language of the same correspondent, "the immediate annexation of Cuba without regard to the declaration of the president and congress." In other words, to obtain substantial compensation, we are to repudiate our solemn pledge. In the estimation of some people, possibly, that may be done without sacrificing consciousness of right; but they are moral paralytics.

The chief impulse behind this disposition to go back on our pledges and annex conquered territory is monopolistic. A corporation has been organized in New Jersey, for instance, for the development of Cuba. It proposes undertaking the improvement

and sale of lands, the cultivation of stock farms, plantations and ranches, the construction and operation of railroads, water works and electric light plants, and the ownership and operation of mines. This corporation is typical. And we of the United States know the functions of such corporations. They do the land grabbing and owning; poorly-paid employes are to do the working and operating.

There is, however, an honest but misguided species of patriotism, which also yearns for territorial expansion, even at the expense of violated national pledges. This is the "business" man's patriotism. What he wants is more markets, to which American goods may be carried for sale. He is oblivious to the fact that within our own country there is a vastly larger market than all the territory we could possibly grab can offer. Every hungry, ragged, homeless man, and every man who is hungry, ragged or homeless in any degree, is a possible new customer for American products. All he needs is a chance to work, or a chance to work for better wages, and he will buy. Why not give, then, to this large and growing class, the working chance they need, and thus open a vast and never-failing market for American products? That is the door we need to open. That is the commercial invasion we need to make.

Is it said that we must have new land upon which our capital may employ itself in order to give employment to our people? We already have the land—better land than there is in Cuba, Puerto Rico or the Philippines—land that is still virgin. It is a mistake to suppose that American land is all occupied. Most of it has been appropriated, but only a little is occupied. We refer not alone to the unplowed acres of our prairies, but also to the monopolized mines of our hills and the vacant lots of our cities. Here is abundant territory—territory that would be most inviting to capital and more responsive to

labor's demands for employment than the coveted islands of the West Indies and the Pacific. But the policy of the "closed door" is now applied to that territory by land monopolists. Let us open the door. If we neglect to do that, what reason have we to believe that in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the "closed door" policy will not be as effectually maintained by land monopolists as it is already here?

In this connection, it is interesting to note the ease with which monopoly newspapers glide from accounts of American capital seeking vainly for profitable enjoyment and therefore yearning for territorial expansion, to assurances that we are living in a period of marvelous prosperity. Why should capital seek so vainly for profitable employment in a period of prosperity? Here is a contradiction which should put any sensible man instantly upon his guard against the prosperity touters. If capital cannot find profitable investments—and the fact that it pours into the treasury to purchase three-per-cent. bonds is conclusive evidence that it cannot—it must be true, as workingmen insist, that labor cannot find profitable employment. For capital—real capital, not monopoly values—works together with labor. When capital is employed, labor is employed; when interest is good, wages are good; when interest is low, wages are low; when capital is redundant, labor is out of employment. And that labor is now in bad condition, just as capital is, all intelligent observers know, and all the honest ones admit.

If direct proof of the bad condition of labor were required, we need only point to the strike still in progress in Cleveland. The men on strike there have had their wages reduced twice since the presidential election, until at the time when the strike began their wages were 50 per cent. less than when the men were marching through the streets of Cleveland bearing the banners of "the advance agent

of prosperity." Though organs of speculation are full of assurances that we have tumbled into the butter tub of prosperity, the fact remains that opportunities for profitable employment of labor, like opportunities for profitable investments of capital, are as restricted as ever, and that wages of labor, like interest on capital, are still declining.

Since Aguinaldo does not lend himself to the designs of American imperialists, he has lost prestige with them, and from a great military leader has become a savage chief. But Aguinaldo is no fool. Doubtless he has heard of the way in which we are treating the Cuban republic, so he declines to throw himself unreservedly into the arms of Gen. Merritt as the confiding Garcia did into the arms of Shafter. Why should he outline his policy, Aguinaldo asks, when America will not be frank with him. And then with penetrating pointedness he asks: "Am I fighting for annexation, protection or independence?" We are glad that Aguinaldo has asked that question, and hope he may get an answer. Should he get one, the American people would welcome his confidence. They too would like to know whether the Philippines are to be annexed, protected, or freed.

We should like to see some of the papers of the New York Nation type draw a moral for home consumption from Gen. Wood's order compelling the Santiago merchants to reduce the price of their goods. Gymnastics would hardly describe the liveliness of the performance. For on the one hand these papers are violently and democratically opposed to governmental dictation in private business, while on the other they incline with autocratic bent to military rule. Of course they might object to military rule with reference to prices; but if that kind of rule works well in that respect in Santiago, why would it not work well also in New York? At any rate, is its successful operation in Santiago not as good an

argument for autocratic control of prices everywhere and at all times, as other successful experiments in military rule are for their general adoption. If, when popular government seems to fail in some particular we may urge a military or other autocratic substitute and draw arguments from the experience of Santiago, why not fall back upon the Santiago regime when prices rise too high or fall too low? It would be a simple reform, at least. What trouble and disorder it might save, for example, in cases of strikes. The military commandant would have only to satisfy himself that the strikers were asking too much, and then order them at the point of the bayonet to go back to work at the old wages, or at the cut wages, as the case might be. The great advantage of autocratic over popular government is its directness, its effectiveness, and withal, its extreme simplicity. And when very strong, it is also very stable.

Some light is thrown upon the value of a city franchise, by a recent mortgage transaction in Chicago. The Commonwealth Electric Light Company, with hardly any property except its franchise, has floated a mortgage for the neat amount of \$2,500,000 at 5 per cent. Nearly all of that sum was put into the company's treasury by the board of aldermen which voted the franchise. Is it any wonder that aldermen are thought to be corrupt, or that corporation mongers object to abolishing private ownership of franchises?

The real estate assessment of 1898, for the entire city of Chicago—land, buildings and all—is only \$140,246,107. If the business section alone were destroyed by fire, the smouldering site of that very small portion of Chicago real estate, would be worth more than that assessment.

One plank in the populist platform of Cook Co., Ill., indicates that some populists are drifting toward the advocacy of an effective reform. It demands, to use its own language,