battle has not taken place, nor is it likely to. Gen. Miles's strategy contemplates a flanking movement. Part of his force is to pass Aibonito to the east and part to the west, abandoning the military road and thus avoiding the disadvantage of meeting the enemy on that road near Aibonito. Pursuant to this plan the town of Guayama, far to the east of Ponce, and about six miles inland from Arroyo, was captured on the 5th by the troops under Gen. Brooke. Four Americans were wounded in the action, but none were killed. From Guavama, Gen. Brooke was to advance to Cayey, which lies to the east of the military road not far from Aibonito, and thence north to the military road beyond the Spanish defenses at Aibonito, his objective being San Juan. Gen. Wilson, commanding the center, was to go through Coamo along the military road nearly to Aibonito and then diverging to the east to join Gen. Brooke at Cayey, and proceed with him to San Juan. On the left, Gen. Henry was to march due north from Ponce on the south coast, to Arecibo on the north coast, a point more than 30 miles west of San Juan; while Gen. Swan, marching from Ponce westward along the southern, and then north along the western coast, through Guayanilla, Yauco, Mayaguez and Aguadilla, was to turn eastward from the latter place and join Gen. Henry at Arecibo. This plan seems to have been conceived after the method of an Australian rabbit hunt, in which the hunters move in a wide but ever narrowing crescent until they corral their game. San Juan is in this case the corral, and the Spanish garrisons throughout the island the game.

Upon the plan outlined above, the entire American army in Puerto Rico, 14,000 men, began to move on the 7th. The advance was slow, it being Gen. Miles's purpose to avoid fighting on the way if possible. Coamo was taken early on the 9th, by the centre, under Gen. Wilson, after a fight lasting 30 minutes, in which the American loss was six wounded. The Spanish lost their commander—a major—along with two captains and nine privates, all killed, and 35 wounded. Spanish prisoners taken numbered The right column, under 180. Gen. Brooke, encountered an ambuscade five miles beyond Guayama, which involved and came force; but the Spanish were driven off with a dynamite gun, and the American loss was confined to five wounded. At last reports all the American troops were in motion, in the four columns contemplated by the plan described above.

And now the Philippines have furnished a scene of battle between American and Spanish troops. News of this event did not reach the United States until the 9th, though the battle began on the 31st of July. American troops were entrenched west of old Manila, which lies on the west bank of the Pasig river. The entrenchments extended north and south, at right angles to Manila bay, the left flank of the troops resting upon the bay, the right flank being covered by insurgent troops. Gen. Francis V. Greene, formerly of the 71st New York, was in command. On the 31st, Sunday, the insurgent left flank had withdrawn, the day being a feast day which the natives are accustomed to observe. This exposed the American right flank, and during the middle of the night, while a tropical storm was raging, wind sweeping the camp and rain falling in torrents, 3,000 Spaniards attacked the exposed American flank. They drove in the pickets easily, but were met by the 10th Pennsylvania, which checked them with three volleys. Still, in overwhelming numbers, they were almost into the American trenches, when the 1st California, part of the 3d artillery, armed with rifles, and the Utah battery came up to the support of the Pennsylvanians. The Spanish were then driven back in disorder. On the following night, August 1st, they renewed the attack, but at long range with heavy artillery, which was silenced by the Utah battery. On the 2d, just before midnight a third attack was made, again without success. The American loss was in killed 13, in seriously wounded 10, and in slightly wounded 38. The Spanish lost 350 killed and 900 wounded.

Reflections upon the good faith to the Americans of Aguinaldo, president of the Philippine republic, has drawn from him a letter in reply to the United States consul general at Hongkong, Mr. Wildman, who had brought the subject to Aguinaldo's attention. In this letter, which bears date July 30, Aguinaldo says:

I have read that I am getting the

ised you. In reply I ask, why should America expect me to outline my policy, present and future, and fight blindly for her interests, when America will not be frank with me? Tell me this: Am I fighting for annexation, protection or independence? It is for America to say, not me. I can take Manila, as I have defeated the Spanish everywhere, but what would be the use? If America takes Manila I can save my men and arms for what the future has in store for me. Now, good friend, believe me, I am not both fool and rogue. The interests of my people are as sacred to me as are the interests of your people to you.

Mr. Wildman has answered Aguinaldo as follows:

Trust to the honor and justice of the United States and let nothing interfere with the first task of throwing off the Spanish yoke. I believe in you. Do not disappoint me.

In Cuba the war has, indeed, practically ceased, with the Americans holding all they have conquered. This is exceedingly fortunate, for the health of the American troops is such that it has become necessary to hurry Though it had been them home. known that our troops were suffering from sickness, the seriousness of the danger was not appreciated until the 5th. Then the country was shocked by the publication of a letter from Col. Roosevelt to Gen. Shafter, and of another to him from all the general officers at Santiago. The letters were given to the Associated press for publication, by Gen. Shafter himself. They showed the army to be in immediate danger of destruction by disease.

Col. Roosevelt's letter represented that while yellow fever cases were as yet few, the whole command was so weakened and shattered by malarial fever as "to be ripe for dying like rotten sheep" when the yellow fever epidemic should come. He added that if the army were kept there it was the estimate of the surgeons that over half would die. The other letter, which was signed by Gens. Kent, Bates, Chaffee, Summer, Ludlow, Ames and Wood, and by Col. Roosevelt, declared it to be the unanimous opinion of the signers that the army should be at once taken out of the Island of Cuba and sent to a northern sea coast; and represented that owing to malarial fever the efficiency of the army was already destroyed, and that the army was in a condition "to be practically destroyed by an epidemic of yellow fever," which was "sure to near destroying a reconnoitering | "big head" and not behaving as I prom- | come in the near future." The letter

