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When hostilities between this country and Spain broke out, there was a reasonable fear they would not end until all the great nations of the world were at war. It may have been in some sense an explanation of this that lead Spain on to the last ditch. Certain it is that she relied more upon the possibilities of European diplomacy, and of interference in her behalf by continental powers, though that would have involved counter-interference by Great Britain and consequently 'a world's war, than she did upon the strength of her own arms, or the weakness of ours. Fortunately, so terrible a calamity as universal war has for the present been avoided, but the prospects of universal peace are not encouraging. The ink is hardly dry upon the protocol which stops our conflict with Spain, when England begins to show signs of preparation for war with Russia.

Should England go to war with Russia, we of this country could in all sincerity reciprocate the sympathy we have just received from her, for she would be fighting for freedom. While it is true that the surface cause of her war would be Russian interference with British investments in a Chinese grant of railway monopoly, yet honorable causes lie deeper down. Russia is making encroachments upon the English policy of the "open door" in China—free trade there for all nations; and her action with reference to the railroad grant in immediate question is a culmination to those encroachments. The Russian policy is inimical to freedom; for commerce is so interwoven with free-

dom that freedom is menaced when commerce is obstructed. What gives to questions of commercial right a sordid tinge, is the fact that commercial benefits are so largely monopolized by means of grants to favored individuals. But for that, we should more clearly see that in resisting Russian aggression England stands for the American principle of liberty and equality. For that principle we should fight, and our sympathies cannot but go out to England when she fights for it, even though on the surface the war should be in the interest of monopoly investments.

It will be observed that the protocol under which hostilities between Spain and the United States are suspended pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, makes no mention of the Spanish debt for which Cuba is mortgaged. Spain naturally wishes the United States to assume it. So do the bondholders. And in the course of the negotiations for peace this was proposed. The United States refused, however, to consider the matter in connection with the protocol, insisting upon unconditional relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. But there is no doubt that the peace commissioners might take Spain's wishes and those of her bondholders into consideration in framing the treaty. While Spain must relinquish Cuba whether we agree to provide for the debt or not, the treaty may nevertheless provide for it, if our peace commissioners, our president and our senate should so decide. That Spain is relying upon some such possibility is evident; and if her bondholders do not lobby for it till they are blue in the face, they are an entirely unique species of the bondholding genus. The fact that the Spanish Cuban bonds hold their own in the Paris market, is very significant of

the purposes and expectations of the fraternity of government note-shavers. It is within the possibilities, therefore, that in some shape the people of this country will have to think over the justice of protecting the owners of the Spanish bonds for which Cuba has been pawned. It is even more than a possibility. A prominent liberal statesman of Spain, an ex-minister, makes this statement:

I have reason for thinking that our government has received positive information of an unofficial assurance that the American government will do something for the Cuban debt. You know the Americans are practical people. Still, Spanish and foreign bankers, especially French, German and Belgian, have induced some powerful American speculators and financiers to buy Cuban stock with a view to creating a syndicate in New York that will oblige McKinley to listen to their arguments.

The question of making the Cuban debt good by the treaty of peace admits of but one answer. It must not be done. The people of the United States are, of course, under no possible obligations in justice to help either Spain or the bondholders. There was no privity between us and them in the issuing of the bonds. On the contrary the bonds were issued chiefly to pay the expenses of keeping up a bloody fracas near our front door. And no privity could be charged to us in consequence of our having beaten Spain in war and as a condition of peace forced her to get out of the neighborhood. If Spain had mortgaged the Caribbean sea, or the proceeds of a system of piracy which she carried on there, it would hardly be pretended that we incurred any liability for the mortgage by sending our battleships and driving her and her piratical system away. Why does not the same principle apply to a mortgaged system of piracy carried on upon an island in the Caribbean?

The liability of the Cubans is no greater than our own. To impose the burden of these bonds upon Cuba would be like charging a murdered man's estate for the weapon with which he was put out of the way. And when we get to the bottom of the matter, the people of Spain ought not to pay the bonds either. The bonds were never issued for their good, nor did they ever receive any benefit from the proceeds, as the bondholders well know. So far from being evidence of a nation's faith, these bonds are evidence of corrupt agreements between government note-shavers and a rascally government, and from any point of view their repudiation would be entirely just. It is not likely that any Spanish government will have the boldness and honesty to repudiate them, but if that were done it would clear the money-lending atmosphere immensely. No one thing could give a more healthy tone to political conditions generally, than an honest repudiation of one of the great fraudulent public debts of the world. It would be a new and wholesome interpretation to that eminently just maxim, "let the buyer beware."

Tammany Hall has spoken on the subject of territorial expansion, in characteristic fashion. Her mouth-piece is the redoubtable Richard Croker himself. "I do not believe"—says Mr. Croker in an interview given out for publication from Saratoga on the 12th of August—"I do not believe in giving up anything we have gained by this war; on the contrary, I believe in holding on to all we have gained, and reaching out for more."

Mr. Croker's utterance is full of native candor. Being the boss of Tammany Hall and speaking for that organization, he can afford to be candid, boldly and cheerfully so; for Tammany Hall indulges not in sentiment, nor tolerates it as a social or political element. There is no necessity. In politics for "what there is in it," Tammany men are undisturbed by moral considerations or political

principles of the higher grade. The moral considerations that weigh in the precincts of Tammany would never win prizes at Sunday school; the political principles which pass current there never rise above the rules of the game. And whether from indifference or policy, Tammany scorns to indulge in the homage which well-mannered vice is supposed to pay to virtue. She is no hypocrite. From long experience in holding on to all the plunder they gain and then reaching out for more, Tammany men have come to regard that as a principle of human conduct as just and honorable as it is wise and profitable. It is no reflection, therefore, upon Tammany patriotism, if they recommend the same principle to the United States. If expansion of territory is to be desired, nothing could be more natural to either Tammany or its boss than gravely to propose as he has done that we hold on to all we have gained by the war, and reach out for more.

The only difference, unfortunately, between Tammany and the rest of the expansionists is in Tammany's candor. While Tammany, wishing to grab, plainly says so, the others give their predatory propositions nice names and bury the larcenous intent in pretty phrases. The purpose of all, however, is the same and unmistakable. Gen. Gomez understood it from the beginning. When at the outbreak of the war—the story is upon the authority of E. Hernandez, one of his close friends, who recently made it public through a Chicago interview—when at the outbreak of the war, his attention was called to the disclaimer on the part of the United States of all intention to acquire territory, Gomez "would only shake his head and say that whatever America's present intention might be, there could only be one end to the matter, with American troops and generals conducting the campaign, and that was the complete ascendancy of American rule." Gomez was right in his fears. Unless the American people denounce the policy, we shall, in Croker's plain

language, hold fast to all we get, and reach out for more. This policy contemplates the appropriation of Cuba.

Since a positive pledge stands in the way of reaching out boldly for Cuba—Tammany fashion, Croker fashion, highwayman fashion—as we are reaching out for Puerto Rico, we are under the necessity of reaching out for it sneak-thief fashion. John Morley explains the method in his account of the "forward" rake's progress. He is describing the British method, but that is the method we are preparing to imitate. Mr. Morley says:

First, you push on into territories where you have no business to be, and, in our case, where you had promised you would not go; secondly, your intrusion provokes resentment, and in these wild countries resentment means resistance; thirdly, you instantly cry out that the people are rebellious and that their act is rebellion, this in spite of your own assurance that you have no intention of setting up a permanent sovereignty over them; fourthly, you send a force to stamp out the rebellion; and fifthly, having spread bloodshed, confusion and anarchy, you declare, with hands uplifted to the heavens, that moral reasons force you to stay, for if you were to leave, this territory would be left in a condition which no civilized Power could contemplate with equanimity or with composure. These are the five stages of the Forward Rake's Progress.

That is a fairly good outline of the plan which American Tories, less blunt than Croker, are inculcating with reference to Cuba. If not exact it is at least suggestive. First, we are to establish a military government in Cuba, where we have no business except to turn over the relinquished island to the Cuban republic, which our congress has distinctly recognized. Then, when our unwarranted military dominion excites resentment of some sort, we are to find it necessary to remain in control for the sake of "stability." Finally, we are to see our way, as a necessity, of staying permanently; and thus for moral reasons—reasons that would make Croker impatient, but which are nevertheless intended adroitly to justify his all too bluntly expressed purpose—we are to