

A N
E N Q U I R Y
I N T O T H E
N A T U R A L S T A T E
O F
M A N .

By WILLIAM THOMPSON, D. D.

Nunc parvulos nobis (*natura*) dedit igniculos, quos celeritur malis moribus opinionibusque depravati sic restringimus, ut nusquam naturæ lumen appareat — simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate et in summa opinionum perversitate versamur. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

Sunt philosophi et fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procurationem Deos — atque haud scio, an pietate adversus deos sublatâ, fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, justitia tollatur. *Cic. de nat. Deor.*

Lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. *de legib. lib. ii.*

Nescio quomodo, dum lego, assentior; cum posui librum, et mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum capere cogitare, assentio omnis illa elabitur. *Cic. Tusc. Quæst.*

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Printed by M. RHAMES, at *Tillotson's-Head* in
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To the Reverend the
P R O V O S T
A N D
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O F

TRINITY-COLLEGE,

The Following

E N Q U I R Y

Is Humbly Inscribed by the AUTHOR,
in Testimony of his Regard for so

LEARNED and USEFUL a

B O D Y.

357/16

To the Reverend

PROVOST



FELWS

OF

TRINITY-COLLEGE

The Bolognian

ENQUIRY

Is Humboldt's list of the Animals
in Testimony of his Regard for the

Learned University

BODY.



Gentlemen,

AS there is not any Thing more
suitable to the true Original
Frame of the Human Mind,
than a Sense of Religion, and the
Love of Truth, so nothing can be
conceived of greater Moment to the
Happiness of Mankind; GOD, in
the Wisdom of his Providence, hav-
ing so blended and tempered the
Natures of Things, that the strongest
a Inclina-

Inclinations, and trueſt Interests of his rational Creatures, must run, when not diverted from their proper Course, in the same Channel, inſomuch that they cannot be miserable, in any Part of their Existence, without acting in direct Opposition to the most radical inherent Propensions of ingenuous Nature :

BUT however strongly such Propensions may operate, when excited to Action by Application of proper Means of Culture, they exert themselves but very feebly, in their Natural unaided State, toward the Attainment of the Ends, for which they were originally planted in Human Nature, which Consideration hath moved all wise and good Princes, as well as generous and well-disposed Men,

Men, who were warmed with any Degree of Zeal for the true Welfare of their Country, to the founding of Schools and Colleges, as the fittest and most expedient Means of cherishing these good Inclinations in Human Nature, and of drawing them forth into Use for the Benefit of Mankind :

THAT Colleges are admirably fitted to answer these Ends, and, in Consequence, to derive on any People the greatest and most diffusive Blessings, must readily be granted, whether we consider them, as Nurseries of Religion, or Seminaries of Learning :

THE Human Mind is naturally either void of all Impressions, or furnished at best with a very slender Stock of Notions ; but how rude and imperfect such Notions are, and how slow a Progress the Mind makes in acquiring any clear and distinct Conceptions of Things, when left to subsist on the Fund of its own Strength, without the Culture of Discipline and Erudition, hath been the Experience and Complaint of Mankind in all Ages :

AND, as the Mind of MAN is naturally very ignorant, it is also naturally very prone to Vice, for besides the Vices, which flow from the Ignorance, Mistake, and Prejudice, which inseparably cleave to rude uncultivated Minds, we all know,
that

that there is in every Man naturally a Principle of Vice more or less disposing him to Evil: That this Principle, when left to it self, will pass into Action, and, if not hindered in its Operations, must produce vicious Habits: That such Habits are the direct and immediate Causes, which disturb and afflict Mankind: And that the Operations and Influences of this evil Principle can be restrained only by Discipline, and the Infusion of certain Powers and Habits into the Soul, which are able to give a different Bent to the Will and Affections, by convincing the Understanding that the Practice of Virtue is preferable to that of Vice, and, that there is a real Happiness, as well as Honesty, in the One, and a real

a real Misery, as well as Turpitude, in the Other.

Now what can be conceived of greater Force and Efficacy to remove the Vice and Ignorance, which inseparably cleave to the Mind of Man in his rude uncultivated State, than a liberal Education ? For is it not the peculiar Business of such an Education to form the Mind to Religion and Truth ? To give it clear and distinct Apprehensions of the Natures and Habitues of Things ? To trace the essential Differences of Moral Good and Evil ? And to train the Soul to a due Sense of the Dignity of its Nature, and the Great and Noble Ends, for which it was created ? Good Dispositions, when planted early in the Mind, a Soil, though naturally barren,

barren, yet capable of vast Improvement by proper Culture, shoot forth and ripen into Habits of Knowledge and Virtue, till they become the leading Principles of Human Actions :

IN Consequence of many Blessings, of great Moment to the Happiness of Mankind, which Naturally spring from the Culture of Human Reason, the Inventors and Promoters of Arts and Sciences, together with all Founders of wise Laws and useful Institutions, have justly met with the greatest Esteem and Veneration in all Ages : From the Wisdom of such Men sprung all the Grandeur of Athens, of Sparta, and Rome, once so famous for Arts and Arms ; and if we trace the Beginnings, Establishments,

ments, and Ruins of States and Empires, we shall find them every where rising or falling, flourishing or decaying, in Proportion as Arts and Sciences were more or less cultivated, and drawn forth into common Life for the Interest of the Public Weal.

YOUR Society, GENTLEMEN, was founded by the best and wisest QUEEN whom any Age ever produced, and your Care in training Youth to the Syllogistic Method, which, however some Men may inadvertently vary from you in Opinion, is the true Ground of solid Ratiocination : Your mixing the Study of Natural Philosophy with a previous Knowledge of Mathematic Science, without which the Former cannot subsist to any effectual Purpose : Your selecting from
ancient

ancient and modern Moralists whatever is found consistent with right Reason, and forming a complete System of ethic Precepts of eternal Truth, all tending, by a Natural kind of Efficacy, to raise Human Nature to its original Dignity and Perfection : Your Knowlege and Culture of the sacred Languages, and your diligent Care in forming the Minds of Youth to a true Sense of the Principles of the Christian Religion, by your Lectures in Divinity, and by regularly explaining to them, in your catechetical Discourses, that clear, consistent, rational Summary, which contains a complete System of the true Grounds of Natural and Revealed Religion : All these proper Means of Instruction, in the regular

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Methods

Methods wherein, GENTLEMEN, you pursue them, must, in the usual Operation and Consequence of Things, effectually answer the original Design of your Royal Foundress, and the main End, for which your Society was instituted.

As this Kingdom, in the general, is very far from being illiterate, would the Gentlemen, who have drank liberally of your Fountain of Knowledge, or indeed of any other, properly so called, attend your Examination for Fellowships, I presume, without the least Force upon the most delicate Modesty of which I have any Conception, they would unanimously concur with me in Opinion, that no Examination can be conducted with
more

more Judgment, nor sustained by Candidates with more Honour and extensive Knowledge.

BUT give me leave, GENTLEMEN, to view you in another Point of Light, which cannot fail to cast a Lustre upon your Society, and to render it still more conspicuous, and of greater Importance : I consider you as a Barrier raised by Providence, and a wise QUEEN studious of the Welfare of her People, against any Invasion which might be made on the Rights of Religion and Civil Power, by your sending great Numbers of Gentlemen, every Year, into the several Parts of the Kingdom, filled with a sincere Zeal for the true Interest of Both, and with Abilities to de-

send and support that Zeal with Strength of Reason, and Integrity of Heart: Your Sagacity, your Care, your Animadversions on the least Disposition or Tendency of Youth toward different Ends, must, in their natural Consequence, raise your Administration to very high Esteem in every Mind, which has any true Sensation of the Interest and Honour of the present happy Establishment, and the intrinsic Excellence and Merit of Religion.

You live, GENTLEMEN, under the Conduct and Inspection of a Governor, long trained to Principles of Wisdom, high in Reputation for Strength of Intellect, and a Heart flowing with Zeal for the Interest of
the

the Society, and of the Public Weal : A Prince, intimately known to Civil and Social Virtues, is your Royal Chancellor : And a KING, conscious of Military Glory, who rules his People with gentle Sway, and holds in his sacred Hand the Ballance of the Powers of Europe, is your puissant Protector, and the glorious Defender of your Rights and Privileges.

IN this happy Situation, go on, GENTLEMEN, to form the Minds of Youth to clear Apprehensions of the true Interest of that Illustrious Royal Family, under which alone these Kingdoms can continue in a State of Civil Security : Go on, at the same Time, to cultivate the only Principles,

ples, on which the Structure of Religion and Civil Power is able to subsist: Go on, by Culture and early Discipline, to train the Youth of the Nation to a due Sense of moral and religious Virtues, and of Duty and Obedience to the Best of KINGS.

WHETHER the following Dissertation hath any Tendency to strengthen the Cause of Religion and Loyalty, you, GENTLEMEN, to whom it is addressed, are the best Judges, but this I am clearly conscious of, that the Enquiry proceeded from a sincere Zeal for the real Interest of Both, being fully convinced, that when Men act under just Apprehensions of Religion and Restraints of Conscience, and believe that the Laws of their
Prince

Prince are bound upon them by the
Laws of GOD under the solemn
Sanction of Rewards and Punish-
ments, their Loyalty is founded in
the strongest Hopes and Fears, which
can be excited in Human Nature. I
am, GENTLEMEN, with Respect,

Your very obedient

and humble Servant.

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Constiution r. Constitution. p. 22. for Institution r. Institutions.
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compel to r. compel him to. 20 AU 66

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I may safely, I Presume, assert with the Schoolmen, that GOD gave to every Thing a Being: That he assigned to every Thing a Portion of Perfection, suitable to the Degree of that Being: That he endued it with an Instinct and Inclination to preserve that Perfection: And impressed on it, in its Original Formation, a Rule, or Law, directing and exciting that Inclination to pursue the End, for which it was created.

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ALL Creatures, below Man, move to their Preservation and Perfection by strong Impulse and unvaried Rule, and find a natural Happiness in the Fruition of their End, as being the only Portion, which was assigned them by their MAKER.

MAN, in the lower Part of his Nature, is as mere an Animal, as other sensible Creatures; and, therefore, in that Respect, resembles them in his Motions, Fruitions, and Ends: but, as MAN hath something in the Frame of his Being of a higher Constitution, than other Creatures, and, consequently, of higher Perfection, he doth or ought to move to an End, in in a Way, suitable to that Perfection.

As

INTRODUCTION.

As the compound Nature of Man is made up of Sensible, Rational, and Immaterial Perfections and Powers of Operation, the End or Good, which he was ordained and fitted to pursue, is various, in Proportion to the Variety of the constituent Parts, and Perfections of his Nature.

As MAN, then, in Respect of the Natural and Sensitive Part of his Constitution, is a mere Animal, he moves to a Natural and Sensible Good, as an End; but as this Good, however Natural, is only subordinate, and suitable to the Exigence of the Material Part of his Composition, he ought to pursue it, as an End, only in Proportion to its Subsistence to the Body, which ought to be preserved in Vigour and Activity, as
a 2 being,

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being, in the present Situation of the Soul, the material Instrument of its Operations,

THE Happiness, therefore, or End of MAN, cannot consist in Pleasures of Body, in Gratification of Sensual Appetite, or Opulence of Fortune, farther than the Use and Fruition of them may contribute to the true Interest of the Animal OEconomy, in Subordination to the Rational ; for, as Man is a rational Agent, an End, suitable to his Nature, is an Intellectual, real Good, proportionate to the Faculties of the Rational Soul, in which the Perfection of his Being eminently consists,

Now, as Intellect and Will are the highest Faculties of the Rational Soul,

INTRODUCTION.

Soul, and the principal Use of every Faculty is in Order to the Discovery and Pursuit of a suitable End, it is essentially necessary to the Constitution of such an End, that what is pursued by the Will, as *Good*, should also be entertained by the Intellect, as *true*, the highest Perfection of the Intellect consisting in the Discovery of the Truth and Certainty of an adequate Supreme Good, as such Discovery is the highest Act of the rational Soul.

THE Truth of this Good, whatever it may be, stands in Opposition to That, which seems to be a Good, but is so far from being so, that it is the vain Issue of false Conception, and delusive Fancy: Or, to That, which hath indeed a real Being, but
is

INTRODUCTION.

is not a real Good: Or, lastly, to That, which, though a Real Good, hath only the plausible Appearance, but not the Reality, of the Supreme Good.

THIS Good also, wherein the Happiness of Man consists, must, though Intellectual, be, notwithstanding, divided in its Nature from the Soul, for could the Soul be its own End, it would cease to move, but as it hath constant vigorous Motions to other Things, it is evident, that the Soul doth not operate in the Way of a *pure Act*, but tends to, and is receptive of Something, distinct from it Self, to which it moves, as to its End and Perfection, Nothing being an End or Supreme Good to it Self, but the First Cause, who alone is Self-sufficient.

As

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As the Soul is of an immaterial Nature, this Good, which stands divided and distinct from it, cannot be Material, Objects of Sense, with all the Pleasure and Magnificence of Felicity, which seems to attend them, being as unsuitable to satisfy and fill a Spirit with Delight, as a Spirit is to feed a Body, as bearing no Proportion or Conformity to one another, which is the Reason, why the Soul cannot make use of Material Things, conveyed through Organs of Sense, to any Intellectual Purpose, till it hath purified, refined, and abstracted them into a Kind of Spiritual Nature; and yet, after the highest Exaltation of Refinement and Purity, to which Things of this gross Consistence can possibly be raised by the utmost Energy of the most speculative

INTRODUCTION.

culative Mind, the Soul, in respect of its Natural Capacity and receptive Power, is a mere Void :

AGAIN, could a Good be conceived or imagined equal, and, in all other respects, suitable to the Perfection and Capacity of the Rational Soul, but of a temporary evanescent Nature, the Happiness of Man could not consist in the Fruition even of such a Good, partly, because the Determination of that Good would determine the Felicity of the Soul, and, partly, because the Enjoyment of a determinable Good, be it on other Accounts never so perfect, is mingled with Anxiety and Fear, which rob the Soul of true Happiness, in the very Act of Fruition :

To

INTRODUCTION.

To the Constitution, therefore, of the true End, or Happiness of Man, the Fruition of a Good is absolutely Necessary, which is equal and commensurate to the Nature, Faculties, Powers, Motion, and Duration of the Rational Soul, that is, a Good Real, Intellectual, Immaterial, and I must also add, Perpetual, and Infinite: For, though the Intellect of Man can, in no Sort of Measure, approach toward an Infinite Being, who hath a Plenitude of Perfection beyond the Conception of the most exalted Spirit, yet this incomprehensible Parent of Beings hath planted in the Soul of Man an Intellect, which cannot be filled with what is Finite, and a Will, so restless in its Motions, that Nothing can satisfy it, but an Infinite Good:

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Now,

INTRODUCTION.

Now, in respect of the End, or Good, which Man was Originally made for, and, in Consequence of his Frame, fitted to attain, a Question arises, whether Man, in his mere Natural State, purely by Force and Efficacy of his intellectual and moral Powers, is able clearly to discern, and to pursue this End, or, whether some foreign, supplemental Aid is Necessary to strengthen the Force of Natural Reason, and to move the Will to regular Pursuits, which is the true Ground of this Enquiry into the Natural State of Man.

As this is a Question of the highest Moment to the true Interest and Happiness of Man, it ought to be discussed with the utmost Care and Candour, for surely all Men are, or
ought

INTRODUCTION.

ought to be, sollicitously employed in Search of Truth, and Place it, when found, in the strongest Points of Light: Whether what I here offer, can in any Measure contribute to open and clear the Cause of Truth, I freely leave to the learned and judicious, to whose Decision I shall ever pay a Sacred Regard:

THIS, however, and this only I can positively and truly assert in my own Favour, that I did not enter into the Enquiry through Ostentation of Knowledge, nor in Contempt of the Abilities or Writings of any Author, and, therefore, though Men may differ from me in Opinion, they can fairly conclude no more, than that I argue through Mistake or Ignorance, in Favour of the wrong Side

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of an Argument, which many Men of Abilities, vastly superior, have in certain Cases done before : And, on Supposition of the heavy Charge, I have this pleasing Reflection left to alleviate and soften the Weight, That, as Error, Mistake, and Ignorance are strong Instances of the Natural Weakness of Human Reason, there is an amiable Quality in generous Minds, disposing them to animadvert with Tenderness, and to censure with Reluctance and Pain.

IF it is objected, That in my way of Reasoning, in certain Parts of the Enquiry, all Human Knowledge is Originally derived from Sensation, the Objection is of no Weight, for draw Knowledge from as many Natural Sources as you please, the Argument,

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gument, which I pursue, is still in this respect of equal Force, and must ever remain so, till the Defects, which I complain of in the Human Intellect, are cured, which is not in the Power of Natural Reason to effect, from whatever Natural Sources you may suppose the Materials of Human Knowledge to be derived.

IF a Question should arise, what will become, in this way of Reasoning, of our Natural Knowledge of the Being of a GOD, and of the Powers and Faculties of the Human Soul? The Solution of the Question is very easy from the Ground, whereon it is raised, our Natural Knowledge of the Being of GOD being clearly collected from the Works of the Creation, which are Objects of Sense, and
the

INTRODUCTION.

the only Natural Means of the Knowledge of his Existence: And our Natural Knowledge of the Powers and Faculties of an Human Soul is also very safe, because it is collected from their Operations on outward Things conveyed to the Soul by Organs of Sense, and from reflex Acts of the Intellect upon them, which Operations and Reflections on Materials of Knowledge, thus conveyed, we are strongly conscious of, though, abstractedly considered, they are not Objects of Sense:

To the mere Logical Part, then, of the Objection the Solution is very easy: All Ideas are Originally Images of some Kind of Objects; Objects, therefore, from which Images, which form Ideas, are received,

INTRODUCTION.

ceived, must be Originally extrinſical to the Soul, otherwiſe there muſt be Ideas of Ideas, or, what is equal, Images of Images, which is abſurd: What, therefore, are uſually called Ideas of Reflection, can only, if they mean any Thing, be reflex Acts of the Intellect upon Ideas of Senſation, or Materials of Operation received from outward Objects: Before the Intellect can operate, it muſt have Something to operate upon; Materials of Operation muſt either be innate or adventitious, but no Man, I preſume, of common Senſe will ſay, That Ideas are Innate, when they cannot be of any Sort of Uſe, till the Organs of the Body are fit to receive them from outward Things, and the Intellect is ſupplied with Materials of Operation and Reflection from that Source:

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Source : It remains, therefore, That all Ideas and Materials of Knowledge are unessential, adventitious, and extrinſical to the Soul.

If poſſibly an Objection can ariſe, That in Conſequence of the Ground of this Enquiry into the Natural State of Man, I mean to place Religion in Oppoſition to Reaſon, or at leaſt to ſet them at Variance with one another, I do here declare quite the Contrary, being fully convinced, That *Right* Reaſon is not only the *True* Ground of *Natural*, but a Neceſſary and the *only* Mean of judging of the Truth of *Revealed* Religion : *True Religion* and *False Reaſon* are indeed *Incompatible*, but *True*, Reaſon and *True Religion* are *Inſeparable*, though there are Myſteries in the *One*, which
never

INTRODUCTION.

never can appear in a clear Light, till the Powers of the *Other* are vastly enlarged.

ANOTHER Thing I would premise is This, that, in any Part of the Enquiry wherein I mention *Religion*, I would not be understood to mean, that the Principles, there mentioned, contain the *whole Theology* of the Heathen World — Some of the wiser and more ancient Philosophers, by Force of Natural Reason, and Traditionary Aid, formed very high and magnificent Ideas of the Being, and more obvious Attributes of GOD, yet, with Submission to those venerable Sages, whom I vastly honour for the Improvement of their Natural Abilities, and their laborious Searches after Divine Truth, I hum-
c bly

INTRODUCTION.

bly conceive, that were all their sublime Notions selected from the gross Errors, wherewith they are mixed, into a System of Theology, they would, notwithstanding the most accurate Selection, appear in a very imperfect Light, and, therefore, an Aid, superior to mere Powers of Natural Reason, however carefully improved by proper Culture, was absolutely necessary to give them Strength and Energy to effect the End they were applied to, which is the main Thing, for which I contend, throughout the whole Enquiry,

I beg Leave, in this Place to inform the Reader, that I owe great Obligations, in several Parts of the Enquiry, to the Pious, Learned, and Judicious Sir *Matthew Hale*, who
was

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was as intimately acquainted with the Designation and OEconomy of Human Nature, as with the Laws and Institutes of his Country: I own also with Pleasure, that I derived Information and Aid, in a particular Part of it, from the Controversy between the acute Schoolman and Divine, Dr. *Bramhall*, Primate of *Ireland*, and Mr. *Hobbes* of *Mamesbury*, who applied very great Talents to very bad Purposes: I confess moreover, That toward the End of the Enquiry, I made some Use of an anonymous Letter of a real Deist, as he calls himself, to a Nominal, wherein he maintains the Necessity of a Sense of Religion to the Safety and Welfare of Civil Societies: To these Authors I refer; any Materials, which are borrowed from them, and their
Language

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Language also, being so intimately blended with mine, that I cannot distinctly sever them, without giving the Reader and my self an idle Trouble.



AN
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
NATURAL STATE
OF
MAN.

EVERY MAN of common Sense will, I presume, at first Sight clearly discern, and allow the Truth of the following Propositions, which I therefore take for self-evident Principles :

B

I. THAT

1. THAT the Nature of any Thing is that peculiar Constitution, and Complexion of Parts, Faculties, Powers, and Operations, which GOD gave to that Thing in its Original Formation :

2. THAT every Thing, in Proportion to the Perfection of its particular Nature, was Originally intended, and directed by GOD, to a certain End :

3. THAT, in Consequence of this Direction, every Thing was endued with Powers of Action, peculiarly fitted to the Attainment of that End :

4. THAT so long as any Thing continues in the State wherein it was created, it is entirely in the Way of the Order and Perfection of its Nature :

5. THAT

5. THAT so soon as any Thing is diverted from its Original Direction, and Natural Course of Operation, it falls into a disordered, irregular, and unnatural State :

6. THAT when any Thing is disordered, it cannot return to its natural, regular State, till the Cause, which disordered it, shall cease to operate, or the Restoring, regulating Power is superior in Strength to the Power of the Disorder.

LET us examine, by these Principles, what is commonly distinguished by Human Nature, and see whether that Thing, or Being, called MAN, is, in his present Condition, in a regular, or disordered State: Whether he hath, from the Time of his Creation

tion to this Day, acted up to the Original Constitution, and Law of his Being: Or whether, if haply he ever swerved from the Appointments and Rules of his Nature, any Means were made Use of to bring him back to the Path he strayed from; and if any, whether they met with the intended Success.

As the Men, I am to argue with, boastfully insist on the great Perfection of unassisted Reason and the Natural Powers of the Human Mind, and assert the absolute Sufficiency of those Powers to all the Purposes and Ends of their Being, I shall, in the Method of my Reasoning, lay aside all Regard to Revealed Religion of any Sort, and consider MAN in his pure Natural State, *merely as MAN,*

in
as

in like Manner as I would consider an Horse, or a Flower, were that the Subject of my Disquisition.

HUMAN Nature, or the Nature of MAN, is of a complex kind: Had MAN been made merely Animal, the highest Principles of his Nature would have been Instinct, and a certain Complexion of Animal Powers, by which he would have been led, in one uniform Way, to certain determinate Ends; but as MAN was raised higher in the Scale of Beings, and endued with Faculties of Reason, the special Constitution of his Nature must be taken from the Powers of his Intellect, and the Freedom of his Will, whereby he is capable of pursuing various Ends, in various Ways, according to the different Judgments
he

he forms of Things ; for to assert, that a reasonable Being is a necessary Agent, is as absurd as to assert, that a Being is able to judge, and yet not able to chuse.

HUMAN Nature, then, is a Compound, partly of Animal, and inferior Powers, such as Instincts, Appetites, and Passions, with all other Appurtenances of the Animal OEconomy ; and partly, of Rational, or superior Powers, such as Intellect, Will, Reflection, Deliberation, Judgment, Conscience and Choice, all aiding, and co-operating with one another in such manner, that the System of Human Nature may very aptly be illustrated by the Analogy which it bears to a well regulated State, consisting of several Powers, whereof some project, consult,

consult, weigh, and determine the Moments of Things, while others not less usefully concur, in their several Degrees of Subordination, to aid, and to execute: And this Account of Human Nature answers the End and Purport of the first Proposition, that the Nature of any Thing is that peculiar Constitution and Complexion of Parts, Faculties, Powers, and Operations, which GOD gave to that Thing in its Original Formation.

BUT as MAN is confessedly a Being of more excellent Constitution than other Creatures, chiefly in respect of his Rational Powers, he must have been Originally ordained, and directed to an End, proportionate to the superior Excellence of his Being, and enabled to pursue, and to attain that
End

End, in a Way fuitable to the Perfection of his Nature : For, according to the second and third Proposition, every Thing, in Proportion to the Perfection of its particular Nature, was Originally directed by GOD to a certain End, and endued with Powers of Action, peculiarly fitted to the Attainment of that End.

MAN, therefore, was Originally intended, and therefore must necessarily have been fitted, and enabled, to be governed by some Rule, equal and commensurate to the leading Principles, and Powers of his Being :

BUT to suppose a Rule, to which MAN was obliged to conform his Actions, and at the same Time to suppose him incapable of knowing that Rule :

OR

OR to suppose MAN endued with a sufficient Knowledge of the Rule, and yet to suppose him, in Consequence of any Weakness, Obliquity, or Perverseness in his Will, unable to conform his Actions to the Rule, is to suppose what is absolutely inconsistent with the Goodness, Wisdom, and Justice of his MAKER :

MAN, therefore, in his Original Formation, must have been endued, not only with a sufficient Knowledge concerning GOD, and that Law of Reason, which was to be the Rule of his Actions in order to the Attainment of the End he was designed for, but also with such Rectitude of Will, as to have Power to move steadily and uniformly, with Ease and Pleasure, in Obedience to that Law, under the Di-

C rection

rection and Influence of that Knowledge: or, in other Words, MAN, in his Original State, must have judged according to the most perfect Rules of right Reason, and must have had Power to act, with Ease and Pleasure, in absolute Conformity to the Will of his MAKER: That is, he must have been able to answer minutely all the real genuine Uses of the Original Faculties and Powers of his rational Nature, in the most ample, plenary, and unlimited Manner and Measure it was capable of: Or, in other Words, he must have been able to act, with Ease and Pleasure, in perfect Conformity to all the Powers, and Ends of his Being.

WE find, then, that MAN, Originally, must have been perfect in his Intel-

Natural State of MAN. 11

Intellect, and regular in his Will ; I mean, as completely perfect, and entirely regular, as GOD, who gave him those Faculties, intended, and required he should be : And, therefore, according to the fourth Proposition, so long as MAN continued in this State, he was entirely in the Way of the Order of his Nature, and must, by Virtue, and in Consequence of his Original Powers, have absolutely and effectually answered all the Ends, and Laws of his Being.

BUT if it shall appear, that it was possible Human Nature might be, and that it was more than probable that, in Fact, it was diverted from this Original Direction and Natural Course of Operation, so as to find Reluctance in the Discharge of such Actions

ons as by the Design of the CREATOR it was intended to perform, and take Pleasure in acting contrary to that Design ; in Consequence of the fifth Proposition we shall find it in an irregular, disordered State : The Intellect either weakly, or erroneously, or falsely informed in Matters of Duty, and the Will, by Virtue of this Imbecility, or Want of Information, weak, fortuitous, or blind ; the inferior Faculties, indignant of Restraint, raised into Tumult, and the whole Polity of the Human Constitution distempered and disturbed ; like a Musical Instrument, which, however harmonic and toned to Melody in the first Construction, when disordered, or untuned, can emit nothing but jarring Sounds.

I shall

I shall not here enquire concerning the Cause, which seduced MAN from his Original State, nor concerning the Manner, wherein he was seduced ; nor do Speculations of this Sort in any Measure affect the present Question, for so Human Nature is disordered, it is not material how that Disorder happened :

NOR shall I say more concerning the Possibility of the Thing, than that it may fairly and clearly be inferred from the Freedom of the Human Will, and the limited Perfection of Human Nature, it being a Contradiction to assert, that a free, imperfect Agent cannot err :

BUT what is much more material to the Point, and, of itself, conclusive

five, is, that the Thing is true in Fact, that MAN is not now in the same State wherein he was created, but is greatly fallen from the Original Integrity and Perfection of his Nature.

IN Order to clear this Point, I must desire you to look back to the Account I gave of the Original Constitution of human Nature, which will put you in Mind, that it is a Compound of various Faculties, Powers, and Principles of Action directing, influencing, and aiding one another in such Manner, that the Rectitude of the general System, according to the Purport of the second and third Proposition, must have consisted in the most perfect Exercise of the Intellect, and a regular Conformity of the Will

Will to all the Rules of perfect Reason, I mean Reason, as completely and absolutely perfect, as it came from the Hand of GOD: And all this regular Procedure of the leading Principles in Human Nature must have been encouraged, and aided, and ministerially promoted by the joint and vigorous Concurrence of the Animal and inferior Faculties.

Now, if this must have been the Original Condition of Human Nature ; and if Human Nature is now, as some MEN pretend it is, and as, in Consequence of their own Principles, it ought to be, exactly in all Respects the same it ever was, inasmuch as they hold Natural Reason to be a perfect, and the only Rule of Duty : Let them take the whole Mass of Mankind
from

from this Day backward to immemorial Time, and shew me in all their Histories, or in the present Generation, even in their own Sect, that deems it self so mighty wise and self-sufficient ; let them, I say, shew me one single Instance, or dead or living, of the Truth they contend for, and I will renounce my Opinion, and together with it that Gospel of Christ, which, on Supposition of the Continuance of the Original Perfection of Human Reason, and consequently of the sufficiency of it to all the Ends and Purposes of my Being, I must too fondly and weakly believe to be the Power of GOD unto Salvation,

BUT, if instead of their being able to do this, it shall appear, upon sober and honest Enquiry, that an universal
Disorder

Disorder hath, in some Way or other, prevailed among MEN, and that Human Nature is so far from being *now*, what I have proved it must necessarily have *Originally* been, that the whole Frame of it is sickly and distempered and disturbed, and that there is a Law in the Animal Parts, warring against the Law of the Mind, and bringing it into Captivity to the Law of Sin, for the Truth whereof I appeal to the Heart of every ingenuous Man on Earth, who hath ever reflected on the Workings of his own Mind; if all this, I say, be true, if there is confessedly found, and felt, great Weakness or Ignorance in the Intellect, and great Perverseness and Obliquity in the Will, and if the Animal Powers are all in Confusion, neither swayed by Reason, nor at Peace with one
D another,

another, where is the boasted Original Integrity of Human Nature, and where the Sufficiency of the rational Powers to all the Ends and Purposes of Being? (a)

BUT

(a) In the Original uncorrupted State of Human Nature, before the Mind of Man was depraved with Prejudicate Opinions, corrupt Affections and vicious Inclinations, Customs, and Habits, right Reason may justly be supposed to have been a sufficient Guide, and a Principle powerful enough to preserve Men in the constant Practice of their Duty, but in the present Circumstances and Condition of Mankind, the wisest and most sensible of the Philosophers themselves have not been backward to complain, that they found the Understandings of Men so dark and cloudy, their Wills so byassed and inclined to Evil, their Passions so outrageous and rebelling against Reason, that they looked upon the Laws and Rules of right Reason as very hardly practicable, and which they had very little Hopes of ever being able to persuade the World to submit to: In a Word, they confessed that Human Nature was strangely corrupted, and they acknowledged this Corruption to be a Disease whereof they knew not the true Cure,

BUT I need not appeal to particular Persons, when I have the public concurrent Testimony of Mankind on my

Cure, and could not find out a sufficient Remedy: So that the great Duties of Religion were laid down by them as Matters of Speculation and Dispute, rather than as the Rules of Action, and not so much urged upon the Hearts and Lives of Men, as proposed to the Admiration of those who thought them hardly possible to be effectually practised by the generality of Men: To remedy all these Disorders, and conquer all these Corruptions, there was plainly wanting some extraordinary and supernatural Assistance, which was above the Reach of bare Reason and Philosophy to procure, and yet without which the Philosophers themselves were sensible, there could never be any truly Great Men.

Nemo unquam vir magnus sine divino afflatu fuit.

See Dr. Clarke's Lectures.

For these Reasons, saith the learned Author, there was plainly wanting a *Divine Revelation* to recover Mankind out of their universal degenerate State, into a State suitable to the *Original Excellency* of their *Nature*, which Divine Revelation both the Necessities of MEN and their natural Notions of GOD gave them reasonable

my Side of the Question : For if Human Nature never was, nor is at present in a degenerate, disordered State, I would be glad any Man would rationally account to me for the various Institutions of Human Laws, for the several Systems of Moral Duty, and for the Civil Restraints and Legal Penalties, which have, more or less, prevailed in all Nations, and in all Ages of the known World : What can all these Schemes of Civil, and Moral Duty mean, if they are not tacit, but strong, Confessions of great Corruption in Human Nature ?

sonable Ground to expect and hope for, as appears from the Acknowledgments which the best and wisest of the Heathen Philosophers themselves have made of their Sense of the Necessity of such a Revelation, and from their Expressions of the Hopes they had entertained, that GOD would some Time or other vouchsafe it unto them.

GIVE

GIVE me leave to step a little back, and take another View of this Matter: I just now compared the Original Constitution of Human Nature, to a regular, well-governed State, consisting of several superior and subordinate Powers, all lending to and borrowing from each other mutual Influences and mutual Aids, and so blended and tempered and cemented together in one common Interest, that, like the Stones of a well-built Arch, they support and are supported by one another, by joint Tendency to one common End: Now, pray, in such a Community, what occasion can there be for Coercions, and penal Restraints? If you say, for Fear the Parts should divide and fall into Disorder——then, in pursuance of the Analogy, I infer, that it is allowed
that

that the constituent Powers of Human Nature, however perfectly framed in their Original Formation, might possibly be disjointed, and fall into Confusion, the *Possibility* whereof hath already been proved from the Freedom of Man — if you say the Reason of such Institution is, because however fair and well-proportioned the Constitution of the supposed State may appear on first View, there are notwithstanding Defects at Bottom, which, without this Caution, may be of fatal Consequence to the whole Frame — then, I must necessarily conclude, that Penal Laws and Moral Precepts are so many Bandages and Supports contrived by the Art of Lawgivers, and Philosophers, to prop the Weaknesses, and guard against the ill Consequences of those Defects —
which

which I before proved could not Originally have been in Human Nature.

HUMAN Nature, then, is, and hath been for many Ages, in a State of Weakness and Disorder: We find the Intellect of MAN, which in its Original Constitution had Light and Power sufficient to guide and carry him to the End he was to move to, dark and disabled of its directive Force, and scarce of Sagacity enough to discern what he is, from what Cause he derived his Being, and what End that Being is designed for: the Faculty indeed is Effential to the Soul, but the Original Furniture and Improvement of it are so disordered, that, in respect of their primitive Perfection, they are scarce fit for the meanest Use.

It

IT hath, from Time to Time, been the Business of the wiser and better Sort of Men to trace several Truths to the Source they flowed from, and to refine them, in some Measure, from the Impurity they contracted through length of Derivation ; but their Illustrations of antique Truths, partly through Weakness in the Channels they were conveyed by, partly through Unfitness in the Reservoirs which received them, and partly through various Mixtures they met with in their Course, are mingled with so much Darkness and Confusion, that, though the succeeding Philosopher discovered Errors in the former, the same Natural Weakness appears also in him, in producing Opinions as much to be reformed, as the Errors he departed from.

THIS

THIS great Defect in the Human Intellect is not in any Thing more discernable, than in Religion *b*, arising,
E partly,

b Seeing there are no Signs, saith the Philosopher of *Malmesbury*, nor Fruit of *Religion*, but in Man only, there is no Cause to doubt, but that the Seed of *Religion* is also only in Man, and consisteth in some peculiar Quality, or in some eminent Degree thereof not to be found in other living Creatures, which is reducible to Desire of knowing Causes, to the Consideration of the Beginning of Things, and the Observation of the Sequel of them:

The two first make Anxiety; for being assured there be Causes of all Things that have arrived hitherto or shall arrive hereafter, it is impossible for a Man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the Evil he fears and procure the Good he desireth, not to be in perpetual Sollicitude of the Time to come; but such a Man, like *Prometheus* who repaid in the Night the Depredation an Eagle made on his Liver in the Day, hath his Heart all Day long gnawed on by Fear of Death, Poverty or other Calamity, and has no Repose or Pause of his Anxiety, but in Sleep.

This

partly, from the Weakness of the Faculty,

This perpetual Fear always accompanying Mankind in the Ignorance of Causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for Object *Something*; and therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good or evil Portune, but some *Power* or *Agent invisible*; in which Sense perhaps it was that some of the old Poets said that the Gods were at first created by Human Fear——which gives occasion of feigning as many Gods as there are Men in the World.

For the Matter or Substance of the invisible Agents so fancied, they could not by natural Cogitation fall upon any other Concept, but that it was the same with the Soul of Man, and that the Soul of Man was of the same Substance with that which appeareth in a Dream to one that sleepeth, or in a Looking-glass to one that is awake, which MEN, not knowing that such Apparitions are nothing else but Creatures of the Fancy, think to be real and external Substances, and therefore call them Ghosts, as the *Latins* called them *Imagines* and *Umbrae*, and thought them *Spirits*, that is, little aerial *Bodies*, and the invisible Agents, which they feared, to be like them; save that they appear and vanish when they please: But the Opinion, that such
Spirits

culty, and, partly, from the Nature
E 2 of

Spirits were Incorporeal or Immortal, could never enter into the Mind of any Man by Nature, for though Man may put together Words of a contradictory Signification, as *Spirit* and *Incorporeal*, yet they can never have Imagination of any Thing answering to them, and therefore, *Spirit immaterial* is a Definition unintelligible.

What immediate Causes these invifible Agents used in bringing Things to pafs, Men, that know not what it is we call *caufing*, (that is, almoft all Men) have no other Rule to guefs by, but by observing and remembring, what they have feen to precede the like Effect at fome other Time or Times before, without feeing between the antecedent and fubfequent Event any Dependance or Connexion at all; and therefore from the like Things paff, they expect the like Things to come, and hope for Good or Evil Luck, fuperftitiously, from Things that have no part at all in the caufing of it.

In Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of fecond Causes, Devotion toward what Men fear, and taking of Things cafual for Prognostiques, confifteth the natural Seed of *Religion*, which by Reason of different Fancies, Judgments and
Passions

of the Object, which doth not fall
within

Passions of Men, hath grown up into Ceremonies so different, that those, which are used by one Men, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

IN that part of Religion, which consisteth in Opinions concerning the Nature of Powers invisible, there is almost nothing that has a Name, that has not been esteemed among the Gentiles, (that is, among Men who had no other Aid to assist them but the mere Powers of natural Reason) in one Place or other, a God, or a Devil; or by their Poets feigned to be inanimated, inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The same Authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the second Ground for Religion, which is Mens Ignorance of Causes and thereby their Aptness to attribute their Fortune to Causes on which there was no Dependence at all apparent, took occasion to obtrude on their Ignorance, instead of second Causes, a Kind of second and ministerial Gods, ascribing the Cause of Fæcundity, to *Venus*; of Arts to *Apollo*; of Subtilty and Craft, to *Mercury*; of Tempests and Storms, to *Æolus*; and of other Effects to other Gods, insomuch that there was
amongst

within the Reach of the usual Means
of

amongst the Heathen almost as great a Variety
of Gods, as of Business.

To the Worship which naturally Men conceived fit to be used towards their Gods, namely Oblation, Prayers, Petitions, Thanks, and Submission of Body, the same Legislators of the Gentiles have added their Images, both in Picture and Sculpture, that the more ignorant Sort (that is, the Generality of the People) thinking the Gods, for whose Representation they were made, were really included and housed within them, might so much the more stand in fear of them; and endowed them with Lands, Houses, Officers, and Revenues set apart from all other Human Uses, that is, consecrated and made holy to those their Idols, as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Islands; and have attributed to them not only the Shapes of Men, of Beasts and Monsters, but also the Faculties and Passions of Men and Beasts; as Sense, Speech, Lust, Generation (not only by mixing one with another to propagate the Kind, but also by mixing with Men and Women to beget mongrel Gods,) besides, Anger, Revenge, and other Passions of living Creatures, and the Actions proceeding from them, as Fraud, Theft, Adultery,

of Knowledge that are employed in
the

Adultery, and any Vice that may be taken for an Effect of Power, or a Cause of Pleasure.

To Prognostiques of Time to come, which are naturally but Conjectures of Time past and supernaturally divine Revelation, the same Authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, partly upon pretended Experience, and partly upon pretended Revelation, have added innumerable other Superstitious Ways of Divination, and made Men believe they should find their Fortunes by Answers from Oracles; on the Leaves of the Sybills; in the insignificant Speeches of Madmen supposed to be possessed with a Divine Spirit; in the Aspect of the Stars at their Nativity; in Presages drawn from their own Hopes and Fears; in the Prediction of Witches that pretended Conference with the Dead; in Augury; in Aruspicina; in Dreams; in croaking Ravens, or chattering of Birds; in the Lineaments of the Face, or Lines of the Hand; in Omina; in Portenta and Ostenta, as Eclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, and uncouth Births; so easy are Men to be drawn to believe any Thing from such Men as have gotten Credit with them, and can with Gentleness and Dexterity take hold of their Fear and Ignorance. See *Leviath.* ch. 12. concerning Religion.

The

the Attainment of other Truths, and
therefore

The Philosophers plainly saw, that the State of Man was very far from being Perfect or Natural; but how he first came into this Condition, was a Question, which could not be clearly resolved without farther Light, than their own; and till they knew the Cause of the Distemper, they could not possibly cure it: Here, then, a *Revelation* was necessary to shew Men their true Condition. But,

Suppose they had really known the true State of their own Case, yet the true Cure for it was more than *Human Power* or Skill could effect: Some had Recourse to Philosophy, but the Disease was too inveterate to be cured by so weak a Medicine, for very few of the Philosophers themselves formed their Minds and Manners according to the Dictates of true Reason, and their several Institutions were more an Ostentation of their Knowledge, than a Rule of their Lives.

But suppose the Philosophers had really designed to reform the Morals and Religion of Men, they were not sufficiently qualified for it, for as they knew not the first Cause of the Corruption of Human Nature, they could know Nothing
of

therefore some extrinfical Aid is necessary,

of GOD's Design in suffering it, nor of the Scheme of his Providence, by which he designed to conduct Mankind out of it, into a more perfect and happy State than that from which they had fallen. Though they were, upon good Grounds of Reason (while they kept steady to it) convinced of some of those great Truths, which are strong Motives to Obedience to the Law of Nature, yet their Conviction was not so uniform as was necessary to persuade Others; and it may be questioned, whether their Unsteadiness to their own Arguments, and their contradictory Opinions, and different Sects formed upon them, did not more hinder, than help that Influence, which the traditional Belief of these primitive Truths had upon the Vulgar, in more early Times, before they had ever heard such Disputing among them: So that there was really more Want of Revelation, after the Days of Philosophy, than there was before——though they could plainly discover from the Nature of Things, that Virtue was necessary to the Perfection of Man, yet their many Divisions upon the Chief Good, or ultimate Happiness of Man, were a great Hindrance to any good Influence upon those who heard them: They could indeed declaim very well upon the Excellence of a virtuous Life in General, and of the immediate Advantage of particular

cessary, either to raise the Faculty in
some Proportion to the Nature of the
Object, or, by apt, and proper Means
F of

particular Virtues, and their Natural Tendency
to the Good of Mankind, but how to reduce
them all to one consistent Scheme, so that Ordinary
Men might see the Obligation to practise
all of them, in all Circumstances, was a Thing
that none of them could attain to.

In Matters of Religion, which naturally have
the greatest Influence over the Mind of Man,
and which therefore ought to be under the best
and truest Direction of all others, they were still
more deficient, than in any Thing else. When
Mankind had once fallen from the Worship of
the One true GOD, they sunk, by Degrees, into
the most abominable Idolatry, which was ac-
companied with such an universal Blindness, as to
the true Nature of GOD and his Attributes,
that if some Notion of GOD's Existence had
not been so deeply rooted in Human Nature, as
never to be wholly destroyed, a general Atheism
must have been the Natural Consequence of such
monstrous Practices: For, as we find no ancient
Account of any, who professed atheistical Prin-
ciples, till Religion was so entirely degenerated
from its Original, that Primitive Truth and
established Falshood could not easily be distin-
guished;

of Discovery, to suit the Object in some Proportion to the Nature of the Faculty.

IN

guished; so after Things were come to that pass, we find several Pretenders to utter Infidelity: Now the Philosophers were so far from being able to make any considerable Reformation in this Matter, that, generally speaking, they made the Case much worse, not only by suffering themselves to be drawn away by the Stream of vulgar Superstition, and complying with every established idolatrous Practice, but likewise by endeavouring to find out some Distinction or other to justify it, or at least to excuse themselves in complying with it: If they could not apply some Symbolical Meaning to the most absurd and ridiculous Ceremonies of their gross Superstition, by which they might seem to reconcile it to something, that looked like Natural, yet however they defended it by the Law and Practice of the Country, where they lived, and consequently, a Divine Revelation was necessary to reform Mens Notions, and to reduce them to the Practice of Religion. See Dr. Lenz in his Boyle's Lectures. —See *Plat. de Leg. lib. 4.* —*Cicer. de Leg. lib. 2. Epict. cap. 30. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2. Plat. de Repub. lib. 4. id. ibid. 6. id. Phædon. p. 85. id. Alcibiad. 2. 150, 151. Cicer. Tuscul. Q. 1. 2. cap. 4. Arist. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 2. c. 4. sub fine.*

c Cicero,

IN Consequence of this natural Weakness in the intellectual Faculty, what various Opinions, and absurd Questions have arose among Men concerning *c* the Nature, Form, and Superintendency of the Divine Being:

F 2

Whether

c *Cicero*, in his excellent Dissertation on the Nature of the Gods, has given a very particular Account of the various and surprizing Opinions, which the ancient Philosophers entertained concerning the Form and Manner of their Existence, to which Treatise I refer the Learned, as to a System of Heathen Theology, compiled with an Elegance and Accuracy of Stile and Argumentation, peculiar to the inimitable Author: But the *English* Reader will, I presume, suffer me to transfer a small Part of it into his own Language, that he may in some measure feel the palpable Darkness, wherein he would have been involved, had he lived before the Day-spring from on High inlightened the World with a Divine Ray, darted from the Father of Lights.

Velleius, of the *Epicurean* Sect, recites the several Opinions of other Philosophers, and refutes them by opposing his own, which are, in
most

Whether he is the Soul of the Universe, or the Universe it self? If the
Universe,

most Cases, still more absurd than those he objects to——

Thales Milesius, who made the first Enquiry into Things of this Nature, maintained, that *Water* was the Origin of Beings, and that the Mind, which formed all Things from this Original Element, was GOD.——*Anaximander* was of Opinion, that Gods had their *natal* Hour; that, in long Intervals of Time, they *rose* and *fell*, and were innumerable Worlds: But we, saith *Vellius*, can have no Notion of a GOD, not sempiternal.——*Anaximanes*, after him, held that *Air* was GOD; that he was generated, immense, infinite, and in sempiternal Motion: As if, or Air, void of Form, could be a Divinity, when to GOD essentially belongs the most beautiful Form; or any Thing, which had a Birth, should be exempt from Mortality——Him *Anaxagoras* followed and borrowed from, and was the First, who affirmed the Model of universal Nature to have been designed and perfected by Reason, and the Efficacy of an infinite Mind; wherein, saith *Vellius*, he is not aware, that in such an Infinite there can be no Conjunction of Sense and Motion, nor indeed any Sense at all, where the very
Nature

Universe, whether, in some Parts, the
Divinity is not scorched with too
much

Nature of the Thing can have no Sensation of Impulse, so that if he reckons upon this *Mind*, as something in the Nature of an *Animal*, there must be some Existence or other, yet more internal, by which that Animal is properly and peculiarly called and distinguished: But what can be more *internal*, than the *Mind*? *Mind* therefore must be inclosed with *external Body*; but as this Doctrine will not go down with *Anaxagoras*, we, on the other hand, are not able to form any Notion or Conception of a Mind being separate from all *Material Sensible Adjuncts*——*Alcmæo* of *Crotæ*, who attributed Divinity to the Sun, Moon, and Stars, as also to the human Mind, did not consider, that he attributed Immortality to mortal Things——*Pythagoras* too, who held, that the Essence of one universal Mind was intimately coextended with, and pervaded the Nature of all Beings, from which Essence our Minds were excerpted, did not see, that, by this Distraction and rending away of *Human Minds*, the Deity must suffer Dilaceration, and that, in proportion as Human Minds are subject to Anxiety, Part of this Deity must, in Consequence, be miserable, which is impossible; and were Human Mind a GOD, how could it be ignorant of any Thing?
or

much Heat, and in others benumbed
with too much Cold? Whether he is
not

or how could this God, consisting of *pure Mind*, void of Body, be infixed, or infused into the World?——*Xenophanes*, who held the infinite Mass of Things, in Conjunction with Mind, to be GOD, lies open to the same Exception with the former——*Parmenides* assigns, for a GOD, that Supreme Circle, which invirons the Heavens, and is indued with Light and Heat, though intirely destitute of Sense, and void of Divine Form, and subjects his GOD to War, Discord, Lust, and other infirmities, which are defaced by Distemper, Sleep, Age, or Oblivion——*Empedocles* will have the four Natures, or Elements, of which all Things consist, to be Divine, which yet are palpably liable to Rise and Decay, and absolutely void of Sense——Nor did *Protagoras*, in acknowledging himself unable to deliver any Thing of Certainty, touching the Gods, whether there were any, or not, or, what they were, seem to surmise any Thing aright concerning the Gods——*Plato*, in his *Timæus*, denies, that the Father of the World can be named, and, in his Books of Laws, will not suffer Inquiries to be made into his Nature; but in making him to be void of Body, he feigns an Impossibility, as, in Consequence of this, he must
be

not subject to Misery and Death, the
Parts of the Universe, which are all
his

be destitute of Sense, Reason, and Pleasure, all which we comprehend in the Notion of a Deity: Add too, that he asserts the World to be a GOD, as also the Heaven, Stars, Earth, and Human Minds; with all, whom Tradition has handed down, as instituted by our Ancestors—— Nor is *Aristotle* in less Confusion, than the Rest, for first, he attributes Divinity to the Mind only; then, to the World; anon, sets a certain Essence over the World, and gives him in Charge to guide, and to govern it by a certain Revolution of Motion: Next, he ascribes Divinity to the Heat of Heaven, not considering, that Heaven is Part of the World, to which he had elsewhere assigned Divinity, though it be hard to conceive, how the Divine Sense of Heaven can consist with such Celerity of Motion; and what must become of so many other Deities, if we reckon even Heaven in the Number? Besides, in not allowing him a Body, does he not strip him of Sense, and Reason? How, moreover, without a Body, could the World be moved? or how can it be at Ease, and Happy, in continual Self-motion?

Xenocrates

his Members, being liable to Disorder and Diffolution? Whether he is
com-

Xenocrates makes the Gods eight in Number; the vague Stars, or Planets five; the sixth to consist of all the Stars in the Zodiac, which, when severally taken, are only Limbs and Members, but, when collectively, one simple God; the Sun is the seventh, and the Moon the eighth; but in what Sense such Gods can be deemed Happy, is hard to imagine——*Heraclides* of *Pontus*, one while, will have the World, or Universe, to be God; another, an Intelligence, or Mind; and anon, the wandering Stars, Air, and Earth-----*Theophrastus*, sometimes attributes Divine Prerogatives, and Sovereignty to the Mind; then, to Heaven, or the Firmament; and then, to the Planets, and celestial Constellations-----*Strato* is of Opinion, that the whole of Divine Virtue and Power is seated in, and diffused through universal Nature, and is the Cause of Birth, Growth, and Diffolution; but is withal void both of Sense and Form, and, consequently, of Prudence and Pleasure——*Zeno* maintains, that the Law of Nature is a Divinity, of Force to command what is right, and to prohibit the contrary; but how such a Law should come by Life, we are as far to seek, as we are assured, that the Divinity
is

compounded of Body, and of Spirit?
If of Body, whether of Human Shape?

G

If

is animated; in another place, he deifies Æther, or the fiery Circle of the Heavens, if any Conception can be formed of a GOD insensible, with whom we can have no intercourse in our Prayers, Wishes, or Desires; and, again, he makes a certain *Reason*, extended through all Natures, to be *Divinely* affected, and attributes Divinity to Stars, Years, Months, and Seasons——*Strato* is of Opinion, that the Form, or Figure of the Gods cannot be discerned; that they are void of Sense, and doubts, whether they are animate, or not.——*Cleanthes*, a hearer of *Zeno*, first, deifies the World; then, the universal Mind, and Spirit; then, pronounces, for a most certain Deity, that Highest, Lowest, All-surrounding, and Embracing Heat, which is called Æther, or Firmament: One while, he holds the Gods to have a certain Form, and Shape; then, that the Stars are the only Deities; and, at length, that Nothing is more Divine, than Reason: Thus, saith *Velleius*, that GOD, whom we only know in Contemplation, and take no other Impression of, than in the Notion of the Mind, comes not to appear at all——*Perseus*, another of *Zeno's* Scholars, teaches to reckon upon those, as Deities, who have been the Authors of any Invention, useful,
and

If not of Human Shape, how can he
be endued with Virtue and Reason,
for

and beneficial to human Life, and to dignify the profitable Things themselves, so found out, with Divine Appellations; intimating that they are Gods, in real Nature, rather than Matters of Divine Institution; but what can be more absurd, than, or to attribute Divine Honours to Things sordid and deformed, or to place in the Number of the Deities, Men long since Dead and Rotten, for whom Tears and Mournings are the most proper Adoration?——*Chrysippus*, who is held to be the sharpest Interpreter of the Dreams and Dotages of the *Stoics*, set up a great Company of Deities, so wholly unknown, that it is impossible to have any Information of them, even in Conjecture, though one might think a Man might take any Figure into his Imagination: First, he makes Divine Virtue to consist in Right Reason, and in a Mind and Spirit, diffused through the whole Mass of Nature: Then, he deifies the World, and the universal Effusion of its Soul; next, the Power of that Soul, influencing the Mind, and Judgment; anon, that Common Nature, which contains, and conjoins all Things; then, the Fatal, and Dark Representation, and Necessity of future Things, as also Fire, and *Æther*; and lastly, those Things, which
do

for Virtue cannot subsist without Reason, nor can Reason subsist without

do naturally flow, and persevere, as Water, Earth, Sun, Moon, Stars, and that Supreme Circle, which invirons the whole World, together with such Men, who have acquired Immortality: He farther adds, that the Power of that eternal Rule, which seems to be the guide of Life, and the Source of Offices, is *Jupiter*, and calls this immutable Decree fatal Necessity, and the Sempiternal Verity of future Events: But none of these Things seem to be, in the least; expressive of Divine Virtue——thus, saith *Velleius*, I have run through most of the Dreams of Dotards, rather than the judicious Decisions of Philosophers, who come little short of the absurd Fictions of the Poets, who have introduced their Gods, raging with Anger, and inflamed with Lust, and present to our View their Feuds, Brawls, Skuffles, Wounds, Piques, Hatreds, Disorders, Births, Deaths, Complaints, Lamentations, prodigious Veneries, Adulteries, Bonds, Copulations with Women, and Mortal Brats springing from Immortal Begetters: And with these Poetical Levities may be joined the superstitious Portents of the *Magi*, the Madness of the *Aegyptians*, and the Opinions of the *Com-*

out an Human Shape? Whether the Members of his Body are in an indolent,

mon People, which are wholly made up of Uncertainty, and Ignorance of Truth.

Velleius, having recited these Opinions of the ancient Philosophers concerning the Nature of their Gods, proceeds, on his own Principles, to infer the Existence of Gods from a certain Anteperception, or Prenotion of their Being in the Minds of Men, previous to all Instruction, and the same Nature, saith he, which furnished the Notion of their Existence, ingraved also on our Minds an Assurance of their Happiness, and Immortality, whom *Epicurus* held to be blessed and eternal, nor cumbred with Trouble, nor creating any to Others, and, consequently, nor actuated by Favour, nor averted by Anger; in regard that what is liable to such Passions, is subject to Imbecility——This done, he proceeds to inquire into their Figure, Course of Life, and Action of Mind——Their Shape, saith he, is, partly, hinted to us by Nature, and, in Part, by Reason: Nature tells us, that no Men, nor Countries, ever represented the Deity under any other, than Human Form; for what other Divine Figure ever yet occurred to any Body, sleeping, or waking? But, not to reduce all to first Notions,

lent, or active State? If they lie idle,
of what Use are they? If imployed,
how

ons, Reason also speaks the same Truth, for
since it cannot but seem fitting, and convenient,
that the most excellent Nature, whether in
respect of his Felicity, or the sempiternal Du-
ration of his Being, should also be the most
beautiful, what Composition of Members, what
Conformation of Lineaments, what Shape or
Figure can, in this Particular, vie with the Hu-
man? If then, in Aptness and Congruity of
Parts, it excel the Form of any other Animal,
and if the Deity be animated, he cannot but be
of that Form, which is most beautiful: And if
it be out of all Doubt, that the Gods are most
Blessed; that Nothing can be Happy without
Virtue; that Virtue cannot subsist without Rea-
son, nor Reason subsist without an Human
Shape, it must necessarily follow, that the Gods
are of Human Form.

Though these Things were discovered more
acutely, and with more Subtilty expressed by
Epicurus, than fell within the Reach of every
Capacity, yet in Confidence of your Quickness
of Apprehension, I made shorter Work with
them, than were otherwise convenient: This
Epicurus, then, who pried deeply into the most
secret

how is that possible, when there is not
Space beyond the Universe, wherein
to

secret Recesses of Nature, and was palpably plain in expounding her Mysteries, affirms the Force and corporeal Essence of the Deity to be imperceptible to Sense, and only discernable to the Mind; that it hath nothing solid in it; nor abides always in the same exact, uniform manner of Firmness, but is seen by Images, perceived by Similitude, and Transition; for Images of this Kind, resulting from the innumerable Atoms, which continually flow from the Deity, being infinite, and our Mind being intent, and fixt upon them with ineffable Delight, there comes, in this Manner, to be wrought in us a Comprehension of that Happy, and Eternal Being.

Nor is the mighty Power of this *Infinity* unworthy of great, and serious Contemplation, for it must necessarily be supposed to be of such Constitution, as to be able to compleat specific Natures, by Coalition, and Poise of Atoms, with corresponding Atoms, which *Epicurus* called an Even-ballancing, or equal Contribution of Powers, and thence inferred, that, since the Number of Mortals is so great, that of Immortals could not be inferior, and the Means of Conservation equal to those of Dissolution.

The

to move them? Whether this Divinity, whatever he may be, created the

The Life of our Gods, and the Manner and Course of their Existence, is of such Nature, that nothing can be imagined to be more Happy, nor to be in Possession of greater, and more affluent Good, for they are never in Action; are intangled in no Occupations; nor project Works of Labour and Design, but rejoice, solely, in the Contemplation of their own Wisdom and Virtue, and live in continual Assurance, not only of the greatest, but of eternal Pleasures: Such a Deity may properly be pronounced Happy, but your God, ye *Stoics* and *Academics*, is, at best, the most laborious of Beings; for if we take the World to be a God, what can be less at Rest, than what is whirled about the Axle of Heaven, with marvellous Celerity, and without Intermision? but nothing can be happy, which doth not repose in Ease, and Quiet: And if we reckon upon some Divinity within the World, who rules and governs it; preserves the Courses of the Stars, Mutations of the Seasons, and the Order, and Vicissitudes of Things; and, surveying the Earth, and the Deep, provides for the Life and Weal of MAN, he cannot be exempt from Offices of Toil and Trouble; whereas we place Happiness in the Security of the Mind,
and

the World ? With what Tools, Engines, and Beams he raised the mighty
Fabric ?

and utter Avocation from all Employment : For the same *Epicurus* hath taught us, that the *Universe* was made by *Nature*, and that there was no Occasion for a Forge, and Tools, to raise the Fabric ; the Work, which you account impossible to have been effected, without the Aid of Divine Skill, being so easy of Operation to Nature, that she *doth*, and *will* make, and hath already *made* innumerable Worlds ; but because you cannot see, how Nature was able to produce the marvellous Effect, like Tragic Poets, when you cannot unfold the Issue of the Argument, you fly to a G O D, whose Aid you would never have called upon, had you seen that Immense, and, in every respect, boundless Magnitude of Regions, wherein the Mind may stretch it self, and wander far and wide, without Discovery of Coast, or Limit, to stay the interminable Flight, and give it Rest : In this Immensity of immeasurable Breadth, Longitude, and Depth, swarms an infinite Number of Atoms, which, in Consequence of a mutual, cohering, intrinsic Power, meet, embrace, and coalesce in continued Order, notwithstanding the Interjection of a void, from which spontaneous Coalition of Seeds spring all the Forms, and Figures of Things,
which

Fabric? Whether the various Things,
which Heaven and Earth are imbel-
H lished

which you fancy not to be formable, but by Bel-
lows, and Anvils: And, therefore, have you raised,
and set over us a sempiternal Lord, to be an Object
of Terror, by Day and by Night, for who can but
fear an all-disposing, all-claiming, thinking, not-
ing, inquisitive, restless Divinity? Hence sprung
your fatal Necessity, which makes all Accidents
to result from an immutable Constitution, and
Continuation of Causes——And hence, too, your
Divinitation, a large Source of the vilest Super-
stition: But we, being loosed from such vain
Fears, and put into a State of Liberty, are now
no longer afraid of Those, whom we know nor
to create Trouble to themselves, nor to molest
others; and we pay our Devotions to them up-
on Consideration, only, of their excellent, and
adorable Nature. *Cicer. De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.*

The Opinion of the Stoics, concerning the
Divinity of the World, or Universe, is so mar-
vellous an Instance of their Stupidity, that I
cannot forbear to transcribe it, for the Amuse-
ment of the *English* Reader.

What I, saith *Balbus*, in his Disputation with
Vellecus, the *Epicurean*, above mentioned, and
Cotta, the *Academic*, what I dilate upon with

lished with, were made for the Use
of wise Men, or Fools? If of wise
Men,

a flowing Vein, *Zeno* reduced to closer Argument. ——— Whatever, saith he, acts by Reason, is to be preferred to what doth not act by Reason; but Nothing is *better* than the *World*; consequently, the *World* makes Use of Reason: By the same way of arguing, may the *World* also be proved to be *Wise*; to be *Blessed*; and to be *Eternal*: for all these Things, being *better* and more *valuable*, than Those which want them, and *Nothing* being *preferable* to the *World*; it necessarily follows, that the *World* is a *God*, ——— again, no Parts of any Thing, which wants *Sense*, can be capable of *Sensation*; but there are Parts of the *World*, which are sensible; therefore the *World* is not destitute of *Sense* ——— again, *Nothing*, which is void of *Sense* and *Reason*, can generate what is indued with Both: But the *World* generates Things, indued with *Life* and *Reason*; therefore, the *World* is *animate*, and participates of *Reason* ——— again, he concludes the Argument with a *Similitude* ——— If *well-turned Pipes* are made out of the *Olive-tree*, it is not to be doubted, but there is a certain innate Skill of *Piping* in the *Tree*; Or if the *Plane-Tree* produce *Fiddle-Strings*, numerously sonorous, the Presumption is the same, that a Natural,

Men, what Occasion for so vast an Apparatus to accommodate a Few?

H 2

If

ral, Musical *Virtue* is inherent in the *Plane-Tree*: Why, then, may not the *World* be deemed *Animate*, and *Wise*, when Beings, indued with *Life*, and *Wisdom*, issue from it?

But because, saith *Balbus*, I have fallen into this Argument, I will prove the Point I speak to, by Arguments, drawn from Nature: For such is the Constitution of Things, that whatever is capable of Nourishment and Increase, contains within it a Force and Efficacy of *Natural Heat*, without which it could never be nourished, nor grow; For every Thing, which is of an *hot* and *fiery* Nature, is agitated and impelled by its own proper Motion; but what is *nourished* and *increased*, is indued with a certain, equable Motion, attended with a temperate Heat, so long as which remains in us, *Sense* and *Life* remain also; but when this Heat is chilled, and extinguished, we too are immediately *put out*, and perish ——— Whatever, therefore, Animal, or Vegetable, hath Life, derives that Life from the Warmth, which is included in it; whence it may be gathered, that Nature, wherein this Heat is imbodyed, hath within it a certain vital *Virtue*, which conveys it self through

If of Fools, what Reason could there
be to accommodate the Bad? Whe-
ther

through the whole World ——— for there is a
general, fiery Property, which pervades all Nature,
and by which the several *Parts* of the *World* are
sustained——— This *Heat* is plainly discerned in
Things of a terrene Nature, for we see, that
Fire is elicited by Friction, and the striking of
one Stone upon another; that Earth, when new
turned up, sends forth a kind of Smoke; and
that Water is drawn warm, especially in Win-
ter, from Spring-Wells, in Consequence of the
great Force of *Heat*, which is contained in the
Caverns of the *Earth*, and which, upon Con-
traction of the Water in frosty Weather, is more
closely confined——— That there is also a certain
Mixture of *Heat* in Water, the Fluidity, and
Effusion of it declare, for it could neither be
turned into Ice by Cold, nor thickened by
Snow and Frost, did it not dilate it self into
Flowings, upon being thawed, and made liquid
by the Heat, which is mingled with it; thus
doth it become hard by Northern, and other
cold Blasts, and, anon, is softened and dissolved
by milder Gales: The *Seas* too, when tossed by
Winds, are warmed to such Degree, that it is
easy to apprehend, that this huge *humid* Body,
hath a certain *Heat*; nor is this Warmth to be
reputed

ther he appointed to Man an End,
and Rule of Action, different from
that

reputed external and adventitious, but is excited, by Agitation, from the inmost Parts of the Deep, which happens also to our Bodies, when heated by Motion, and Exercise——Even Air, which is naturally most cold, is far from being void of Heat, which arises from Exhalations, breathing from the Waters, a certain Vapor whereof may be reputed Air, deriving its Being from the Motion of that Heat, which is contained in the Waters, in like Manner, as Liquors are made boiling-hot, by putting Fire under them.

Now, as to the fourth Part, or Element, of the World, the whole intire Nature of it is altogether fervid, and communicates vital, salutary Heat to all other Things, whence I clearly conclude, that, since the several Parts of the World subsist by Virtue, and in Consequence of Heat, the Universe must, through such a length of Time, have been sustained by a Warmth similar, and proportionate to its Nature; and the rather too, in regard it may be presumed, that this hot and fiery Quality is infused into every particular Nature, in order to give it a Power of generating Things of the same Kind, from which Power
all

that of other Creatures? or left him
to act, without the Restraint of a particular

all living Creatures, and whatever is fixed in the Earth by the Root, must necessarily receive Birth, and Augmentation——*Nature*, therefore, is what binds together, and preserves in Being, the *whole World*, yet not without the aid of *Sense*, and *Reason*; for every Nature, which is not simple, and void of Qualities, but annexed and conjoined to another, must necessarily be indued with some one Virtue of an Excellency, superior to all the rest; as *Reason* in *Man*; and in *Beast*, somewhat analogous to it, from which Appetites and Desires take their Rise——That, therefore, wherein the principal Power and Efficacy of *universal Nature* resides, must be the *most excellent*, and worthy of *Dominion* over all other Things——We see that *Parts* of the Universe (for there is Nothing in the *whole World*, which is not a *Portion* thereof) are furnished with *Sense* and *Reason*, Therefore that *Particular* of it, wherein consists its *sovereign*, ruling *Power*, must also necessarily be indued with *Sense* and *Reason*, in a more extraordinary and ample Manner, whence it inevitably follows, that the *World* doth excel in *Wisdom*, and that *Nature*, which holds all Things in her Embrace, in *Perfection* of Reason; consequently, the *World* is a *God*, and the *Powers* thereof

ticular Law, to direct his Conduct?
If he is restrained, what Ground of
Obligation

thereof are contained in *Divine Nature*.——
The *Heat* also of the *Universe* is more pure, clear,
and lively, and, therefore, more apt to move the
Senses, than that *Warmth* of Ours, whereby
Things, which are *familiar* to us, are continued,
and increased: Since therefore *Man* and *Beast*
have this *Heat*, and so come to be Sensible and
Animated, it were absurd to affirm that the *World*,
which is indued with a more complete, bright,
free, quick, and volatile *Ardor*, is void of *Sense*,
especially when the *Heat*, which appertains to
the *Universe*, is not agitated by *alien, external*
Force, but is *spontaneously* moved of it *self*; for is
any Thing of greater *Power*, and *Might*, than the
World, that it should be able to force, and move
the *Heat* it contains: *Plato*, who passes for a lit-
tle God among the Philosophers, is of Opinion
that there are two Sorts of Motion, the one *pro-*
per, the other *external*, and that That, which of
its own accord is actuated by it *self*, is more *Di-*
vine, than the Other, which is raised from *exter-*
nal Impulse; this *voluntary* Sort he places only
in our *Minds*, and conceives, that from thence the
Original of *Motion*, that is, the Motion of uni-
versal Nature, is derived: Wherefore, since all
Motion arises from the *Heat* of the *World*, and
this

Obligation is the Restraint raised from, and what the precise, determined

this Ardor moves *spontaneously*, and not upon any foreign Force, it must necessarily be *Animus*, and, in Consequence, the *World* is *Animated*: And that the *World* is also provided of an *Understanding*, and hath Intelligence, may be inferred from hence, that the Universe is certainly more excellent, than any other *Natural Being*; for as we have not a *Limb*, which is not *less* than our *whole Body*, in like Manner, *Universal Nature* cannot but be of greater Value, than any one *Part* thereof; and, if so, it must necessarily be indued with *Wisdom*: For, were it not; Man, (who is a *Part* of the *World*) because furnished with *Reason*, would be of more *Worth*, and *Value*, than the whole World——If therefore we proceed from the meanest, imperfectest, and most unfinished Natures, to the highest and most perfect, we shall undoubtedly come to the *Nature* of the *Gods*: For, in the first place, we find that Nature upholds, and sustains those Things, which spring from the Earth, whereunto She hath extended her Bounty no farther, than barely to provide for their Growth and Support: On *Beasts* She hath bestowed *Sense* and *Motion*, and a certain *Appetite*, which inclines them to pursue what is Salutory, and to avoid what is hurtful: To
Man

mined Bounds of Just and Unjust,
Right and Wrong? whether there
I is

Man She hath been more liberal, in That She hath given him Reason, whereby to govern his Passions, and the Appetites of his Mind, which should sometimes be restrained, and sometimes remitted: The fourth, and *highest* Degree belongs to those Powers, which are *Good*, and *Wise* by Nature, and who had, from the Beginning, a *Reason* constant, and rectified, beyond the Reach of what *Humanity* can pretend to, and, therefore, is to be ascribed to *God*, that is, to the *World*, wherein this perfect and absolute Reason cannot but be inherent, in regard there is not any Ordination or Appointment of Things, but what hath somewhat *Final* and *Consummate*; for as Nature, if at Liberty, fulfils her Course, even in a *Vine*, or in a *Sheep*, by a peculiar way of her own, and as *Painting*, *Architecture*, and other Arts, are not without a certain End of *Perfection*, it is much more necessary that, in *Universal Nature*, there be something *complete* and *absolute*; for *particular* Natures are liable to sundry external Accidents, which may obstruct their Progress to Perfection, but *Universal Nature* *Nothing* is able to hinder, because it doth it self contain, and bind up all *Single* Natures: That, therefore, must necessarily be the fourth, and *highest* Degree, whereunto

is any Chief Good of MAN? What its
Source?

whereunto no contrary *Force* can reach ; and in this *Degree* the Nature of Things is placed, which, being of Energy to influence all other Things without Impediment, must, in consequence, necessarily be indued with Understanding and Wisdom ; for what could argue more Ignorance, than either a *Denial* of that Nature to be the *Best*, which comprehends all others, or, being the most *valuable*, not to suppose it to be *Animated*, and to partake of Reason, Intellect, and Wisdom? For how else could it be the *Best*? Were it only qualified after the Manner of *Trees*, or *Brutes*, it might be taken rather for the *least*, than for the most *excellent* ; and though it did partake of *Reason*, and yet were not *Originally* wise, the *Condition* of the *Universe* would, in some Sort, be inferior to the *Human*, for it is possible for us, by Care and Culture, to become Wise, but if the World was for an infinite Space of Time past, destitute of Wisdom, it can never attain it, and, therefore, will be *worse* than *Man* ; but since this is absurd, the *World* must be accounted *Wise* from the *Beginning*, and a *God* ; for, excepting the *World*, there is not any Thing, but what is defective in some respect or other, and not every way apt, full, and perfect in all its Degrees and Proportions, for the *Covering* (as *Chrysippus*

Source? and what its Constitution?

I 2

and

pus wittily hints) was made for the *Buckler*, and the *Scabbard* for the *Sword*; so, bating the *World*, all Things else were created for the Sake of *Others*, as Grass and the Productions of the Earth for *Beasts*, they, for the Use of *Man*; and *Man* himself was born to contemplate that *Power*, which is in the *Universe*, and to imitate it, as not being absolutely complete, but only a certain *Particle* of *Perfection*, whereas the *World*, inasmuch as it comprizes all the *Parts*, and every Thing is contained therein, is intirely *perfect*: What then can be wanting to That, which is the *Best*? But nothing is more estimable than *Reason* and *Understanding*, consequently the *World* cannot be destitute of *Understanding*, and *Reason*—— the same *Chrysippus*, therefore, did very well in proving, by way of Similitude, that the Abilities of each *Individual* are generally greater, when come to full Growth, as of a *Horse*, than a *Colt*; a *Dog*; than a *Whelp*, a *Man*, than a *Boy*; and, therefore, whatever is *Best* in all the *World*, must necessarily be inherent in some complete, and absolute Nature; but Nothing is more *perfect*, than the *Universe*, nor *Better*, than *Virtue*; consequently *Virtue* belongs to the *World*, as being a complete *Essence*, resulting from all its Potencies: For *Human Nature* is not consummate,

and how attainable? with various
Dis-

summate, and yet *Virtue* is effected even in Human Nature, how much more easily, then, in the *World*? *Virtue*, therefore, is inherent in the *World*: consequently, the *World* is *Wise*, and, moreover, a *G O D*.

The *Malmesburian* Philosopher, falsely so called, every where asserts, that to say there is any *immaterial Substance*, is not so much an *Error*, as *Nonsense*—it is using an *insignificant Word*, whereby we conceive *nothing*, but the *Sound*——in his *Kingdom of Darknes*, he is very angry with *Aristotle* for bringing in, as he saith, the Doctrine of *separated Essences*, and also of *Immateriality* and *Incorporeity*, for what is not *corporeal* is *nothing*, and, consequently, *no where*——the *Universe*, saith he, is *corporeal*, that is to say, *Body*, and hath the *Dimensions of Magnitude*, namely, *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Depth*; also every *Part of Body* is *Body*, and consequently, every *Part of the Universe* is *Body*, and, that, which is not *Body*, is not *Part of the Universe*; and, because the *Universe* is *All*, that which is no *Part of the Universe*, is *nothing*, and, consequently, *no where*——again, no *Man* can conceive any *Thing*, but he must conceive it in some *Place*, of some determinate *Magnitude*, and as that, which may be divided into *Parts*——again, an *incorporeal Substance* is a *contradictory*, and inconsistent
Name;

Disputes of the like Nature, which
are

Name; it is all one as to say, an incorporeal Body, which Words, when joined together, destroy one another, and therefore Body and Substance are all one.

—— again, the proper Signification of the Word, Spirit, in common Speech, is either a subtile, fluid and invisible Body, or else a Ghost, or other idle Phantasm of our Imagination—— again, to Men that understand the Meaning of the Words, Substance and Incorporeal, they imply a Contradiction, and to say an Angel, or a Spirit, is an incorporeal Substance, is to say, in Effect, there is no Angel, nor Spirit—— in another place, he goes on to assert that GOD himself is a most pure, simple, and corporeal Spirit—— and defines a Spirit in general, to be a thin, fluid, transparent, and invisible Body—— Spinoza also, in his Opera Posthuma, determines extended Substance, (that is, Body) to be one of the infinite Attributes of the Deity, which he undertakes to demonstrate from hence, that there is not any other Substance, but GOD, who, consequently, is a corporeal, as well as a Cogitative Being—— *Deus est res extensa*——

Nor is this a modern Opinion only, for Plato tells us, that there were some in his Time, who asserted nothing to be Substance, but what they could feel, and which would resist their Touch; and, that these Men affirmed Body and Substance
to

are manifest Proofs of vast Weak-
ness

to be the same Thing, and what they were not able to lay hold of, and to grasp with their Hands, they affirmed to be really nothing; and if any Man happened to talk to them concerning any Thing, which was not Body, they ridiculed and despised him, and would not hear a Word more he could say. *Sophist.* p. 172. *Ficin.*

Aristotle also tells us, that such were the Principles of some of his Cotemporaries——they affirm, saith he, *Matter*, or *Body*, to be the only Substance, and that all other Things are only the *Passions* and *Affections* of Body——and in another Place, saith he, they assert all Things to be one; that there is but one *Nature* only, which is the *Matter* of all Things, and this is corporeal, and hath *Magnitude*——which was, long before, the Opinion also of *Leucippus* and *Democritus*.

Epicurus argues against *Plato*, that there can be no incorporeal Deity, not only because no Man can frame a *Conception* of an incorporeal Substance, but, also, because whatever is incorporeal, must needs want *Sense*, *Prudence*, and *Pleasure*, and therefore an incorporeal Deity is a *Contradiction*——and all his Followers continued in the same Opinion, that there is *Nothing* in *Nature*
but

ness in the Human Intellect, when
left

but *Body*, and *Void*——all the *Epicureans*, saith *Sextus Empiricus*, maintained *μὴ εἶναι ἀσώματον*, that there is *Nothing incorporeal*, or immaterial.

We plainly see then, that the Moderns transcribe the Opinions of the Antients, and, that the Notion Mr. *Hobbes* seems to be very fond of, and which he would fain set up as his own Discovery, That a *Spirit is nothing but a thin, fluid, and transparent Body*, seems to be plainly taken from the *σώμα λεπτομερές*, which, *Aristotle* tells us, was the Definition some Men gave of a *Spirit*, or the *Soul of Man*.

That an *immaterial Substance* is an *unconceivable Thing*, is every where the Language of *Hobbes*, who pretends to explain the true Cause of the *Fiction* about *immaterial Substances*——the Notion, he tells us, took its Rise from the Abuse of *abstracted Words*, and *Metaphysical Terms*, which some have fancied as *real Entities*, separated and distinct from the Subject, or *Matter*, of which they are *Attributes*, or *Qualities only*,——thus for Instance, *because*, saith he, *we can consider Thinking*, or a *reasoning Power*, *alone by it self*, and distinct from *Body*, therefore some have been so foolish, as to conclude, that it is not the *Action*, or *Accident* of that *Body*, in which it is, but a *real Substance*
by

left to subsist, and operate, solely
on

by it self; and, it is upon this Account, that when a Man is dead and buried, they will say, his Soul, (that is, his Life) can walk, separated from the Body, and is seen by Night among the Graves, whereas Life is only a Name of nothing, and the Soul, or Mind of Man, is in Reality nothing else, but the Result of Motion in the organical Parts of his Body

——— *Leviath. P. 373. ibid. 372. ibid. 190. & de cive* ———

In Consequence of this, the Soul, like the Forms and Qualities of other Things, depends purely on the Mechanism, Modification, and Motion of the Parts of Matter, according as it happens to be variously disposed, figured, and agitated, and consequently can be nothing distinct from that Body, whose Form, and Quality it is: And this Soul, or Mind, or any other Faculty, or Quality in Man, coming once to be conceived as a Thing, distinct from the Body, and being invisible and insensible, hath been called by Names, which we use to give to fine, subtile, aerial Bodies, as *πνευμα*, Spiritus, &c. which properly signify the *Wind*, or the *Breath* of Man; and therefore Mr. *Hobbes* tells us, that in order to express our greater Honour of GOD, the Name of *Spirit* hath been given to *him* likewise, as better expressing

on the Fund of its own Strength.

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THIS

pressing to vulgar Apprehension his fine, aerial, subtile Nature, than the grosser Word, *Body*: But however, *Philosophers* and Men of *Sense* take Care, not to be imposed upon by insignificant Words, so far as to imagine there can in *Reality* be any such Thing, as an *incorporeal Substance*, which is, when thoroughly considered, an absolute *Contradiction*, *Nonsense*, and nothing but an *empty Name*, with which poor Wretches are frightened, as Birds are from Corn with an empty Doublet, a Hat, and a crooked Stick — which is the Sum of what this mighty Philosopher saith against *immaterial Substances*.

Spinoza, in his postumous Works, asserts that there is but *one only Substance* in the World, which Substance is *God*, *Matter*, or *Body* being one of the Attributes of this *Substance*, or the Mode, by which *GOD* is considered, as *res extensa*, from whence he concludes, there can be no *Substance*, but what is *corporeal*, because *Body* is an *essential Property* of this *one only Substance*, the Divine Nature.

¶ The

THIS Imperfection, and Natural Incapacity in the Human Mind, of discerning Religious and Moral Truth *d* with clear and convincing Evidence, the

d The Philosophers, having no Knowledge of the whole Scheme, Order, and State of Things, the Method of GOD's governing the World, his Design of creating Mankind, the Original Dignity of Human Nature, the Ground and Circumstances of Men's present corrupt Condition, the Manner of the Divine Interposition necessary to their Recovery, and the glorious End, to which GOD intended finally to conduct them; having no Knowledge, I say, of all this, their whole Attempt to discover the Truth of Things, and to instruct others therein, was like wandering in the wide Sea, without knowing whither they were to go, or having any Guide to conduct them; and, accordingly, the wisest of them were never backward to confess their own Ignorance, and great Blindness: *That* Truth was hid from them, as it were, in an unfathomable Depth: *That* they were much in the Dark, and very dull and stupid, not only as to the profounder Things of Wisdom, but as to such Things also, which seemed very capable of being in great Part discover-

the wiser Philosophers where deeply sensible of, and loudly lament it, as their greatest Misery, that they are

K 2 left

discovered: Nay, *That* even those Things, which in themselves were of all others the most manifest, (that is, which, whenever *made known*, would appear most obvious and evident) their natural Understanding was, of it self, as unqualified to find out and apprehend, as the Eyes of Bats to behold the Light of the Sun: *That* the very first and most necessary Thing of all, the Nature and Attributes of GOD himself, were, notwithstanding all the general Helps of Reason, very difficult to them to find out in particular, and still more difficult to explain; it being much more easy to say what GOD *was not*, than what he *was*: And finally, *That* the Method of instructing Men effectually, and making them truly wise and good, was a Thing very obscure and dark, and difficult to be found out. In a Word, *Socrates* himself always openly professed, that he pretended to be wiser than other Men, only in this one Thing, that he was duly sensible of his own Ignorance, and believed, that it was merely for that very Reason, that the Oracle pronounced him the wisest of Men.

More

left to wander, in endless Mazes of Doubt and Error, in Matters of greatest Moment to their Welfare and Happiness: The Disquietude, and Anxiety of Mind, which they express upon this

More particularly; the Manner, in which GOD might be *acceptably worshipped*, these Men were intirely and unavoidably ignorant of: That GOD *ought to be worshipped*, is, in the *general*, as evident and plain from the Light of Nature, as any Thing can be; but, in what *particular Manner*, and with *what Kind of Service* he will be worshipped, cannot be certainly discovered by bare Reason: Obedience to the Obligations of Nature, and Imitation of the Moral Attributes of GOD, the wisest Heathens easily knew, was undoubtedly the most *acceptable Service* to GOD, but some external Adoration seemed also to be necessary, and *how This* was to be performed, they could not with any Certainty discover: Accordingly, even the very best of them complied therefore with the outward Religion of their Country, and advised others to do the same; and so, notwithstanding all their wise Discourses, they fell lamentably into the Practice of the most foolish Idolatry.

Plato,

this Occasion, after deep, laborious Searches into Truth, and the Moral Nature of Things, is a natural, demonstrative Proof of the absolute Necessity

Plato, after having delivered very noble and almost divine Truths concerning the Nature and Attributes of the supreme GOD, weakly advises Men to worship likewise inferior Gods, Dæmons, and Spirits, and dared not to condemn the worshipping even of Statues also, and Images, dedicated according to the Laws of their Country, as if the Honour, which they paid to lifeless Idols, could procure the Favour and good Will of superior Intelligences. See *Plat. de Leg. l. 4. id. ibid. l. 2.*—after him, *Cicero*, the greatest and best Philosopher, that *Rome*, or perhaps any other Nation, ever produced, allowed Men to conform themselves to the superstitious Religion of their Country, in offering such Sacrifices to different Gods, as were by Law established, and disapproves of, and finds Fault with the *Persian Magi* for burning the Temples of the *Græcian God*, asserting that the whole Universe was GOD's Temple. *de Leg. l. 2. id. ibid. Lactant. l. 2.*—and to mention no more, (for indeed those of a lower Rank, the *Minuter Philosophers*,

cessity of something more than Human Reason, to support and assist the Mind, in the Pursuit of true Knowledge, and real Happiness.

Cicero, in the Preface to his third Book of *Tusculan Questions*, gives a lively Description of the General Disorder of the Human Mind: If Nature, saith he, had so formed us, that we could have had a clear and distinct View of her, and have constantly followed her excellent Direction, we should not have wanted any farther Instruction,

as *Tully* calls them, are not worth the mentioning) that admirable Moralist, *Epictetus*, who, for a true Sense of Virtue, seems to have had no Superior in the Heathen World, even *he also* advises Men to offer Libations and Sacrifices to the Gods, every one according to the Religion, and Custom of his Country, *cap. 38. Dr. Clarke's Lectures.*

Instruction, but she hath afforded us only some small Sparks of true Reason, which by vicious Habits and depraved Opinions we so smother, that the clear and genuine Light of Nature no where appears in its full Strength: And, again, there are Seeds of Virtue in the Mind, which, if suffered to rise and ripen to Maturity, would be able, by the Guidance of Nature, to lead us to Happiness; but, as the Case now stands, we go astray as soon as we are born, and pursue the Paths of various Error, and perverse Opinions.

PROBABLY, in Consequence of reflecting on the Darkness and Disorder of Human Nature, and the Necessity of a superior Light to guide it,

Socrates

Socrates, is introduced by *Plato* *e*, informing *Alcibiades*, that Men ought to wait with Patience, till they are taught

e This remarkable Passage, which I very briefly touched on, I afterward found quoted entire, by the learned Dr. *Clarke*, in his *Evidences of Natural, and revealed Religion*, and applied to the same Use, which I make of it, and, therefore, I shall lay before the Reader the whole Passage, with the Reason, and Manner of Dr. *Clarke*'s introducing it.

Since there was plainly, and confessedly, wanting a *Divine Revelation*, to relieve the Necessities of Men in their natural State, and since no Man can presume to say, that it is inconsistent with any of the Attributes of GOD, or unbecoming the Wisdom of the CREATOR of all Things, to supply that Want, to reveal to his Creatures more fully the Way to Happiness, to make more particular Discoveries of his Will to them, to set before them, in clearer Light, the Rewards and Punishments of a future State, to explain, in what Manner, he will be pleased to be worshipped, and to declare what Satisfaction he will accept of for Sin, and upon what Conditions he will receive returning Sinners;
nay,

taught more perfectly, how to behave themselves toward GOD and MAN, and assuring them, that GOD would,

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may, since on the contrary, it seems *more suitable* to our *Natural Notions* of the *Goodness* and *Mercy* of GOD, to suppose, that he should do all this, than not: It follows, undeniably, that it was most reasonable, and agreeable to the Dictates of Nature, to *expect*, and *hope* for, such a Divine Revelation. The Generality of the Heathen World, who were far more equal, and less prejudiced Judges, in this Matter, than modern Deists, were so fully persuaded, that the great Rules, for the Conduct of Human Life, must receive their Authority from Heaven, that their chief Lawgivers thought it not a sufficient Recommendation of their Laws, that they were agreeable to the Light of Nature, unless they pretended also, that they received them from GOD: But I have no need, in this Argument, to make Use of the Examples of Idolatrous Lawgivers; the Philosophers themselves, the best, and wisest, and the least superstitious of them, that ever lived, were not ashamed to confess openly their Sense of the Want of a Divine Revelation, and to declare their Judgment, that it was most natural, and truly agreeable to right and sound Reason, to *hope* for something

one Time or other, remove the present Cloud from their Minds, and enable them to discern the true Difference

thing of that Nature. There is a most excellent Passage in *Plato* to this purpose, one of the most remarkable Passages, indeed, in his whole Works, though not quoted by any I have met with, which therefore I think highly worthy to be transcribed at large, as a just and unanswerable Reproach to all those, who deny, that there is any Want, or Need, of a Revelation.

It seems best to me, saith *Socrates* to one of his *Disciples*, that we expect quietly, nay, it is absolutely necessary, that we wait with Patience, till such Time, as we can learn certainly how we ought to behave our selves both towards GOD and towards Men; when will that Time come, replies the *Disciple*, and who is it, that will teach us This? for methinks I earnestly desire to see, and know, who the Person is, that will do it: It is one, saith *Socrates*, who has now a Concern for you, but, in like Manner, as *Homer* relates, that *Minerva* took away the Mist from before the Eyes of *Diomedes*, that he might be able to distinguish one Person from another, so is it necessary, that the Mist, which is now before your Mind, be first taken away, that afterwards you may learn to distinguish
rightly

rence between Good and Evil, as *Minerva* is represented in *Homer*, dispelling the Mist from the Eyes of

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Diomedes,

rightly between Good and Evil, for, as yet, you are not able to do it: Let the Person, you mentioned, replies the *Disciple*, take away this Mist, or whatever else it may be, as soon as he pleases, for I am willing to do any Thing he shall direct, whosoever this Person be, so that I may but become a good Man: Nay, answers *Socrates*, that Person has a wonderful Readiness, and Willingness, to do all this for you; it will be best then, replies the *Disciple*, to forbear offering any Sacrifices, till the Time this Person appears: you judge very well, answers *Socrates*, it will be much safer so to do, than to run so great a Hazard of offering Sacrifices, when you know not, whether they are acceptable to GOD, or no: Well, then, replies the *Disciple*, we will, then, make our Offerings to the Gods, when that Day comes, and I hope, God willing, it may not be far off——and, in another place, the same Author, having given a large Account of that most excellent Discourse, which *Socrates* made, before his Death, concerning the great Doctrins of Religion, &c. introduces one of his Disciples, replying in the following Manner ——I am, saith he, of the same Opinion with
you,

Diomedes, that he might distinguish between a Divine, and Human Person.

you, O *Socrates*, concerning these Things, that to discover the certain Truth of them, in this present Life, is either absolutely impossible for us, or at least exceeding difficult; yet, not to enquire, with our utmost Diligence, into what can be said about them, or to give over our Enquiry, before we have carried our Search, as far as possible, is the Sign of a mean, and low Spirit: On the contrary, we ought, therefore, by all Means to do one of these two Things, either, by hearkening to Instruction, and by our own diligent Study, to find out the Truth, or, if that be absolutely impossible, then to fix our Foot upon that, which to Human Reason, after the utmost Search, appears best and most probable, and, trusting to That, venture, upon that Bottom, to direct the Course of our Lives; unless a Man could have still some more sure and certain Conduct to carry him through this Life, such as a *Divine Discovery* of the *Truth* would be——I shall mention but one Instance more, and that is of *Porphry*, who, though he lived after our Saviour's Time, and had a most inveterate Hatred to the Christian Revelation in particular, yet confesses in general, that he was sensible, there was wanting some *Universal Method* of delivering Men's Souls, which no Sect of Philosophy had yet found out.

Now,

Now, as Decisions of the Intellect are, or should be, previous to Acts of the Will, when Principles of Direction are wanting in the Intellect, the Motions of the Will must, of Course, be irregular ; and, when they are but doubtfully received, the Operations of the Intellect upon them are proportionably weak, and the Inclinations, in the Will, to Action, still weaker, for, according to the Clearness, and Measure of Conviction in the Intellect, concerning any Truth, the more rational and operative are the practical Conclusions, which are drawn from it, and the more intense, and natural is the Motion of the Will to act, in Consequence of such Conclusions, whereas, a faint Conviction moves the Will but weakly, and a weak Volition seldom ends in Action.

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IN Consequence of this Privation, or Weakness, of true Principles of Direction, and Motion, in the rational Faculties, so devious is the Will from a regular Pursuit of what is Good, and suitable to the Original End of MAN, that we often find in it an Inclination, and Propension, to what is positively Evil, and naturally destructive of the very Body, which even the sensual Appetite should be studious to preserve——For Instance, GOD provided for the Preservation of sensitive Creatures, by their eating such Things, as are suitable to their Natures, and Constitutions: That the Means of their Preservation might not be neglected, he planted in them a Natural Appetite to such Things: And, in order to excite the Appetite to the Pursuit, and Use of such Means, he suited

suitcd, and conformed the Taste of the Things, to the Palates of the Creatures: In brute Animals, this Natural Law is inviolably obeyed, the Motion of their Appetite being always commensurate to the Means of their Preservation; but, in Man, who had a sensitive Appetite, suited, and proportioned to the Exigence of the Body, and made subordinate to the Power, and Direction of Reason, we find preternatural Excesses in Meats and Drinks, not only beyond the Convenience, but even the Inclination and Safety, of his sensitive Nature.

FROM the Sum of Reasoning, hitherto pursued, I clearly conclude, that the true Cause of the Pursuit of false, inadequate Schemes of Happiness, lies in Defects of Intellect, and
Will:

Will : When the Intellect is directed, in its Operations, by a weak or a false Light, the Will is, of course, misguided ; for, as the Soul of Man is always in Motion, to some Thing or other, under the Notion of Good, this Motion *f* naturally sets the Intellect to work, which, when not rightly principled,

f *What is that Good for the Sons of Men?* As this was the greatest Enquiry of the wisest of Men, so it is that Problem, which hath tortured the Wits, and wearied the Pursuits of most of the Children of Men, who have been in the World : The Universality of the Question grows from that restless Motion, in the Soul of Man, after some End, which puts every Man, at last, upon the Prosecution of somewhat, as his End, though it may be not, upon the Speculative and critical Enquiry concerning it. As the Ordinary, rational Faculty of the Soul teacheth a Man to conclude rationally, though he hath not that artificial Reason, which is acquired by Speculation, and Study ; and as this is the Cause, which puts many upon Enquiry, and all upon the Prosecution of some End, so the Difficulty of the Decision doth produce

principled, takes that for a Good, which either the Constitution and Temper of the Body incline it to, or

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present

produce that Variety of Judgments and Practice concerning Ends, which are impossible all to be found true, but possibly they may be all false, inasmuch as there can be but one supreme Good, and adequate End of Man, which is his true Happiness: From hence it is, that amongst the several Determinations of Men concerning this Matter, each doth abundantly convince the other, to be in Error and Mistake, and though no one doth sufficiently satisfy and convince a Man, that it is the right, yet doth it abundantly satisfy, that the adverse Opinion is wrong, because the Truth is, but One, and all the rest, Error; and, though some carry more Likelihood of Reason, than Others, yet they carry so much Distance from Truth, that they are discernable not to be the Truth, and the Mistake is not only evident to Reason, but even to Sense.

As

present Opportunities suggest, as Pleasures, or Profits, or Honours, or empty Speculations, which are found, upon

As the great Creator did appoint himself to be the End of his rational Creature, so he implanted in him a Propension, and Motion to that End, which Propension and Motion is not a mere Natural Inclination, but ariseth from the Fitness of those high Faculties of Understanding and Will for so excellent an Object, in which Faculties he hath placed a Capacity, or Receptibility, in some measure, of himself; and as every Power is ordained, in Reference to Something else, that may actuate and perfect it, and, consequently, moves after that Object, whereunto it is ordained, so this Receptibility, which GOD hath placed in the Soul, doth, or, at least, naturally should move to that Object, which alone can fill its Vacuities and Receptiveness——the Understanding of Man is of vast, and boundless Capacity, receptive of all the Things in the World, and Nothing, which is finite, can satisfy it; hence is it, that it moves from one Thing to another to meet with somewhat, that may satisfy its vast Comprehension——could it meet with an Object, to which it might be perfectly united, and which were large enough to fill it, then
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upon Trial, incompetent Means of Human Happiness, on Account of the vast Disproportion which they

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this Faculty of the Understanding, in this Act of its Knowledge, had its Happiness, because it then had found That, to which it most naturally moves, and wherein it rests : Now, Nothing can do This, but the first and infinite Truth ; my Understanding is as capable of comprehending the whole Earth, as it is of a Tennis-ball, and, could there be a means to unite the Object to my Understanding, were as capacious of the Comprehension of the Compass of the Heavens, as it is of either of the former, yet, when I had acquired that Knowledge, I should still have a *Vacuity*, which might comprehend a Million of Heavens more, for my Understanding pares off the Bulk of Quantity, and the vastest Body takes up no more room in my Understanding, than an Atom ; therefore, certainly I conclude, that the wise GOD, who hath put my Understanding into such a Motion, that it cannot rest in the Knowledge of the Creature, and is too comprehensive for it, hath appointed himself to be the End of my Understanding, in this Act, or Habit of Knowledge, wherein I shall find an Object

bear to the Capacity, and Perfection of the rational Soul, and to the End, to which it was ordained, and fitted

ject, infinitely more than answerable to the Value, Worth, and Comprehension of my Understanding——Here it hath an Object, which satisfies, and fills all its restless Motions; wherein it reads the Satisfaction of all its Doubts and Enquiries, and wherein, though upon the first View it finds more than enough to fill its vastest Comprehension, yet every Atom of its Duration makes new Discoveries of what it thought it wanted not, the Object being infinitely too large for all the successive Actings of the Created Understanding to attain unto, much less, in one Act; an Object, wherein the Understanding finds, not only Amplitude, but unimaginable Delight, while it gazeth on infinite Perfection——every Power, in the Enjoyment of its full and adequate Object, hath Complacency and Acquiescence, which nevertheless is nothing else, but a circular and reciprocal Motion between the Object and the Power, the Power moving with full Desire to the Object, and the Object, enjoyed, returning it self adequately to the Desire, with so swift and imperceptible a Motion, that it is called the Rest of that Power. Sir *Matthew Hale*.

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to move : Or, should the Intellect catch a transient View of the Nature of true Happiness, the Light, which it views it in, is so faint and fugitive a Gleam, and the Conviction, in Consequence, so dim and inevident, that it dares not conclude the Pursuit of a distant Good, which sheds so feeble a Light, worthy to be preferred to the Fruition of Delights, which a Man is sure of, and, therefore, the strong Competition of present Enjoyment gets the better of weak, incomplete Conviction in the Intellect, and, consequently, of all Rational Motion and Pursuit in the Will, which, for Want of the Light of Reason to guide it, runs devious of its Course, and is led captive, by sensual Appetite, to slavish Bondage.

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IN Consequence of this Weakness, and Irregularity in the Rational Powers, Human Nature, according to the sixth Proposition, can no more recover the original Direction, and Natural Course of Operation, from which it departed, till the Cause, which diverted it from that State, shall cease to operate, than a moving Body, forced into a Curve, can exert its natural Inclination to a streight Line, and return from the violent, preturnatural State it was put into, till the Force, which diverted it from the Laws of its Nature, is withdrawn and exceeded by a greater Force: For, when any Thing is disordered, the regulating, restoring Power must be superior in Strength to the Power of the Disorder, for supposing the
Moment

Moment of the restoring Power, to be barely equal to the Moment of the Disorder, the Quantity of the Disorder will for ever remain without Diminution, and supposing the Moment of the Disorder of greater Force, than the Moment of the restoring Power, the Quantity of the Disorder may for ever increase: The regulating, restoring Power, then, must be superior in Strength to the Power of the Disorder.

LET us, then, examine the Moment of the restoring Power in the present Question, and see what Proportion it bears to the Moment of the Disorder: Or, in other Words, let us enquire into the Means, which Natural Reason hath made Use of, to restore Human Nature to its Original

ginal Integrity, and see, whether, in the ordinary Course of Operation, they could possibly answer the End, to which they were applied.

TILL the Intellectual and Moral Powers are restored to their Original Strength and Rectitude, Human Nature must continue in a State of Weakness and Disorder : Before, therefore, any assigned, regulating, restoring Power can efficaciously operate, the Power assigned must enable Human Nature to tread back again the Paths of Error, through which it strayed, which is the fundamental Ground of Recovery from its Disorder, and to return to the Point of Rectitude, from which it diverted, which is the healing, salutary Effect of

of the Operation of the restoring Power.

IN Consequence of a Change in the Human Intellect, and a rational Procedure of the Mind toward Action, the Will, I own, must have Dispositions, Desires, and Resolutions, which prompt a Man to act, otherwise, than he did before, for such is the Natural Constitution of the Human Mind, that we chuse and desire, refuse and determine, according to the different Notions, which we form of Things, Motions in the Will always bearing proportion, in the regular Course of Operation, to the Powers and Influences of the Intellect: For, the Will, being a rational Faculty, doth, or ought, to operate in a rational Way, with this only Difference

ference from the Operation of the Intellect, *g* that though the same Thing is the Object of both, it is considered and pursued under different Notions, in like Manner, as the same Body is the Object of the Eye, as coloured, and of the Touch, as hard: For Instance, though Good is the Object of the Intellect, when the Truth,

g The same simple, individual Soul considers, and, on due Deliberation, concludes the same individual Thing, as Good, and, in Consequence of such Deliberation and Conclusion, pursues it, as eligible, or fit to be attained: This deliberative Power of the rational Soul is by the Schoolmen called Intellect, and the elective Power, Will, which deliberative and elective Powers are, through Inadvertence to the natural Procedure of the Human Soul to Action, vulgarly considered, as two Faculties, really distinct, whereas their Distinction is, in Fact, merely nominal, as being expressive of two Acts of the same undivided Soul, in order to the Attainment of the same individual Good, or End.

Nature,

Nature, Circumstances, Degrees, and Fitness of it are under Examination, it is also the Object of the Will, when considered, in Consequence of such Examination, as a Thing desirable, and, therefore, the Will is only a Motion of the rational Soul, to an Union with any Thing, which the Intellect concludes Good.

WHEN the rational Powers are duly principled, and furnished with Strength and Resolution, sufficient to perform their respective Offices; the Intellect enabled to ponder with mature Deliberation the Weight of Things, and the Will disposed and ready to chuse or refuse, according to the Moment of their Weight and Measure, in Consequence of this regular Order in the Rational OEconomy, the inferior

ferior and Animal Powers of Human Nature, the Affections, and Passions, and Sensitive Appetite must, of Course, submit to the Conduct of Reason, and to the Choice of the Will.

AND, here, I am carried back again to reflect, with religious Wonder, on the rational and animal OEconomy of Human Nature, in respect of the Principles and Powers of Moral Action, with which it was furnished in its Original Formation: How surprizingly did they conspire to produce the same End! With what Fitness, and Harmony, contribute to, and borrow from each other, mutual Influence and mutual Aid! and with what marvellous Mixture of Power, and Subordination, support and facilitate one another, in the
main

main Business of their Nature! For, according to the Original Frame and Constitution of the Human System, moral Actions are all placed in the Power of the Will, and the Will is situate in a middle Station, ready to be moved to operate, by Appetites and Passions on the one Side, and to be influenced and guided, in its Motions and Operations, by the Intellect on the other: In this happy Situation of the directive and operative Powers of Human Nature, a Man cannot, rationally, Will any Thing, but what he clearly knows, and what he clearly knows, and Rationally Wills, his Passions and Appetites vigorously excite him to. Divine Parent of Beings, how marvellous are thy Works! How curious, and delicate of Texture, the Original Frame
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of Human Nature! The Intellect laid open to the Light, and Influence of Truth! The Will, tractable and pliant, with Ease and Pleasure, to the Rules and Dictates of Reason! And the Affections, and Passions, and Appetites in the Animal OEconomy, calm and submissive, and ministerially operative in aiding the Powers of the superior Faculties!

WHEN it is proved, then, that Natural Reason is able, by its own Direction, Influence, and Operation, to restore the Human System from a State of Weakness and Disorder, to the State which I have here described, and which I have, I presume, more directly proved, in another Place, to have been the State, wherein MAN was created, I will readily allow, that

that there is, in Human Nature, a regulating, restoring Power, superior in Strength to the Power of the Disorder.

OUR Enquiry, therefore, now is, what Natural Means have been made use of, to restore the Rational and Animal Powers to their Original Strength and Rectitude, and what Success the Use of such Means hath met with, in the Natural Course of their Operation.

ALL Beings upon Earth, save MAN, have acted, regularly and uniformly, from the Origin of their Existence to this Day, because the Rules, which they pursue and act by, are Qualities, Inclinations, and Propensions, blended with the Substance of their Nature,
and,

and, therefore, can never cease to operate, in an uniform Manner, till the Effence of their Nature is changed: But, in respect of Man, the Case is quite otherwise, for Principles of Reason in the Intellect, by which the whole Man is mainly steered in his Course of Action, being foreign and adventitious to the Soul, these Principles, and the Habits arising from them, may, without an essential Change in his Nature, be quite lost, or, at least, so far disordered and impaired, that a Man may move in a Course, very different from his Original Direction.

ALL Knowledge, then, being unessential and extrinsical to the Intellect, and originally received from Organs of Sense, the Intellect, when
furnished

furnished with Materials of Operation by these Means, may, by its own Natural Strength, deduce from them many Inferences and Conclusions, of signal Use to the Conduct and Happiness of Man: but, if the Nature of the Object, which it is in quest of, lies beyond the Reach of Sense, the Intellect can no more discern it, till it is conveyed to it by other Means, than a blind Man can discern Colours, there being no Possibility of any Apprehension of it in the Intellect, till it can be seen in some sort of Light.

A Man may, I own, by the Strength of Natural Reason, find out several Truths of an high Nature, when some pre-existent Means of Discovery assist him in the Enquiry; but

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this tracing of Truths, through dark Paths, is so far from being a new Discovery, that it is only a confused Vision of what the Intellect had a clear, and full view of, in its Original Perfection.

BUT whatever may be said, concerning the Power and Sagacity of the Intellect, in retrieving certain antique Truths, in some Measure, from utter Ruin, there are several Truths of great Moment, wherein Man is nearly concerned, which cannot possibly be collected and concluded by Natural Reason, partly, because they lie beyond the Verge of Sense, and, partly, because they are Emanations of the Power, and Will, of a free Agent, and, consequently, not deducible into Knowledge and Assent by rational Conclusions:

Conclusions: For Instance, that all Things had the Beginning of their Being from a First Cause, is an evident, Natural Truth, but in what Way, and Manner, Things began to Be, can never be known by Natural Reason: That, as Man is endued with a rational Soul, he was ordained by his MAKER to a certain End, by use of rational Means, may fairly be concluded by Inferences of Reason; and, that Violation of the Rule, or Means, by which he was to move, must incur, not only Privation of End, but positive Guilt, is also rationally evident: But, that the Purpose of GOD should be defeated in Relation to the End, to which Man was ordained, and what positive Penalty is annexed to the Violation of the Rule, by which he was to be

directed, implies Difficulties, which never can be solved by Natural Reason.

NOR can the Will of Man, in his mere Natural State, be in a better Condition, than his Intellect: For, the Defect of the Will consisting in the Weakness and Disorder of the Faculty, in Absence and Privation of practical Principles of Justice and Holiness, and, in Consequence of this, in a violent Propension to irregular Motions and vain Pursuits, this Defect can never be repaired, but by a foreign Aid, superior in Power to the Prevalence of the Disorder, for Principles of Justice and Holiness are as adventitious to the Soul, as Principles of Truth, and, therefore, when Principles of Action are weak, disordered,

ordered, or lost, the Will can no more move, by Virtue of its own Power, to a suitable End, by proper Means, than the Intellect can deduce Conclusions of Truth, when void of Materials of Operation : The Weakness of the Will, then, cannot be cured by any inherent Powers of the rational Faculties, but must be restored to a regular Motion by Influence and Direction of superior Aid.

I know it hath been the Business, and the Care of wise Men, in all Ages, partly, by Moral Precepts, and, partly, by Institution of penal Laws, to reform the Defects, and irregular Motions of the Human Will : But, as such Methods of Cure are abundant Proofs of the general Disorder, the ill Success, which they met with, is an evident

evident Sympton of the Prevalence of of the Disease, and of the Weakness of the Remedy.

THAT Human Laws are ineffectual to this End, is evident, not only from Experience, but the Nature of Things: For, Human Laws can affect only the external Actions of Men, the Sources of Evil lying beyond their Reach; and, therefore, when legal Restraints can be removed by Force, or their Penalties eluded by Craft or Secrecy, there is nothing left to confine the Will, which, like a mighty Torrent, overbearing the Banks which stopped its Course, becomes doubly impetuous.

IN order to succour this Natural Weakness in Human Laws, and render

der them more effectual to restrain the disorderly Motions of the Human Will, the Philosophers framed, and recommended to the Reason of MEN, certain Laws and Rules of Duty, which seemed most likely to produce that End, rightly concluding, that the Will would become less refractory, if the Intellect could be convinced of the Reasonableness of the Duty.

BUT as Moral Precepts, formed and applied to this End, were generally founded on false, or uncertain Principles, they were also enforced by weak, inadequate Motives, the highest Reason, which a moral Philosopher could produce, to persuade MEN to conform their Actions to his Precepts, being derived from the Dignity
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and Beauty of Virtue, the general Esteem which it procures from MEN, or the natural Tendency of it to Civil Happiness, which Motives, though great Encouragements to Virtue in generous Minds, will appear, on the least Examination, utterly insufficient, of themselves, to restrain and subdue the strong Propension of the Will to Vice.

It is also mainly to be considered, that Obligation to moral Duty cannot be laid on a firm and solid Foundation, by the utmost Strength of Natural Reason : The Moralist tells me, I must be just, suppose ; but how am I obliged to the Practice of this Duty ? If by his Authority, the Answer is easy and natural, he hath no more Authority over me, than I have over him :

him : But Reason is on his Side ; it may be so, but if I do not see this Reason, it neither can, nor ought, to determine my Actions : But the Law, which I live under, obliges me to be just ; perhaps it may, but what obliges me to obey this Law, but Power ? which if I can suspend by equal Power, or elude by Art, I am not obliged : But a due Observance of the Rules of right Reason hath a clear Connexion with Happiness, and Violation of the Precepts of Nature necessarily induces Deformity of Being, and Unfuitableness of Action to the Dignity of MAN : I own it ; but where is the Code of Rules of Reason and Dictates of Nature, to which every Man may recur, as to a perfect System of moral Duty, proved

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ved and made out, by clear Deductions of Reason, to be the Law of Nature? And here the Philosopher is to seek for the true Ground, as well of my Conviction, as of my Obedience.

THERE are I own, several moral Precepts, in the Writings of the Philosophers *b*, conformable to right Reason,

b. The Philosophers taught indeed many excellent Moral Truths; but some, upon one Occasion, and upon one Set of Principles, and some upon another; and all of them were mistaken in some Instances of Duty, and mingled particular Superstitions and false Notions with their good Instructions, and built their Doctrine upon no sure Foundation of consistent Principles; and all of them were very imperfect and deficient, and far from being able to make up an entire and complete Scheme of the whole Duty of Man, in all Cases: But now,

Reason, for the Law of Nature being also a Law of Conveniency and Order, it is not surprizing that Men of great Natural Abilities, and studious of the Happiness and public Weal of

to put together all the wise and good Precepts, which ever were delivered by any wise Men, of any Sect, and in any Age; to improve and exalt every one of them to the highest possible Degree of Excellency and Perfection; to separate and lay aside all the superstitious Opinions and Practices, which had been mixed by all, or any, of the different Sects of Philosophers, or Teachers of Religion in any Nation, with their respective moral Instructions; and to supply all those Doctrines, wherein both moral Philosophy, and the additional Institutions of all Religions in the World, had in the whole been hitherto deficient; and all this, in one plain, entire, and regular System, upon the Foundation of certain, and consistent Principles; this is the peculiar Character of the Christian Institution; and all this cannot, with any Colour of Reason, be imagined to have ever been done by any Man, but one sent immediatly by God.
Dr. Clarke's Lectures.

Mankind, should sometimes happen to judge right, even from the Native Excellence and Civil Convenience of Virtue, without being able to prove its Obligations from the true Principles of the Law of Nature: But the great Misfortune lay here, that even the just Measures of Right and Wrong, which civil Laws prescribed, and Philosophy recommended to the Practice of Men, are only considered, as necessary Bands of Society, and Conveniencies of civil Life, and are, therefore, variable and different, according to the Circumstances of Things, and the different Opinions of the same, or different Men, concerning Means of civil Happiness; but the Natural, and eternal Reasons of their Obligation are no where clearly

clearly known, and received, as Enforcements of a Law, which all Men, at all Times, and in all Circumstances, are absolutely, and indispensably bound to obey, and therefore it is absurd in Lawgivers, and Philosophers, to expect, that Men should pay steady uniform Obedience to Laws, which they cannot enforce by steady uniform Reasons: For, where is the Philosopher to be found, who hath so clearly demonstrated the true Ground and nature of Moral Duty, as to fix the Notion beyond all Controversy? Or, could the Philosopher reduce Morality to Science, in a demonstrative Method, with Clearness of mathematical Proof, how could even such a System of Morality prove effectual to the Reformation of the World? Have the Bulk of
Mankind

Mankind *i* Time and Strength of Reason to examine the Evidence of Demonstration, and to carry in their Heads long Trains of Proofs and Deductions, without which they cannot

i. Those Things, which the Philosophers were most fully certain of, and in good Measure understand, they were never able to *prove clearly and distinctly enough to Persons of all Capacities*, in order to their complete Conviction and Reformation: Because most of their Discourses upon these Subjects have been rather speculative and learned, nice and subtle Disputes, than practical and universally useful Instructions: They proved, by strict and nice Argumentation, that the Practice of Virtue is wise and reasonable, and fit to be chosen, rather than that it is of plain, necessary, and indispensable Obligation; and were able to deduce the Will of GOD, only by such abstract and subtle Reasonings, as the generality of Mankind had by no means either Abilities, or Opportunities, to understand or be duly affected by: Their very Profession and Manner of Life led them to make their Philosophy, rather an Entertainment of leisure Time, a Trial of Wit and Parts, an Exercise of Eloquence, and of the Art and Skill
of

cannot yield a rational Assent? And in Failure of such Ability and Assent, what Human Power is able to reach the Conscience, and bring the Notion into

of good Speaking, than an Endeavour to reform the Manners of Men, by shewing their plain and necessary Duty: And, accordingly, the Study of it was, as *Cicero* observes, unavoidably confined to a few, and by no Means fitted for the Bulk, and common Sort of Mankind, who, as they cannot judge of the true Strength of nice and abstracted Arguments, will always be suspicious of some Fallacy in them: None, but Men of Parts and Learning, of Study and liberal Education, have been able to profit by the subtle Doctrines of *Plato*, or by the sublime Disputations of other Philosophers, whereas the Doctrine of Morality, which is the Rule of Life and Manners, ought to be plain, easy, and familiar, and suited fully to the Capacities of all Men——Another Reason, why the Philosophers were never able to prove and explain, clearly and directly, even those Things of which they were the most certain, to Persons of all Capacities, in order to their complete Conviction and Reformation, was, because they never
were

into Practice, so as to make it the Standard of Duty, and the Rule of Life? For, Human Power is as subject to Contempt and Evasion, as Human Wisdom is to Weakness and Error.

were able to frame to themselves any complete, regular, and consistent System, or Scheme of Things, but the Truths, which they taught, were single and scattered, accidental, as it were, and hit upon by Chance, rather than by any Knowledge of the whole true State of Things, and, consequently, less universally convictive: Nothing could be more certain, than that Virtue was unquestionably to be chosen, and the Practice of it to be recommended necessarily above all Things, and yet they could never clearly, and satisfactorily make out, upon what *Principles originally*, and for *what End ultimately*, this Choice was to be made, and upon *what Grounds* it was universally to be supported: Hence they perpetually disagreed, opposed and contradicted one another, in all their Disputations, to such a Degree, that St. *Austin*, somewhere out of *Varro*, reckons up no less than two hundred and eighty Opinions, concerning that one Question, what was the *Chief Good*, or *Final Happiness*, of Man. Dr. *Clarke's Lectures*.

UPON

UPON the whole, then, Moral Precepts being, in the present Question, the Contrivances and Compositions of Human Reason *k*, must derive all the

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Weakness

k. The Doctrine of far the greatest Part of the Philosophers consisted plainly in Nothing, but Words, and Subtilty, and Strife, and empty Contention, and did not at all amend even their own Manners, much less was fitted to reform the World: Their Scholars, as *Aristotle* excellently describes them, thought themselves greatly improved in Philosophy, and that they were become gallant Men, if they did but hear and understand and learn to dispute about Morality, though it had no Effect at all, nor Influence upon their Manners; just as if a sick Man should expect to be healed, by hearing a Physician discourse, though he never followed any of his Directions: Undoubtedly, saith he, the Mind of the one was, exactly, as much improved by such Philosophy, as the Health of the other's Body by such Physic: And no wonder the generality of the common Hearers judged of their own Improvement of Philosophy by false Measures, when the enormous Viciousness of the Lives of the Philosophers themselves made it plainly appear, that their Art was not so much intended

Weaknesses of the Principle, from which they flow, and consequently are, in proportion, imperfect and inadequate Rules of Duty ; and, having
no

intended and fitted for the Reformation of Mens Manners, as to be an Exercise of Wit and Subtily, and an Instrument of vain Glory——
Whoever pleases, may, in *Diogenes Laertius*, and other Writers, find Accounts enough of the Lewdness and unnatural Vices of most of the Philosophers; *it is a Shame for us, so much as to speak of those Things, which were done of them,* not only in Secret, but even in the most public Manner. I shall only add the Judgment of *Cicero*, a Man, as able to pass a right Judgment in this Matter, as ever lived: Do you think, saith he, that these Things (meaning the Precepts of Morality) had any Influence upon those Men, (excepting only a very few of them) who taught, and wrote, and disputed about them? No; who is there of all the Philosophers, whose Mind, and Life, and Manners were conformable to right Reason? Who ever made his Philosophy to be the Law and Rule of his Life, and not a mere Boast, and Show of his Parts? Who observed his own Instructions, and lived in Obedience to his own Precepts? On the contrary, many of them were Slaves to filthy
Lusts,

no Sanction, but Human Authority, cannot effectually bind the Consciences of Men, which lie beyond the Reach of Human Knowledge : Or, in

Q 2

other

Lusts, many to Pride, many to Covetousness, &c. — Besides, the Philosophers had not Authority enough to enforce, what they were able to prove and explain clearly and distinctly enough — The Truths, which they proved by *speculative Reason*, wanted still some more *sensible Authority* to back them, and make them of more *Force* and *Efficacy* in *Practice*; and the Precepts, which they laid down, however evidently reasonable and fit to be obeyed, seemed still to want Weight, and to be but the Precepts of Men: Hence none of the Philosophers, even of those who taught the clearest and certainest Truths, and offered the best and wisest *Instructions*, and enforced them with the strongest *Motives* that could be, were yet ever able to work any remarkable *Change*, in the Minds and Lives of any considerable Part of Mankind — In Speculation, indeed, it may perhaps seem possible, that, notwithstanding it may be confessed Philosophy cannot discover any complete and satisfactory Remedy for *past* Miscarriages, yet the Precepts and Motives, offered by the best Philoso-

other Words, Systems of Moral Duty, being the Conposures of mere Human Philosophy, and the Power, which requires Obedience, being also merely Human, neither the Rule is indisputable, nor the Power unavoidable, and, consequently, the one is too imperfect, to instruct Men fully, and the other too weak, to restrain Men effectually.

Philosophers, might at least be sufficient to amend and reform Mens Manners for the *future*: But in Experience and Practice, it hath on the contrary appeared to be altogether impossible for Philosophy, and bare Reason, to reform Mankind effectually, without the Assistance of some other Principle: For, though the bare natural Possibility of the Thing cannot indeed easily be denied, yet in this Case, (as *Cicero* excellently expresses it) in like manner as in Physic, it matters nothing, whether a Disease be such as that no Man *does*, or no Man *can* recover from it; so neither does it make any Difference, whether by Philosophy no Man *is*, or no Man *can* be made wise and good; so that without some greater Help and Assistance Mankind is plainly *left in a very bad State.* *Dr. Clarke's Lectures.*

GIVE

GIVE me leave to argue still closer to the Point in Question: Moral Virtue cannot subsist, without sufficient Sanction to bind it on the Conscience, and sufficient Reward to recommend it to our Practice, because, otherwise, should present Interest interfere with Virtue, we have no Reason to prefer Duty:

BUT when signal Advantage is proposed in Favour of Virtue, the Choice of Virtue is highly rational, because, in this Case, we do not chuse Duty in Opposition to Interest, but prefer a greater to a less Interest:

Now, take away Obligations to Virtue, deduced from the Certainty of a future State of Reward, and there can remain no Sanction, no Reason
for

for embracing it, but what terminates in *this* Life, which is generally resolved into present Interest, or popular Opinion:

BUT as Principles of this Kind are ever varying with mutable Circumstances, and must, at different Times, be pursued by different Methods, and contrary Actions, Motives to Virtue become the most uncertain, precarious, and contradictory Things in Nature, that is, Motives to Virtue utterly cease, for if you destroy the Coherence and Stability of the Reasons, which oblige Men to Virtue, Virtue can be nothing but Inconsistence and Folly.

Cicero was so pressed with the Weight of a Reflection on the various Contingencies, which in the usual Course

Course of Influence and Effect, the Goods of Body and Fortune are, subject to, that when he comes to explain his own Principles, he is forced to turn Stoic, and to apply to Virtue, as the sole Remedy of Human Maladies, this being the only Good, which is satisfactory, stable, and permanent, intimate to the Mind, always in his Power, and beyond the Reach of Sicknefs and Poverty.

If, saith he, there is any such Thing as Virtue, it is entirely satisfied with it self, and, in being so, is above Attempts of Fortune: The true Ground of philosophic Wisdom is to slight all other Things, as Trifles, and employ our selves wholly in this great and noble Exercise of Life: Thou soveraign Good of Human Kind!
Thou

Thou Patroness of good Men, and Scourge of Vice, how forlorn and despicable were the Life of Man, or Man himself, without Thee! Thou didst at first found Cities, and call that wild Beast, MAN, out of Caves and Dens into Society! Thou wert the Author of Civil, and Domestic Friendship! Thou art the only Fountress of Laws, and good Manners! To Thee alone we owe the Comfort and Happiness of Human Life, and to thy Divine Discipline we entirely submit our selves! One Day, spent according to thy Precepts, is infinitely to be preferred to an Eternity of Vice.

ALL this is greatly said, and that inimitable Author abounds with Flights of this Kind, in all his Moral Works:

Works : but, as Virtue, without the Certainty of a future State, cannot subsist, as wanting Sanction and Reward, strong enough to bind and enforce it, the main Pillar, on which he raises his magnificent Structure of Human Happiness, sinks into Ruin, and leaves nothing to support the Mind, but Schemes of Eloquence and pompous Phrase : For, that Virtue is, of it self, a Reward, sufficient to justify our Preference of it to all other Things, is a Proposition, in numberless Instances, false in Fact ; for must not Virtue, on this Supposition, forego all Things, rather than it self, and, therefore, must I not, in many Cases, be just, and exert my Fortitude, with apparent Disadvantage to my present Interest, and Danger to my Life ; perhaps, with

R certain

certain Loss of Both? And, how, then, can Virtue alone *l*, abstracted from

1. Men, (that is, the Stoics) who were not *certain* of a future State (though most of them did indeed *believe* it highly *probable*) and yet would not give up the Cause of Virtue, had no other way left to defend it, than by asserting, that it was, in all Cases, and under all Circumstances, absolutely *Self-sufficient* to its own Happiness; whereas, on the contrary, because it is manifestly *not Self-sufficient*, and yet undoubtedly the Cause of Virtue is not to be given up, therefore, they ought from thence to have concluded the *Certainty* of a future State: That Virtue is truly *worthy* to be *chosen*, even merely for its *own* Sake, without any respect to any Recompence or Reward, must, indeed, necessarily be acknowledged; but it does not from hence follow, that he, who *dies* for the Sake of *Virtue*, is really any more *Happy*, than he who dies for any fond Opinion, or any unreasonable Humour or Obstinacy whatsoever, if he has no other Happiness, than the bare Satisfaction, which arises from his Resoluteness in persisting to preserve his Virtue, and in adhering immoveably to what he judges to be right, and there be no future State, wherein he may reap any Benefit of that his resolute Perseverance: On the contrary,
it

from all other Considerations, repair the Damage I sustain by firm Adherence to its Laws? Virtue, there-

R 2

fore

it will only follow, that G O D has made Virtue, necessarily amiable, and such, as Mens Judgment and Conscience can never but chuse, and yet, that he has not annexed to it any sufficient Encouragement, to support them effectually in that Choice. Brave, indeed, and admirable were the Things, which some of the Philosophers have said upon this Subject, and which some very few extraordinary Men (of which *Regulus* is a remarkable Instance) seems to have made good in their Practice, even beyond the common Abilities of Human Nature; but, it is very plain, that the general Practice of Virtue in the World can never be supported upon this Foot, it being indeed neither possible, nor truly reasonable, that Men, by adhering to Virtue, should part with their Lives, if thereby they eternally deprived themselves of all Possibility of receiving any Advantage from that Adherence: Virtue, it is true, in its proper Seat, and with all its full Effects and Consequences unhindered, must be confessed to be the *Chief Good*, as being truly the Enjoyment, as well as the Imitation, of G O D; but as the Practice of it is circumstantiated in this present World, and, in the present State

fore, must be recommended, and enforced by a better, and stronger Reward, before it can be superior to Attempts of Fortune, and become the true Ground of philosophic Wisdom, and Human Happiness.

Now, however certain it may be, that there shall be a Retribution of Recompence in another Life, I do most peremptorily assert, that this future State, with the Reward which may attend it, never yet was, and, I am convinced, never can be made out on Principles of Natural Reason, with Evidence of Proof sufficient to make it a standing, uncontroverted Ground and Rule of Action, for the Truth

State of Things, it is plain it is not *it Self* the chief Good, but only the *Means to it*, as *Running in a Race* is not, in *it Self*, the *Prize*, but the *Way to obtain it*, Dr. Clarke's Lectures.

whereof

whereof I may safely appeal to the Writings of the Ancients, which, I am confident, can never, on the Foot of Natural Reason, be exceeded by better, notwithstanding the high and mighty Claim, which Modern Deists make, to more Natural Sagacity and Wisdom, than their learned Forefathers pretended to, whose *Thoughts* of another Life are at best *obscure*, and their *Expectations* so *uncertain*, that they seem, rather to *wish* and *hope* for, than to have any clear *Conception* of a future State *m*, in Consequence of the Providence

m. As to the Immortality of the Soul, the Certainty of a future State, and the Rewards and Punishments to be distributed in a Life to come——though the best Philosophers could not be *entirely* ignorant of them, yet there was so much *Doubtfulness*, *Uncertainty*, and *Unsteadiness* in the Thoughts and Assertions of these Philosophers concerning them, as could not but
very

Providence of GOD, and his super-
intendency of Human Actions, in
order

very much diminish their proper Effect and Influence upon the Hearts and Lives of Men——I do not here think it of any great Moment, that there were indeed some whole Sects of Philosophers who absolutely denied the *Immortality* of the *Soul*, and peremptorily rejected all kind of Expectation of a *Life to come*, because these Men were weak Reasoners in other Matters also, though, to be sure, this could not but in some Measure shock the *common People*, and make them entertain some Suspicion about the Strength of the Arguments, used on the other Side of the Question by wiser Men; but what I now observe, and which cannot be observed without Pity and Concern of Mind, is, that even the very *best* and *wisest* and most *considerable* Philosophers that ever lived, notwithstanding the undeniable Strength of the Arguments, which sometimes convinced them of the Certainty of a future State, did yet at other Times, express themselves with so much Hesitancy and Unsteadiness concerning it, as, without doubt, could not but extremely hinder the proper Effect and Influence, which that most important Consideration ought to have upon the Hearts and Lives of Men. I am now, said *Socrates* a little before

order to Reward: They talk with
great Rapture, and Eloquence, of
Manes,

before his Death, about to leave this World, and ye are still to continue in it; which of us have the better Part allotted us, GOD only knows; seeming to express a Doubtfulness, whether he should have any Existence after Death, or not — and, again, at the End of his most admirable Discourse concerning the Immortality of the Soul, I would have you know, said he to his Friends who came to pay their last Visit, that I have great *Hopes* I am now going into the Company of Good Men, yet I would not be too confident and peremptory in it: But, if Death be only, as it were, a Transmigration from hence into another Place, and these Things, which are told us, be indeed true, that those, who are dead to us, do all live there, then, &c. — So, likewise, *Cicero*, speaking of the same subject — I will endeavour, saith he, to explain what you desire, yet I would not have you depend upon what I shall say, as certain and infallible; but I may guess, as other Men do, at what shall seem most probable, and farther than this I cannot pretend to go — Again, which of these two Opinions, saith he, (that the Soul is Mortal, or that it is Immortal

Manes, and Ghosts, and Shades of departed Men; of *Elysian* Fields, and
the

tal) be true, GOD only knows; which of them is most *probable*, is a very great *Question*——And again, in the same Discourse, after having brought all those Arguments, beforementioned, in Proof of the Immortality of the Soul, yet we ought not, saith he, to be over confident of it, for it often happens, that we are strongly affected at first, with an acute Argument, and yet, a little while after, stagger in our Judgment, and alter our Opinion, even in clearer Matters than these, for these Things must be confessed to have Obscurity in them——And again, I know not how, saith he, when I read the Arguments in Proof of the Soul's Immortality, methinks I am fully convinced, and yet, after I have laid aside the Book, and come to think and consider of the Matter alone by myself, presently I find my self fallen again insensibly into my old Doubts——From all which it appears, that notwithstanding all the bright Arguments, and acute Conclusions, and brave Sayings of the best Philosophers, yet *Life* and *Immortality* were not *satisfactorily* brought to *Light* by bare *Natural Reason*, but Men still plainly stood in *Need* of some farther and more
complete

the Seats of the Happy ; but, as these
pompous Notions were derived from
S the

complete Discovery. Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. et
n Phæd. Cic. Tusc. Q. lib. 1. id. ibid id. ibid.
See Dr. Clarke's *Lectures*.

Credebam facile opinionibus magnorum vi-
rorum rem gratissimam (animæ immortalitatem)
promittentium magis, quam *probantium*. Senec.
Epist. 102.

Adeo omnis illa tunc Sapientia Socratis de
industria venerat consultæ æquanimittatis, non
de fiducia compertæ veritatis. Turtul. de anima.

Since all rational Creatures by Reason of
that natural Liberty of Will, which is essen-
tially necessary to their being such, cannot but
be capable of exalting and improving their Na-
ture by the Practice of Virtue, and the Imita-
tion of GOD; and, on the contrary, of de-
praving and debasing their Nature by the Prac-
tice of Vice and Alienation of themselves from
GOD, it follows undeniably, that it is highly
agreeable to the Light of Nature and to right
Reason to suppose, that GOD, the supreme
Governor and Disposer of all Things, will
finally make a just and suitable Distinction be-
tween his Creatures, by the Distribution of pro-
por-

the Poets, they found them mixed
with their Fables, and, therefore,
raise

portionable Rewards and Punishments; nevertheless, both the Truth it self of these final Rewards and Punishments was so far called in Question, and rendered doubtful and uncertain, by the Disputations even of the best Philosophers, that ever lived; and those, who did, in general, believe the Truth and Certainty of them, had yet so very blind and obscure Notions of what Nature and Kind they were to be, having their Imaginations strangely prejudiced with poetical Fictions and fabulous Stories, that the setting this Matter clear and right, and the supplying this single Defect in the Light of Nature, was a Thing highly worthy of Divine Revelation, it being plainly a very different Thing, and of very different Force, as to the influencing Mens Actions, for Men to be able to argue themselves into a *reasonable Expectation* of future Rewards and Punishments, and to be *certainly assured* of the *Reality* of them by exprefs Testimony of *Divine Revelation*: And, accordingly, by Divine Revelation in the Gospel, this Defect in the Light of Nature is now actually supplied, in *such Manner*; Life and Immortality are *so* brought to Light, and the Wrath of God is *so* revealed from *Heaven,*

raise their fine, imaginary Structures of future Happiness on Poetic Ground, which floated on the Fancy, without sinking into the Heart: There is

ven, that this very Thing, the clear and distinct, and consistent Account, which the Gospel gives us of these final Rewards and Punishments (which, though indeed in themselves so absolutely necessary, that without them no tolerable Vindication could be made of the Attributes of GOD, yet neither by the Light of Reason, nor by any positive Institution of Religion, excepting only the Christian, were they ever so clearly and plainly represented to Mankind, as to have their full and proper Force upon the Hearts and Lives of Men) this very Thing, I say, the clear, distinct, and consistent Account, which the Gospel gives us of these final Rewards and Punishments, is it self no contemptible Argument of the Truth and Divine Authority of the Christian Religion: By the certain Knowledge of these Rewards and Punishments it is, that the Practice of Virtue is established upon a sure Foundation: Men have now abundantly sufficient Incouragement to support them in their Choice of Virtue, and in their constant Adherence to it, in all Cases, and under all Circumstances, which can be supposed. *id. ibid.*

something, they conceive, in Man, which may escape the Grave, but a complete Life of eternal Duration after the Diffolution of the Body, which is the strongest, and surest, and most operative Motive to Virtue, entered little into their Thoughts, and less into their Persuasion.

WHAT noble Use would the Sagacity and Penetration of *Socrates*, *Plato*, and *Aristotle*, of *Plutarch* and *Cicero*, have made on the immortal Existence of the Human Soul, could they have clearly proved the absolute Certainty of it beyond Controversy, and raised their Systems of Moral Duty on Principles of eternal Reason, and indispensable Obligation : But, from many gross Defects, and inconclusive Arguments, in the Writings of Men
of

of the most exalted, improved, and refined Natural Abilities, that ever appeared in the World, we may fairly conclude, that it is a Task, unequal to the greatest Strength of Human Philosophy, to fix moral Virtue in all its Branches, upon its true Foundations, with clear and convincing Evidence,

SUFFER me to pursue the Point, which I am speaking to, as far, as, I presume, it can be carried on Principles of mere Natural Reason.

I. THE Existence of Things, of every Kind, Order, and Degree of Being, was a free Act of the Will and Power of the Creator :

2. BECAUSE

2. BECAUSE a Thing *now* IS, which *once* was NOT, cannot be inferred in any fair Way of Consequence, that the Thing, now *existing*, shall not cease to Be :

3. ANY Difference in the Duration of one Thing, more than of another, must arise from certain Qualities, and Modes of Subsistence, impressed on the Texture and Constitution of the Things, in their Original Formation:

4. MIXT Bodies, consisting of Parts, naturally and dividedly of different, and otherwise contrary Qualities, Dispositions, and Propensions, are more subject to Decay and Dissolution, than Bodies less compounded, and made up of Parts and Properties, Naturally less inconsistent ; and
These,

These, too, are naturally of less durable Existence, than Beings of an uncompounded, uniform, indivisible Nature :

5. As Substances of the latter Kind, as well as Substances of grosser Consistence, were raised into Being from Non-existence, there is not any Thing in the Constitution of their Nature, that can, by mere Virtue of any inherent Power, preserve them from Annihilation, which is as much a free Act of the Power of the Creator, as their First Production into Being:

6. THE Human Soul cannot be Material, because it thinks, reflects, deliberates, abstracts, infers, and performs many Operations, which cannot result from any Modification, or Refinement of Matter :

7. PURELY

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7. PURELY, and solely, from the Human Soul being of an Immaterial Nature, the Eternal Duration, or Immortality of it, cannot be inferred:

8. IF the Human Soul is Immortal, it is so, either, because it was the Will of the Creator it should exist for ever, or, because the Cessation of its Existence interferes, and is incompatible with, the Purposes, Appointments, and Designations of Divine Providence:

9. THE first presumed Cause is utterly imperceptible to Natural Reason, because the Will of GOD can only be known by certain Manifestations of Things, which lie within the Reach of the Human Intellect,
but

but there is not, in the Universal Compass of Nature, as far as it is discernible to the Intellect, the least Manifestation or Trace to be found of the Immortal Duration of the Human Soul, though plain Evidences of its being Immaterial are deducible, on clear Principles of Natural Reason, from its own Operations :

10. NATURAL Reason, then, must resolve the Immortality of the Human Soul, as far as it can argue about it, into certain Attributes of GOD, relative to his Providential Superintendency of the Actions of Men, in order to Retribution of Reward or Punishment, suited to Merit or Demerit, arising from the Observance or Violation of a certain Law, by which,

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as

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as

as rational Creatures, they are obliged to act:

II. It is true, the Justice of GOD is inseparable from his Essence: It is also true, that as GOD planted in inferior Creatures Instincts and Propensions, suitable to their Natures and Ends, he also gave to Man a Law, answerable to the superior Perfection of his Being: And as these Propensions are internal to inferior Creatures, and rule their Inclinations as well as Actions, the Law, given to MAN, is extended also, not only to outward Acts, but to the inmost Motions of the Rational Soul, as the main Ground of the Moral Nature of the outward Acts: MAN, therefore, by Violation or Observance of this

this Law, must contract Guilt or Innocence, Merit or Demerit, and, in Consequence, Reward or Punishment, which is the Sanction of the Law, by which he is to act : The Distribution of Reward or Punishment, arising from Merit or Demerit, is, in GOD, who is the Lawmaker, an Act of Justice ; But this Justice cannot be executed on Man, if the Soul, which is the Subject of it, doth not survive the Body :

12. I HAVE, I presume, placed the Argument in as strong a Light, as the Nature of the Thing can bear, and yet I conceive it to be very far from being positively conclusive of the Immortality, or eternal Duration of the Human Soul :

13. FROM

13. FROM the Justice of GOD, and the Merit or Demerit of MAN in respect of the End and Law of his Being, may be inferred the Permanence of the Human Soul after the Diffolution of the Body, which is only ministerial to its Operations: But, from the permanent Subsistence of the Soul, cannot be inferred that it must subsist for ever, because it never can be determined by Natural Reason, what Quantity and Duration of Punishment, and, consequently, what Quantity and Duration of Existence, may satisfy and fill up the Measure of Divine Justice: And Infinite Punishment being, on Principles of Natural Reason, immeasurably inadequate to Finite Transgression, determinable Existence, in the
Penal

Penal Way, bears a rational Proportion to determined Obliquity :

14. As the Transgression of one Human Soul may be vastly greater, or less than another, and as Quantity of Punishment is, in the Natural Order of Things, commensurate to Quantity of Transgression, the precise Quantity even of Temporary Existence, equal to the precise Measure of Transgression, can never be determined :

15. As to Reward, in Consequence of Merit, however consistent it may be presumed to be with the Justice and Goodness of GOD to extend the Duration of a *pious* Soul to Eternity, it never can be positively concluded

concluded, on Principles of Natural Reason, that GOD will so extend it : Partly, because such Extension of Existence, in the Way of Reward, is infinitely superior to determined Merit, which, in the present Question, is the Ground even of a temporary future Existence, in order to make Measure of Reward equal and proportional to Measure of Merit, which is all that Natural Reason can possibly contend for : And, partly also, because, on Supposition of eternal Extension of Existence, this Extension is a pure Act of Free-Will in the CREATOR, and, consequently, absolutely indeducible into Knowledge by Rational Conclusions.

HERE

HERE *n* Natural Reason, as far as I am able to pursue it, hath put forth all its Strength, and must remain in an

n In General, that GOD will finally reward Virtue and punish Vice, stands upon the same Foot of Certainty in Natural Reason, as the Proof of the Being, and of the Government of GOD; but in particular, what Degrees, or what Duration of Reward or Punishment, GOD has appointed to either, cannot be known without Revelation——in Natural Consequence of Reason, the Wages of Sin is Death, and that, attended with such Circumstances, and such Duration of Punishment, as shall to the righteous Judge of the whole Earth seem meet; but eternal Life is the free Gift of GOD, in no Consequence of Reason due Naturally, as a Claim of Right, even to innocent and sinless Creatures: It is GOD's mere good Pleasure to give Being to any Creatures at all, and to continue them in Being, for what Space of Time he sees fit, in a State suitable to the Capacities of their several Natures, and in Degrees of Happiness proportional to their moral Improvements; but, when they *have done all that is their Duty to do*, this gives them no Right to Immortality,
nor

an anxious State of Doubt and Uncertainty, in a Matter of the highest Moment, till the Human Intellect is raised and supported by superior Aid, and thereby enabled to present to the Soul a clear View of Eternal Duration.

FROM this short View of the Natural State of the rational Faculties, it is, I presume, clearly evident,

nor to any other State, or Degree of Happiness, than what they were qualified for by the original Capacity of their respective Natures: If Men had never sinned, yet they would have had no Claim, in Point of Justice, to be made equal to the Angels; much less does the Repentance of Sinners put GOD under any Obligation to bestow upon them a blessed Immortality: The *Hope of eternal Life, therefore*, both as to the *Duration*, and as to the *Greatness* of the *Happiness*, is founded *wholly* upon the Promise of GOD in Christ. Dr. Clarke.

that

that the Means *o*, which were made
Use of, to restore them to their Ori-
U ginal

o. There was plainly wanting a *Divine* Revelation to recover Mankind out of their universal Corruption and Degeneracy, and, without such Revelation, it is impossible, that the World should ever effectually be reformed: For, *if* the gross and stupid Ignorance, the innumerable Prejudices and vain Opinions, the strong Passions and Appetites of Sense, and the many vicious Customs and Habits which the generality of Mankind continually labour under, make it undeniably too difficult a Work for Men of all Capacities to discover, every one for himself by *the bare Light of Nature*, all the particular Branches of their Duty, but most Men, in the present State of Things, have manifestly Need of much Teaching, and particular Instruction: *If* those, who were best able to discover the Truth, and to instruct others therein, namely the *wisest* and *best* of the Philosophers, were themselves, unavoidably, altogether ignorant of some Doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, absolutely necessary to the bringing about that great End, the *Reformation* of Mankind: *If* those Truths, which they were themselves very certain of, they were not yet able to prove and explain clearly enough to vulgar Understandings:

If

ginal Strength and Rectitude, have greatly erred from the End they were applied

If even those Things, which they proved sufficiently, and explained with all Clearness, they had not yet Authority enough to inforce and inculcate upon Mens Minds with so strong an Impression, as to influence and govern the general Practice of the World, nor pretended to afford Men any supernatural Assistance, which yet was very necessary to so great a Work: *If*, after all, in the Discovery of such Matters, as are the great Motives of Religion, Men are apt to be more easily worked upon, and more strongly affected, by good Testimony, than by the strictest abstract Arguments, so that, upon the whole, it is plain the Philosophers were never by any Means qualified to reform Mankind, with any considerable Success: *Then*, there was evidently wanting some particular Revelation, which might supply all these Defects: There was plainly a Necessity of some particular Revelation to discover in what Manner, and with what Kind of external Service GOD might acceptably be worshipped: There was a Necessity of some particular Revelation to discover what Expiation GOD would accept for Sin, by which the Authority, Honour, and Dignity of his Laws might be effectually vindicated: There was a Necessity of
some

applied to, and that Man cannot recover the Integrity of his Being, by Virtue and in Consequence of the highest Improvement of the Natural

some particular Revelation to give Men full Assurance of the Truth of those *great* Motives of Religion, the *Rewards* and *Punishments* of a *future State*, which, notwithstanding the strongest Arguments of Reason, Men could not yet forbear *doubting* of: In fine, there was a Necessity of some particular Revelation, to make the whole *Doctrine* of Religion clear and obvious to all Capacities, to add Weight and Authority to the plainest Precepts, and furnish Men with extraordinary *Assistances* to enable them to overcome the *Corruptions* of their *Nature*: And, without the Assistance of such a Revelation, it is manifest it was not possible, that the World could ever be effectually reformed: Ye may even give over, saith *Socrates*, all Hopes of amending Mens Manners for the future, unless GOD be pleased to send you some other Person to instruct you—and *Plato*: Whatever, saith he, is set right, and as it should be, the present State of the World *can only be so* by the particular Interposition of GOD, Dr. *Clarke's Lectures. Plat. in Apolog. Socrat. de Repub. lib. 6.*

Powers of his rational Faculties ; or, in other Words, that there is not in Human Nature a regulating, restoring Power, superior in Strength to the Power of the Disorder :

FOR the Disorder, which Human Nature complains of, arising, partly, from Weakness in the Intellect *p*, and, partly, from Obliquity and Perverseness

p. It may here perhaps be pretended by modern Deists, that Philosophy and right Reason was, of it self, sufficiently able to instruct and preserve Men in the Practice of their Duty; that the great Ignorance and undeniable Corruptions of the whole Heathen World has always been owing, not to any absolute Insufficiency of the Light of Nature it self, but merely to the Fault of the several particular Persons, in not sufficiently improving that Light; and that Deists now, in Places, where Learning and right Reason are cultivated, are well able to discover and explain all the Obligations and Motives of Morality without believing any Thing of Revelation:

ness in the Will, the Remedy, which it hath Recourse to, must answer this
two-

velation: But this, even though it were true (as in the Sense they intend, it by no Means is, because there are several very necessary Truths, not possible to be discovered and explained by the mere Light of Nature alone) but, supposing it, I say, to be true, that all the Obligations and Motives of Morality could possibly be discovered and explained by the mere Light of Nature alone, yet even this would not at all prove, that there is no Need of Revelation: For, whatever the bare *Natural Possibility* was, it is certain in *Fact*, the *wisest Philosophers of old* never were able to do it, to any effectual purpose, but always willingly acknowledged, that they still wanted some higher Assistance: And as to the great Pretences of *Modern Deists*, it is to be observed, that the Clearness of Moral Reasonings was much improved, and the Regard to a future State much increased, even in Heathen Writers, after the coming of Christ; and almost all the Things, that are said wisely and truly by Modern Deists, are plainly borrowed from that Revelation, which they refuse to embrace, and, without which, they could never have been able to have said the same Things. Now, indeed, when our
whole

two-fold Disorder in Human Nature,
by restoring a sufficient Degree of
Light

whole Duty, with its true Motives, is clearly revealed to us, its Precepts appear agreeable to Reason, and Conscience readily approves what is Good, as it condemns what is Evil; nay, after our Duty is thus made known to us, it is easy, not only to see its Agreement *with* Reason, but also to begin and deduce its Obligations *from* Reason: But had we been utterly destitute of all revealed Light, *then*, indeed, to have discovered our Duty in all Points, with the true Motives of it, merely by the Help of Natural Reason, would have been a Work of Nicety, Pains, and Labour, like groping for an unknown Way in the obscure Twilight. What Ground have any Modern Deists to imagine, that if they themselves had lived without the Light of the Gospel, they should have been wiser than *Socrates*, and *Plato* and *Cicero*? How are they certain they should have made such a right Use of their Reason, as to have discovered the Truth *exactly*, without being any way led aside by Prejudice or Neglect? If their Lot had been among the *Vulgar*, how are they sure they should have been so happy, or so considerate, as not to have been involved in that Idolatry and Superstition, which overspread the World? If they had join-
ed

Light and Knowledge to the Intellect,
in order to enable it to discern, and

a.

ed themselves to the Philosophers, which Sect would they have chosen to have followed? And what Book would they have resolved upon to be the adequate Rule of their Lives and Conversations? Or, if they should have set up for *themselves*, how are they certain, they should have been skilful and unprejudiced enough to have deduced the several Branches of their Duty, and applied them to the several Cases of Life, by Argumentation and Dint of Reason? It is *one Thing* to see that those Rules of Life, which are beforehand plainly and particularly laid before us, are perfectly agreeable to Reason; and *another Thing* to find out those Rules merely by the Light of Reason, without their having first been any otherwise made known——assuredly all Men are not *equally capable* of being Philosophers, though Men are *equally obliged* to be *religious*——The Truth at the bottom is plainly this——All the great Things, that modern Deists affect to say of *Right Reason*, as to its *Sufficiency* in discovering the Obligations and Motives of *Morality*, is only a Pretence. Dr. Clarke's Lectures.

Men, who *now* think that no Revelation was ever necessary, but that the Want might always
have

a sufficient Degree of Rectitude to
the Will, to enable it to pursue the
true

have been sufficiently supplied by the Use of Human Reason alone, do not State the Matter fairly, because they unwarily confound part of that Light, which we insensibly receive by the Revelation of the Gospel, with that Light of Nature, which Men had before it, that is, they do not distinguish between those Notions, which the mere Heathen World were in possession of before, and those, which they attained to after the Preaching of the Gospel; and yet whoever carefully considers it, will find that Christianity made a very considerable Alteration, both in the Notions and Practices even of those, who continued obstinate Opposers of its Establishment——and though their Manner of Writing was not so polite, as that of some of the more ancient Philosophers, yet their Thoughts and Reasonings were much improved——And as for our Modern Deists, who have any tolerable Notion either of Natural Religion, or true Morality, they are more beholding for it to that Light of Revelation, in the midst of which they live, and which has greatly cleared up, and firmly established the Principles of Reason, than to any of those Human Discoveries, which Philosophers, utterly destitute of such Revelation, or living
before

true End and Happiness of an Human Being: But, as the Intellect and Will are the principal, leading Faculties in Human Nature, than which there are not any other Faculties of greater Strength and Efficacy; and,

X

as

before it, could certainly lead them to: So that when Men argue against the Necessity, or Usefulness of Revelation from the present Improvement of Reason, they argue against Fact and Experience; and if they were not both very ungrateful, in disowning and despising that Light, whereof they enjoy so great Benefit, without considering it; and extremely vain, in thinking so much better of their own Natural Abilities, than they do of those of all the greatest Men, in the Times preceding the Light of the Gospel, they could not but think it more likely, that such wise and serious Men as *Socrates, Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero*, and others, should understand the State of the World in their own Time, and know how much could be done in that State, towards finding true Religion, and bringing Men to the Practice of it upon the Foot of mere Human Reason, much better than we can do at this Distance, when we cannot be sensible
of

as every Disorder must be set right by Application of Means, superior in Power to the Force of the Disorder, the Recovery of Human Nature from a State of Weakness and Corruption must necessarily be derived from extrinsic

of the Want of Revelation experimentally, because we are prevented by the antecedent Enjoyment of it. Men, who are bred and brought up in *Christian* Countries, where the great Principles both of Natural and revealed Religion are commonly professed and discoursed of without Distinction, and our whole Duty, with all the proper rational Motives of it, are made Parts of ordinary Instruction, even though they have never strictly considered the additional Evidence, which Revelation gives, yet will be able to see, how agreeable to Natural Reason and Conscience many Things in this Light now appear to be, which they could never have so clearly discovered, if they had not been so effectually, though to themselves insensibly, assisted.——It is not always easy to discern, how much of that Stock of Knowledge, which any Man has, was acquired, purely, by his own industrious Application of his Thoughts, and how much by the external

extrinsic Aid, superior in Strength to the Malignity of the Disorder, it being as impossible for the Human Intellect and Will to recover, in any other way, the Knowledge and Rectitude they departed from, as for a Disease to cure it self.

nal Teaching of others ; but yet it is always evident, that without the *latter* he could not have made so great a Progress, as not to need any more Teaching for the future: So though there be *now* no *Occasion* for any *new* Revelation to make Principles of Natural Religion better understood, since we can, by the Help of that Light, which we have already had from Heaven, make such Use of our Natural Reason, as to see our original Obligations in points of Religion and Morality, yet, without that Light, Men were fallen into such a Maze of Uncertainty, that it is evident the wisest of them could not, of themselves, find the Way out of it: And why should any Man *now* think, that, if he had been in the same State, he should have had better Success? Bishop *Leng's* Lectures.

THIS being the Natural Condition of MAN, in his degenerate State, what Atonement can he possibly make to the Author of his Being, for the Violation of a Law, imposed on him in his Original Formation, in order to a certain End, to which, by Virtue of that Law, he was obliged to move?

GIVE me Leave to clear this Point in a Way, which is, I presume, strictly regular, and conclusive:

MEANS, made use of by Beings, merely Natural, in order to their several Ends *q*, are that Law, Rule
or

q. The learned Mr. *Hooker* hath a Passage, in his excellent Works, so pertinent to the Subject which I am now upon, and so enlivened and beautified with poetic Images, that I am persuaded

or Order, which was impressed on them in their Creation, with Inclinations and propensions suited, and

suaded it cannot fail to entertain the ingenious Reader.

If Nature should intermit her Course, and leave, though it were but for a while, the Observation of her own Laws; if those principal and Mother-Elements of the World, whereof all Things, in this lower World, are made, should lose the Qualities, which they have; if the Frame of that heavenly Arch, erected over our Heads, should loosen or dissolve it self; if celestial Spheres should forget their wonted Motions, and by an irregular Volubility turn themselves any way, as it might happen; if the Prince of the Lights of Heaven, which now, as a Giant, doth run his unwearied Course, should, as it were, through a languishing Faintness begin to stand and rest himself; if the Moon should wander out of her beaten Way; the Times and Seasons of the Year blend themselves by Disorder and confused Mixture; the Winds breath out their last Gasp; and the Fruits of the Earth pine away, like Children at the withered Breasts of their Mother, no longer able to yield them Relief; what would become of Man himself, whom all these Things now serve!

naturally

naturally tending, to the Observance of that Law :

THIS Law of Nature, with the regular Procedure of Things in Consequence of it, is a plain Proof of a Lawgiver : For, though Natural Things, pursuant to this Law, move regular and uniform, when not disturbed by outward Causes, this Uniformity of their Motion is so far from being an Argument, that the Law, by which they move, did not proceed from a voluntary Agent, that it proves the contrary, and is a plain Evidence of the Wisdom and Power of the Lawmaker, who foresaw and ordered Things in such Manner, that one uniform Law, or Rule, should direct their Motions to their several Ends, without Alteration : For the
Change

Change of a Law implies Imperfection in the Law, and want of Foresight in the Maker of it to discern the Emergencies, which induce an Alteration ; but, as Nothing can Be, which did not previously exist in the Knowledge and Power of the First Cause of Beings, all Rules and Tendencies to Motion, impressed on Natural Things in their Original Formation, are regularly and uniformly subservient to the Purposes and Ends, for which they were designed :

THE Law of Nature, then, in inferior, sensitive Creatures, is that regular, orderly Course of Motion and Operation, wherein their MAKER placed them, and is evidently manifest in their Natural Tendencies and Propensions to the Protection of their Beings,

Beings, and Propagation of their Kinds, which are the main Ends, to which they are to move: And the Relation, which MAN, the only Intellectual, Voluntary Being upon Earth, hath to the First Cause, and the End, to which this superior Being was Originally directed, may be collected from the following Propositions, which are too evident to require a Proof:

1. THE Disposition of every Thing, to a certain End, was an Act of the Will, and Power of the Creator of Beings:

2. THE End, to which every Thing moves, in the regular Course of Operation, is its own Preservation, and Perfection:

2. As

3. As the Being of Things is different, in Nature and Degree of Excellence, their Perfections are also different, in Proportion to the Degrees of their respective Excellence :

4. ALL Creatures, therefore, in order to move to their several Preservations, Perfections, and Ends, have fuitable Inclinations, Dispositions, and Motions placed in them, as Rules and Means, Naturally conducing to the Pursuit, and Attainment of such Ends :

5. MAN hath something in his Constitution, common to inferior Beings, and, therefore, in that Respect, is directed to the same Natural End, by the same Natural Law, which other Creatures regularly pursue :

Y

6. BUT

6. BUT, as MAN hath an higher Degree of Being, than other Creatures, he hath, in Consequence of this Superiority of Being, an higher End, which he is, or should be carried to, and an higher and different Law, in order to that End, the Pursuit whereof is his greatest Wisdom, because he acts conformable to the Will of his MAKER, and moves to an End, fuitable to his Nature, by fuitable Means :

7. MAN, therefore, without Pursuit of this End by Use of proper Means, either, moves not to a proper End, or, by such a Rule, whereby it is impossible to attain the End, to which he moves :

8. THAT Rule, then, Principle or Instinct, by which Things Natural
are

are carried to their several Operations and Ends, is, in respect of Man, a Law, because Man is endued with Intellect and Will, and, therefore, capable of an higher Rule of Action, than inferior Creatures can be subject to :

9. As the Interruption of this Rule, or Principle, in Natural Things, would induce an Obliquity and Irregularity in their Motions, and thereby divert them from that End, which they might otherwise effectually pursue, the Violation also of this Law, given to Man, in order to direct him to move to a certain End, must, by necessary Consequence, divert him from the Attainment of that End, and he doth, by Virtue of this Diversion, not only contract Deformity and Un-

suitableness of Action to the Will and Design of his MAKER, but moreover incur positive Punishment for the Violation of a Law, which he should, and might have obeyed: For Loss of End and Deformity of Being may casually be contracted by Creatures, void of Intellect and Will, but when a Law is given to a Rational, Free Agent, the Violation of the Law, under such Circumstances, implies not only a privative Offence, which a privative Punishment is adequate to, but implies also an Act of positive Opposition and Disobedience to that Duty and Subjection, which he owes, and is enabled to perform, to his MAKER: And, therefore, it is just, and, in the Natural Course of Things, rational, that there should be added, as a Sanction to that Law, a positive Penalty,

Penalty, that, as Obedience of the Law would have carried Man to the Fruition of a positive Good, the Disobedience of it should be attended with more than mere Privation of that Good :

10. Now, by what imaginable Means can Man, who hath offended his MAKER by erring from the Original Law of his Being, expiate *r* the Guilt

r. That, which of all other Things, the wisest and best of the Philosophers were most absolutely and unavoidably ignorant of, and yet which, of all other Things, was of the greatest Importance for sinful Men to know, was *the Method, by which such as have offended God, may yet again restore themselves to the Favour of God, and to the Hopes of Happiness*: From the Consideration of the Goodness and Mercifulness of GOD, the Philosophers did indeed very *reasonably hope*, that GOD would shew himself placable to Sinners, and might be some Way reconciled, but when we come to enquire more particularly *what Propitiation*

Guilt of that Offence? That GOD, against whom the Offence is committed, may, by an Act of free Will, remit the Guilt, is an undeniable Truth:

But,

pitiation he will accept, and *in what Manner* this Reconciliation must be made, here Nature stops, and expects with Impatience the Aid of some particular Revelation: That GOD will receive returning Sinners, and accept of Repentance; *They cannot certainly know*, to whom he has not declared that he *will* do so; for, though this be the most *probable* and *only* Means of Reconciliation, that Nature suggests, yet whether this will be *alone sufficient*, or whether GOD will not require *something farther* for the Vindication of his Justice, and of the Honour and Dignity of his Laws and Government, and for the expressing *more effectually* his *Indignation* against *Sin*, before he will restore Men to the *Privileges* they have *forfeited*, they cannot be *satisfactorily assured*: For it cannot positively be proved from any of GOD's Attributes, that he is *absolutely obliged* to pardon all Creatures all their *Sins* at all Times, barely and immediately upon their *Repenting*; there arises therefore from Nature no *sufficient* Comfort to Sinners, but anxious and endless Sollicitude about the *Means* of appeasing the Deity:

But, whether GOD will remit it?
Or, by what Means? Or, upon
what Terms? are Questions, which
never can be solved by Natural Reason:
That Man hath violated the
Law of his Being, hath been evidently
proved; and it is equally evident,
that there is not any Thing, in the
Natural Powers of Man, which bears
the least Proportion, in the Way of
Atonement, to the Guilt of the

Deity: Hence those diverse Ways of Sacrificing, and numberless Superstitions, which overspread the Face of the Heathen World, but were so little satisfactory to the wiser part of Mankind, even in those Times of Darkness, that the more considering Philosophers could not forbear frequently declaring, that they thought those Rules could avail little or nothing towards appeasing the Wrath of a provoked GOD, or making their Prayers acceptable in his Sight; but that Something still seemed to them to be wanting, though they knew not what. Dr. Clarke.

Offence,

Offence, for when Man hath done all he can, it is no more than he was obliged to do, and, therefore, cannot, in any Measure, expiate for what he was obliged not to have done.

IN what deplorable Condition, then, is Human Nature left, on mere Principles of Human Reason! and how detestable are the Doctrines of Men, who labour, with malicious Industry, to deprive Human Kind of all the Aids and Consolations of Revelation, and Divine Grace! Revealed Religion, as commonly received, opens to the Intellect, in a clear Light, the whole Scene of Things I have been speaking to, which, on the Foot of unassisted Reason are altogether inexplicable, and gives a plain, consistent, rational

nal Account of Human Nature from its Origin to this Day : It describes the Original Perfection, wherein Human Nature was created, and for some Time continued : It sets forth the Defection and Degeneracy of Human Nature from this Original State, together with the Causes, which produced this mighty Change, and the disorderly Effects, which ensued upon it : It shews the certain and only Cure of the Weaknesses and Disorders, under which it laboured, and hath prescribed a Regimen and Rules of Practice, which, if attended to and properly pursued, will effectually prevent all Danger of Relapse : And hath opened to us, on our Departure hence, a sure Passage to endless Happiness.

Z

BUT

BUT I ask Pardon for this short Digression from my Subject, and return to Points, at present, more pertinent.

IN Prosecution of my Enquiry into the Natural State of MAN, I find my self insensibly led to examine, what Consequences and Effects necessarily result, in the ordinary Course of Operation, from the Principles, upon which a Man must argue and act, who asserts the Sufficiency of Natural Reason to all the Purposes and Ends of his Being; and, I conceive, I cannot place such a Person in a clearer Light, than to consider him, as a Member of the collective Body of Mankind, in respect of religious Duty to the Creator of Beings, or, as a Member of Civil Society, acting, in a Moral

ral Way, in Consequence of his own Principles.

DEIST, which is the Name Men of this Class are fond of being distinguished by, is a Man, who believes a GOD, and Deism, the Profession of that Belief, expressed in suitable Acts.

THE Belief of a GOD is so far from being exclusive of the Belief of any other Thing, which is consistent with proper Ideas of the Divine Nature, that, if I have not clear Demonstration, from such Ideas, of the Impossibility of the Thing proposed, I may and ought to examine the Probability of that Thing, and give more or less Credit to it, in proportion to the Strength of the Evidence,

THE Reason, therefore, why a Word, so innocent in its Natural Sense, and of such extensive Latitude, is applied to a particular Number of Men, who have little, or, perhaps, no Right to it, must arise from fixing something Negative to the Signification of the Word, which, in its genuine Meaning, it cannot import.

IN Consequence of this Negative Sense of the Word, they, who impose the Name, imply in it at least a Denial of the Grounds of Revealed Religion, in which Acceptation the Word is stretched too far : And they, who assume the Name, and at the same Time deny the true Grounds of Natural Religion, pervert the Word, directly contrary to what

what it signifies, and usurp a Title, which they have no Right to: For, though the Belief of a GOD doth not consequentially imply the Belief of Revealed Religion, it consequentially implies a Sense of Divine Worship and Moral Duty, which is the true Ground of Natural Religion, and, therefore, though the Denial of Revelation doth not properly make a Man a Deist, in the strict Sense of the Word, yet the Want of Natural Religion doth absolutely hinder him from being a Deist, in any Sense.

FROM this Difference, in Principles, arise two Deistic Sects, the Real and Nominal, the one, denying the Authority and Use of Revealed Religion, and the other, corrupting and
perverting

pervverting the true Grounds and Principles of Natural.

THE real Deist I refer, at present, to the preceding Part of this Enquiry into the Natural State of MAN, and the Insufficiency of the intellectual and moral Powers of the Human Mind to the Original, genuine Purposes, and Ends of his Being: And, if what is there asserted, and, I presume, fairly deduced from clear Principles of Reason, hath not convinced him of the absolute Necessity of a superior Aid, I promise to strengthen and confirm my Proofs, when I proceed to a subsequent Enquiry into the rational Evidence and Certainty of Revelation, as it is supplemental to Natural Religion, and proposes effectual Means to repair the Defects and

Weak-

Weaknesses of Human Nature, and, consequently, to restore MAN to a Capacity of the Happiness his CREATOR designed him for, in his Original Formation, which the highest Powers of mere Natural Reason cannot effect.

LEAVING, therefore, this Argument with the Real Deist, on the Foot I have here placed it, till he and I meet again, I propose, in the ensuing Part of this Enquiry, to confer with the Nominal Deists, who are vastly more numerous, and more hurtful to Mankind, in Proportion as they act on Principles more corrupt, and, consequently, more destructive of Moral Duty, and Social Happiness: And, I conceive, the fairest Method, I can take, of maintaining an Argument with

with such Men, is to oppose a Real Deist, who best knows the Principles which the Other acts upon, to a Nominal, and see in what Conclusion the Points in Question must necessarily end, my Design of annexing this to the previous Part of the Enquiry being little more, than to take a View of Deists in their several Lights, and to shew, that the Nominal Deist is, on Principle and in Fact, as great an Enemy to Moral Virtue and Civil Society, as the Real Deist is to revealed Religion.

It is not simply the Word, GOD, but the Idea, fixed to the Word, which can have any Influence on the Minds and Morals of Men, and Ideas, improperly formed of GOD, may probably have a worse Influence than

than no Ideas at all : It is, therefore, highly necessary to enquire, whether Men, who own, and seem to glory in the Name, do not take away the Reality of the Thing, or at least insinuate a corrupt Sense of it.

My Intention is not, to enquire into the several Sorts of Gods s, whom Men of this Frame and Cast of

A a

Mind

s. Take an accurate account of various *Gods* and *Spirits*, that obtained among the ancient nominal Deists, from the Philosopher of *Malmesbury* — The unformed Matter of the World was a God, by the Name of Chaos — The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods — Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dog, a Snake, an Onion, a Leek, deified — They filled almost all Places with Spirits, called Dæmons — The Plains, with Pan and Satyres; the Woods, with Fauns and Nymphs; the Sea, with Tritons; every River and Fountain, with a Ghost of his Name, and with Nymphs; every House, with its Lares, or Familiars;

Mind create to themselves, as Temper or Genius inclines them, but if, in pursuing some of their principal Hypotheses, I shew the mischievous Effects, which such Opinions necessarily derive upon the Moral and Civil State of Things, I shall prevail, I presume, on all Friends to Mankind to concur with me in declaring their Detestation of Principles, directly
tending

miliars; every Man, with his Genius; Hell, with Ghosts, and Spiritual Officers; and, in the Night Time, all Places, with Larvæ, Lemures, Ghosts of Men deceased, and a whole Kingdom of Fairies and Bugbears——They also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to mere Accidents and Qualities, as Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, Virtue, Honour, Health, Rust, Feaver, and the like; which, when they prayed for or against, they prayed to, as if there were Ghosts of those Names, hanging over their Heads, and letting fall, or with-holding that Good or Evil, for or against which they prayed——They invoked

tending to Irreligion, and the utter
Ruin of Human Societies.

BECAUSE *Hobbes*, the Father of modern Deists, could not relish the Sound of Immaterial Substances, some Men *z*, without considering whether they are

A 2 able

voked also their own Wit, by the Name of *Muses*; their own Ignorance, by the Name of *Fortune*; their own Lust, by the Name of *Cupid*; their own Rage, by the Name of *Furies*; their own Privy-Members, by the Name of *Priapus*; and attributed their Pollutions to *Incubi* and *Succubæ*: Insomuch, that there was Nothing, which a Poet could introduce, as a Person, in his Poem, which they did not make either a *God*, or a *Devil*. *Leviath. ch. 12.*

z. These Gentlemen pretend that they cannot conceive, or have any Idea of an *Incorporeal Substance*, yet think, I presume, that they have a clear Idea and Conception of *Body*, though should you put them to describe it, they would be very much at a loss; for, as the Logicians observe, if we carefully examine our Idea of *Substance*,
we

able to form a more distinct Conception of Matter, fear not, upon his Authority, to ridicule the Notion of Spirit,

we shall find that it is a Kind of *complex* one, consisting of several Ideas, co-existing together, to which, because we are apt to conceive it *one* Thing, we give the general Name of *Substance*, as imagining that Word to express *Something*, though in Reality we know not *What*, which is the *Support* of these Accidents or Qualities, which occasion the Ideas we have of it in our Minds: Let us, therefore, take any *Corporeal Substance*, as suppose Gold, and enquire in our Mind, what is that *Support*, *Substratum*, or *Substance*, in which the Accidents of *Yellowness*, *great specific Weight*, and strange *Ductility* under the Hammer, do inhere, all which concur to give us that complex Idea, which we have of Gold, shall we not find ourselves put to it how to conceive, or to have any clear Idea of it? If we should say, that the *Subject* of these Properties are the *solid, extended Parts*, we shall not be much the nearer to an Idea of it, for our Mind will be inquisitive again, what is the *Support* or *Subject* of that *Extension* and *Impenetrability*: We may say indeed, that it is the *Substance* it self, which is a Word we use, and which implies *Something*
or

Spirit, and resolve the Structure of the Universe, and all the Beings, with which

or other, that is the *Support* of these *Properties*, but what that *is*, we have, I think, no clear and certain Idea, when yet we have clear and distinct Conceptions enough of these *Properties*, which we find in this *Body*, and from whence we pronounce it to be *Gold*: So, if on the other hand we take any Incorporeal Substance, as, suppose, the Mind or Soul of MAN, and enquire what is the *Support* of that *Self-moving Power*, that *reasoning* and *cogitative Faculty*, and that *Liberty* or Freedom of Action, which we plainly perceive to be inherent in it, we shall indeed be at a Loss, but yet no more than we were before, in Reference to *Gold*: For, as from considering the *Properties* peculiar to that *Body*, we were satisfied, that they must be inherent in *Something*, though *how* or in *what* we have no clear Idea, so when we consider *Life*, *Cogitation*, and *spontaneous Motion* in our Soul, we know very well that *those real Properties* must have *Something* also for their *Support*, or some Substance to inhere in, though what *that is*, and the peculiar *Manner* of it, we are wholly ignorant of: But then we have as just Reason to believe, that *this Substance* is *real*, as that the Substance of *Gold* is *so*; for *Cogitation*, *Life*, and *spontaneous Action* are Properties

which it is replenished, into the inexplicable Powers of Matter and Motion.

ties undoubtedly of as *real* a Nature, as *great intensive Weight, Yellowness, and Ductility* can possibly be; and as we cannot but conclude both, these to be real Substances, so we cannot also but conceive them, as Natures absolutely distinct, and different from each other, and which can have no necessary Dependence upon, and Relation to each other; for we can never imagine, that *Gold* can be ever brought to *think, reason, or move* it self *spontaneously*, any more than we can conceive a *Soul* or *Mind* to be *yellow, heavy, or ductile*, that is, we have quite different Ideas of each of them, which nothing but wilful or long habituated Ignorance can ever make us confound: We have, then, as clear an Idea of *Incorporeal Substance*, as we have of *Body*, and, therefore, it is as absurd to argue against the Existence of a *Spirit*, only from our not having any clear Idea of the *Substance* of a *Spirit*, as it would be to say there is no such Thing as *Body*, because we do not know exactly what the *Substance* of *Body* is. Dr. Harris's Lectures.

IF, according to this Hypothesis, there is Nothing in the World, but Matter and Motion *u*, Thought is either

u. The Corporealist is of Opinion, that there is no other Substance, but Matter or Body, in the World:

Upon this Principle, how came *Matter* to be first moved? before *Motion* began, *Matter* could have been nothing but an heavy, lifeless Lumb of vast extended Bulk, which must have lain for ever in the same dead, unactive State, if nothing had been superinduced to put it into Motion and Action; and no one sure can be so stupid to to call this a *Deity*:

The Patrons, then, of this Opinion must assert one of these three Things, either, that *Motion* came into *Matter* from *Something without* it, and distinct from it——Or, that *Motion* is *essential* to *Matter*, and *co-eternal* with it——Or, that it came into it by *Chance*:

If the Corporealist admits the first, our Controversy with him is at an End, for we hold that it was a Divine Mind, perfectly distinct from, and superior to *Matter*, who first *made* it, and *moved* it, and doth still continue to modify and dispose

either a Property essentially inherent in Matter, or the Result of some particular

dispose it, according to his infinite Wisdom and Providence:

That Motion came into Matter without any Cause, and that it was *Chance* only, which first produced it, is what I might presume no Man senseless enough to maintain, and yet so very fond are some Men of any Thing, which opposes Truth, that they will run into the greatest Absurdities to maintain it, for a late Corporealist is pleased to say, *That Matter can move of it self*, and to shew his deep Skill in Philosophy, tells us, that *Wind, Fire, and very fine-sifted Dust*, are *Matter*, and yet *Self-movers*; and of Wind and Fire he profoundly asserts, that they *cannot lose their Motion, or cease moving*, so long as they *continue to be Wind and Fire*, that is, so long as Wind and Fire are in *Motion*, they cannot *cease to move*:

The second Point, therefore, is, I suppose, what the Corporealist will adhere to, *viz.* that *Motion* is *essential* to, and co-eternal with Matter, and that either all *Matter* and *Motion*, taken together, or some fine and *subtile Parts* of it, are the *Deity*, which is a Proposition as absurd and unaccountable,

particular Figure and Motion impressed upon it: That Thought is inhe-

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rent

unaccountable, as that Matter should be moved without any Cause at all:

For it is plain, that *Motion* is not *essentially* included in the Idea of *Matter*——when I consider any determinate Quantity of Matter, I can clearly conceive, that it is a Substance, which is impenetrably extended, divisible, and moveable; that it fills a certain Space, and excludes any Body from being in the same place in the same given Time, without conceiving it to be in *Motion*, much less being forced to acknowledge, that it *must be*, and *always was* in Motion: Whereas, certainly, if *Motion* were as *essential* to *Matter*, as *Impenetrability* and *Extension*, it were as impossible for me to conceive it at *Rest*, as it is, to conceive it without those Properties; but I have as true an Idea of a Stone or a Bullet, or of any Part of Matter, when it lies on the Ground, as I have of it, when it is projected from a Sling or a Gun:

But, supposing *Motion* to be *essential* to *Matter*, it must, in Consequence, be so to every *Particle* of it, uniformly, and in the same Proportion; and, if so, every Atom of Matter must, in Consequence, retain the Original Degree of Motion
or

rent in Matter, they cannot with the least Appearance of Reason maintain, when

or Velocity, for no accidental Cause can increase or diminish, promote or hinder the essential Properties of a Being: For Instance, take a Particle of Matter, or any Body, and move it as fast, or as slow as you please; place it where, or how you please; separate it from other Particles or Bodies, or combine it with them, it will still retain its essential Properties of *Extension* and *Impenetrability*, which will receive no Intension, or Remission: But in the Case of Motion it is quite otherwise, for we find the *same Body* may be brought to move, sometimes *faster*, sometimes *slower*, and sometimes, to all Appearance, be reduced to absolute *Rest*, which could never be, if *Motion* were *essential* to each *Particle of Matter*, in a certain *determinative Degree* of Velocity:

If the Corporealist saith, that Motion is co-eternal with Matter, and that the Deity is Matter eternally moved, then either every Particle of Matter must be essentially God, or he must be the Result of the *Whole*, or of some *Parts* of Matter, combined together: If the former be asserted, there must of Necessity be as many Gods, as there are Atoms, inasmuch as they are individually distinct from each other, and have
their

when the Parings of their own Nails convince them it is false, but that

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Thought

their separate and peculiar Properties of Impenetrability, Extension, and Motion, which, in this Hypothesis, are the only Perfections of the Divine Nature——but whence proceeds Cogitation, Wisdom, Understanding, Self-activity, and Spontaneous Power, in which the Essence of a Deity ought principally to consist? the Idea, which we have of Body, doth not necessarily include Cogitation, nor our Notion of Cogitation include Body, but are two distinct Ideas, so far from being the same Thing, that we cannot possibly conceive Cogitation with Extension: For did a Man ever conceive a Thought to be so many Inches or Yards *long*; to be *deep*, *thick*, or *broad*; to be *divisible* into two or more *Parts*, or to have any kind of *Figure* or *determinate* Extension? Whereas, if whatsoever is *unextended*, or not *Body*, be, as the Corporealist asserts, absolutely Nothing, Cogitation, Wisdom, Intellect, and Spontaneous Power, must either be *Nothing*, or must be *figurative Bodies*, than which nothing can be more absurd——But these Powers are the Result of Matter in *Motion*——But did ever any one, but a stupid Corporealist, imagine that a Particle of Matter, by being moved, was made intelligent? Or think, that
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Thought is the Result of various Modifications of Matter, may, they
presume,

the Knowledge of such an Atom increased in proportion to the Velocity of its Motion? At this rate of Reasoning, a Bullet, discharged from the Mouth of a Cannon, ought to be looked upon, as one of the most ingenious Beings in Nature.——Again——as we cannot possibly conceive, that the Motion of one Particle of Matter alone can give it Knowledge and Understanding, so neither can we suppose, that a Body, composed of many Particles, can acquire any such Thing, barely on account of the Motion of its Parts, for *Motion* can do no more to the *Whole*, than it did to each *Part* singly, and therefore three Millions of Bullets will not be wiser for being discharged together, than if they were shot singly, in pursuit of Understanding: Nor can any happy Combination or Constitution of Parts avail in this case, more than Motion, for after all the various Positions, Configurations, and Combinations of Matter, is it not Matter still? Will rarefying or subtilizing of Matter change its Nature, and essential Properties? A rare Body is nothing, but a Contexture of fine subtile Particles, which being separated farther asunder, than is usual, are also perhaps more briskly moved; but will moving a few Atoms,
to

presume, be true, and, therefore, conclude it is.

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to a good Distance from each other, *separate* them into *Knowledge*, and disjoin them into an Understanding Power, which none of them had before?——and yet such Absurdities are the Natural Consequences of supposing Matter and Motion capable of Thinking; of supposing that Matter can be *rarefied* into a *Deity*, and that Divine *Wisdom*, *Knowledge*, *Goodness*, and *Power*, are the Result of *Body*, luckily *disposed* and *moved*.

A later Corporealist, than Mr. *Hobbes*, asserts, that *the inflamed and glowing Parts of the Blood, called Spirits, though not in themselves Sentient and Intelligent, are yet the active Principle of Life and Motion, of Sense and Understanding in Man and Beast, and do act the Understanding or Brain to apprehend, judge, and remember*——Now by this it is plain, that he supposes Cogitation, Understanding, Consciousness and Liberty, with all the Faculties of the Soul of Man, to be nothing but the Result of some peculiar Motions in a fitly organized Body, the Animal Spirits being, as we must suppose, like the elastic Particles in the Spring of a Watch, which, though they cannot tell what a Clock it is themselves, yet can, by Means of the Spring which they actu-
ate

BUT if this Principle of Wisdom,
this God, as they would call it, which
discovers

ate, do that and many other Things, which the
Movement shall be fitted to; or, to make Use
of his own Comparison, the Animal Spirits may
do, as the Wind doth in the Chest of an Organ,
which, though it can make no Music of it Self,
yet, by being communicated so as to inspire the
several Pipes, may actuate them into fine Har-
mony.

These, and such like Absurdities, other Cor-
porealists perceiving, and being fully convinc-
ed, that it is impossible to account for Cogitati-
on, Consciousness, and Liberty from mere Mat-
ter and Motion, and to educe the Perfections of
the Deity out of the Power of Matter only, had
recourse to another Way of maintaining that
there is no other Substance, but *Body*, and assert,
that *Cogitation is essential to Matter*, or, as *Spino-
sa* hath it, *all Substance is essentially cogitative, and
extended*, so that as there is no *Substance*, but
what is *material*, so there is *none*, but what is *cogita-
tive* too——there is, saith he, but *one only Sub-
stance*, which is *GOD*, or *Universal Matter*,
Cogitation and Extension being two infinite At-
tributes or Affections of the Attributes of the
Deity:

Now,

discovers it self in the Frame and Texture of the Universe, consists only in
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Now, if Cogitation be as essential to Matter, as Extension, every Particle of Matter must, in Consequence, be a *thinking Substance* or *Body*, distinct from all other Particles of Matter——It is allowed, that every least Particle of Matter hath the Properties of Impenetrability and Extension, as complete within it self, as they are in the whole Bulk of the Universe, and are also individually distinct in each Particle, though of the same Kind; if then to each Particle of Matter Cogitation be also added, every Atom in the Universe will be a *thinking, intelligent* and *reasonable* Being, distinct from all the rest, and have its own proper and peculiar Faculties and Operations; will be a different Person from all others, and every individual Particle of Matter will be *so from it*, and from *every one* else: Every Atom also will be equal in respect of this *cogitative Power*, and if, as it is now supposed, all Matter be essentially cogitative, there either must, in Consequence, be no GOD, or every Particle of Matter must be a distinct God; for if there be any such Thing, as *infinite Knowledge, Power, and Wisdom*, every Particle must have it, for *finite* Cogitation can no more
be

a particular System of Matter, which
can *receive* no Impression *from* the
rest,

be the Cause *Infinite*, than *Cogitation* can arise
from *incogitative Matter*.

This *Spinoza* very well saw, and therefore asserts all *Cogitation*, as well as all Substance, to be infinite, and that there is but *one Substance* in Nature, and that this Substance is *God*——
But if by Substance he mean only *Substance in general*, or the Idea, which we have of some *Substratum* or Subject, in which we conceive the Properties and Accidents of real Beings to inhere, it is plain that Substance, according to his Definition of it, is only a Metaphysical Term, which serves to denote our Conception of Something in a Being, which doth not depend upon the Properties of *it*, nor inhere in *them*, but they *upon* and *in it*: But we can have no more Notion of Substance, existing without Properties, than we can have of Properties, without Substance; if, therefore, *Spinoza's* God is nothing but the Term and Idea of Substance in general, the Deity is a mere Name and Creature of the Brain, whereas the Attributes and Properties of the Deity are what we chiefly contend for, and which we assert to be *inherent in an infinite immaterial Substance or Spirit*.

But

rest, it, consequently, cannot *make*
any Impression *upon* the rest, and,
C c therefore,

But if, by there being but *one only Substance*, which he saith is God, *Spinoza* means that the Deity is the whole Mass of Matter, which he must mean, when he asserts that all *corporeal Substance* is *infinite* and *one*, and that Cogitation and Extension are the Attributes, or Affections of the Attributes of GOD; if this, I say, be his Opinion, the Notion is not only absurd, but inconsistent with what he doth at other Times assert, for if *Substance*, *Matter*, and *God*, signify all the same Thing, and if all *Matter* be *essentially cogitative*, as *such*, it will follow that GOD cannot be the *whole* Matter of the Universe, but each *Particle* of Matter will be a distinct God; for if there be any such Thing, as infinite Perfection, it must be essentially in every Particle of Matter, otherwise infinite Perfection may arise out of what is finite, which is impossible; and if every Particle of Matter has this infinite Perfection, the whole Mass, collectively considered, will not be *one God*, or *one Being*, *infinitely perfect*, but a Swarm of innumerable Deities, every one of which will be personally distinct from each other, and yet contain all possible Perfection in it self: But, allowing the collective
Mass

therefore, can have no Energy: If they say, that Matter moves always uniformly, and, therefore, the Power and Wisdom of their God is stable, uniform,

Mass of Beings, or the Universe, to be God, what a strange Kind of Deity would this make? The Divine Nature must then necessarily be divisible, Part of it here, and Part there; Part of it, in Motion, and Part of it, at Rest; Part of it, hot, and Part, cold; Part, Fire, and Part, Water; and subject to all Manner of Imperfections, Vicissitudes, Changes, Contrarieties, and Alterations, that can be imagined: Besides, this is contrary to what *Spinoza* asserts in other Places, where he saith, *Substance* is *indivisible*: But how there can be but *one only Substance*, and *That* the Matter of the Universe, and how this Substance can be indivisible, when yet each Particle of Matter must be a distinct Substance, divided from all others, is a Flight of Metaphysics, above my Understanding.

Upon the Whole, then, the God of the Corporealists is only *Nature*, or a *plastic Power* in Nature, the whole Mass or some fine, subtile, and active Parts of Matter in rapid Motion, without Understanding, Wisdom, or Design, without

uniform, and operative, we answer that this uniform Motion of the Particles of Matter is either, in empty Space, an eternal Progression of se-

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parate

without Liberty of Will, or Freedom of Action, but physically and mechanically necessary in all his Operations; their God is, as *Herodotus* speaks, *the Servant of Necessity, and cannot possibly himself avoid the destined Fate*: Now, if GOD be not a free Agent, nothing else can, for, all Things, flowing from him by inevitable Necessity, or being, as *Spinoza* asserts, Parts of him, must be under the same Necessity with the Deity; and, he saith plainly, that every Thing, which is determined to operate, is so determined necessarily by GOD, and could not act at all, if GOD did not thus necessarily determine it: That the Will of Man cannot be called free, but is only a necessary Cause: And, in another Place, he tells us, that there are no such Things, as *final Causes* in Nature, they being only the ignorant Figments of Mankind; but that all Things are governed by absolute Necessity: In the next Page, he asserts, that Man is a mere Machine, and that they only, who are ignorant of Causes, say he was thus finely formed by any Art or Design, or attribute his Composition to any supernatural Wisdom:

parate Particles in streight Lines,
 which is the same Thing in respect of
 the Energy of every Particle, as if it
 moved in a particular System, re-
 moved

Wisdom: And, at last, he comes to the great Point, on which all this Kind of Philosophy turns, which is, that Good and Evil are not by Nature, but that the Notions of them came only from Men's mistaken Opinion, that all Things were made for them, and who, therefore, call that Good, which is agreeable to their Fancy, and that Evil, which is contrary to it. *Oper. Posth. p. 453. 24. 28. 36. 37. Dr. Harris's Lectures.*

In our Conception of any Quantity of Body, there is nothing but Figure and Site, and a Capacity of Motion, which Motion, when actually excited in it, doth cause a new Order and Contexture of Parts, so that the Ideas of sensible Qualities are not inherent in the inanimate Bodies, but are the Effects of their Motion upon our Nerves, and sympathetical and vital Passions produced within our selves.

This being the true Notion of Body in general, let us enquire what it is in the Constitution and Composition of Man, that hath the Faculty
 of

moved from any Communication with the rest; or, it is, in the Mixture of several Particles, a regular Impulse of one Particle upon another

of receiving such Ideas and Passions, and observe what Prerogatives this Rational Machine (as some Deists would make it) can challenge above other Parcels of Matter: We observe then in this understanding Piece of Clock-work, that this Body, as well as other senseless Matter, has Colour, and Warmth, and Softness, and the like; but it is acknowledged, that these Qualities are not subsistent in those Bodies, but are Ideas and Sensations begotten in something else, so that it is not Blood and Bones, that can be conscious of their own Hardness or Redness, and we are still to seek for something else in our Frame and Make, that must receive these Impressions:

They may say, it is not the gross Substance of the Brain, that causes Perception, but the Animal Spirits, that have their Residence there, which are void of sensible Qualities, because they never fall under our Senses by reason of their Minuteness: But we conceive by our Reason, though we cannot see them with our Eyes, that every one of these also hath a determinate Figure;

ther, according to Bulk, Figure, Swiftnefs and Incidence, which gives a Man no Idea of any Possibility of Thought, resulting from such

Figure; they are Spheres, or Cubes, or Pyramids, or Cones, or of some Shape or other, that is irregular and nameless, and all these are but Modes and Affections of Magnitude, and the Ideas of such Modes can no more be subsistent in the Atoms so modified, than the Idea of Redness is found to be inherent in the Blood, or that of Whiteness in the Brain, and what Relation or Affinity is there between a minute Body and Cogitation, any more than the greatest? Is a small drop of Rain any wiser than the Ocean? Or do we grind inanimate Corn into living and rational Meal? My very Nails, or my Hair, or the Horns and Hoofs of a Beast may bid as fair for Understanding and Sense, as the finest Animal Spirits of the Brain:

But it is not the Bulk and Substance of the Animal Spirits, but their Motion and Agility, that produces Cogitation and Sense: If then Motion in general, or any Degree of its Velocity can beget Cogitation, surely a Ship under Sail must be a very intelligent Creature, though
while

such Variety of Figures and Motions: Or, should it be allowed, in Opposition to all Sense, that a particular Hit, in an infinite Variety of Modifications

while she lies at Anchor, those Faculties be asleep: Some cold Water must be phlegmatic and senseless, but when it boils in a Kettle, it has wonderful Heats of Thinking, and Ebullitions of Fancy: Nay, the whole corporeal Mass, all the brute and stupid Matter of the Universe must upon these Terms be allowed to have Life and Understanding, since there is nothing, that we know of, in a State of absolute Rest; the Things, that seem to be at Rest upon the Surface of the Earth, being daily wheeled about its Axis, and yearly about the Sun, with a prodigious Swiftmess:

But it is not Motion in general, that can do these Feats of Sensation and Perception, but a particular Sort of it in an organized Body, through the determinate Roads and Channels of Muscles and Nerves: But, I pray, among all the Kinds of Motion, whether straight, or parabolical, or in what Curve they please, what Pretence can one make to Thinking and Liberty of Will, more than another? Why do not these Persons make a Diagram of these Cogitative Lines

Modifications and Motions, might produce Thought, Knowledge, and Wisdom in the highest degree, it must, at the same Time, be also allowed, that

Lines and Angles, and demonstrate their Properties of Perception and Appetite, as plainly as we know the other Properties of Triangles and Circles?—

But they will say farther, that it is not Motion alone, or under this or that Determination, that produceth Cogitation, but when it falls out that numerous Particles of Matter, aptly disposed and directed, do interfere in their Motions, and strike and knock one another; this is it which begets our Sensation: All the active Power and Vigour of the Mind, our Faculties of Reason, Imagination and Will are the wonderful Result of this mutual Occurse, this Pulsion and Repercussion of Atoms: Just as we experience it in the Flint and the Steel; you may move them apart as long as you please, to very little Purpose, but it is the Hitting and Collision of them, that must make them strike Fire — Light and Heat, and the rest of those Qualities, are not such Ideas in the Bodies, as we perceive in our selves, so that this smiting of the

that every Variation of that particular Modification and Motion, which produces them, must not only disturb, but may utterly destroy them.

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the Steel with the Flint doth only make a Communion, and a very rapid whirling and melting of some Particles, but that Idea of Flame is wholly in us: But what a strange and miraculous Thing should we count it, if the Flint and the Steel, instead of a few Sparks, should chance to strike out Definitions and Syllogisms? And yet it is altogether as reasonable, as this sottish Opinion, That dead senseless Atoms can ever jostle and knock one another into Life and Understanding——Again, how can that Concussion of Atoms be capable of begetting those internal and vital Affections, that Self-consciousness, and those other Powers and Energies, that we feel in our Minds, seeing they only strike upon the outward Surfaces, cannot inwardly pervade one another, nor have any Penetration of Dimensions, and Conjunction of Substance——What can be so disingenuous or so stupid, as to profess to believe, That all the natural Powers and acquired Habits of the Mind, that penetrating Understanding and accurate Judgment, that Strength of Memory and Readiness;

ALL the possible Variety, then, of Figure and Motion, which we can conceive in Matter, proves, either, an Impossibility of any Thing, like Thought, resulting from it, or, on Suppo-

diness of Wit, that Liberality and Justice and Prudence and Magnanimity, that Charity and Beneficence to Mankind, that ingenuous Fear and Love of GOD, that comprehensive Knowledge of the Histories and Languages of so many Nations, that experienced Insight into the Works and Wonders of Nature, that rich Vein of Poetry and inexhausted Fountain of Eloquence, those lofty Flights of Thoughts and almost intuitive Perceptions of abstruse Notions, those exalted Discoveries of Mathematical Theorems and Divine Contemplations; that all the admirable Endowments and Capacities of Human Nature, which we sometimes see actually existent in one and the same Person, can proceed from the blind shuffling and casual clashing of Atoms: I could as easily take up with that senseless Assertion of the Stoics, That Virtues and Vices and Sciences and Arts, and Fancies and Passions and Appetites are all real Bodies and distinct Animals, as with this wild Notion, That they can all be derived from the Power of mere Bodies. Dr. Bentley's Lectures.

Supposition of such Result, a Necessity of Changeableness in that Thought, with every Change in the Matter, which produces it.

LET us, in the next Place, take a View of one Omnipotent Universal Cause of Beings, which is an Idea some Deists are apt to form of GOD, without determining any Thing concerning his Substance, whether Material, or Immaterial: Men, of this Cast of Mind, suppose it suitable to the Dignity and Perfection of the Divine Nature to have impressed, in the Original Constitution of the Universe, such an Energy into the Frame and Texture of it, as is capable, for ever, of continuing all Appearances, Causalities, and Operations of Things, with which we are, or are not acquainted-

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quainted, without interposing any more in the Production, Direction, or Government of any Thing whatsoever, and that it is beneath the Elevation and Eminence of his Situation to interfere in the vain Tumults of Men, and to operate with or against them, in any of their Projects, by immediate Influx,

IN Consequence of this determined System of Things, Men, like other Animals, are mere Machines, directed in their Motions by Impressions from outward Objects, and necessitated to act by the fatal Chain of Causes, which links the Universe,

To these Schemes of Deistic Theology I shall add another Opinion, which hath great Affinity and Correspondence with them, or rather,
indeed,

indeed, which flows from them by as clear Derivation, as an Effect from its Cause :

MANY Men, without troubling themselves in any Manner about the Notion of a Deity, and considering how evidently their Thoughts depend on the Structure and Disposition of the Organs of their Bodies, boldly conclude, That an absolute Diffolution of this Organical Texture, which all Men are subject to in Death, must of Necessity extinguish that Principle of Thought, which they find in their present Frame, and leave Nothing to subsist, capable of conscious Reflections on their past Lives.

As I do not intend to prove the Philosophic Absurdity of any such
Opinions,

Opinions, a Mixture whereof does, I am persuaded from their Conversations and Writings, fill the Heads, and actuate the Hearts and Practices of Nominal Deists, I proceed to consider the Moral Influence, which they are naturally apt to have on the Lives and Societies of Men, and to shew, that though, to avoid Offence, or for other popular Reasons, the Maintainers of such Opinions make use of the Name, GOD, they notwithstanding destroy the Thing, and, in Effect, remove him out of the World.

A Material GOD, who sprung from casual Coalition of Atoms, or even from the most regular Motions, which can possibly be conceived in the collective Mass of Matter, if, in Defiance of all Sense, we allow

low his Existence, is evidently the Result of such Causes, not the CREATOR and Disposer of the Universal Frame, but the mere Effect of some peculiar or casual Disposition in it, liable, if not to Extinction, at least to as many Alterations, as the Matter, whereof he is compounded, is subject to, and therefore the Idea of such a God can have no Moral Influence, or useful Effect, on the Minds and Manners of Men.

FOR if all Things in Nature go their Round, and return to their Fountain, and are revolved of themselves, without Direction, and without the Superintendency of a Divine Agent: If, from congregated Seeds of Fire, Suns after Suns light up
one

one another in perpetual Splendor: If Tempests roll on, unstable and unguided, without Order, and without Providence: If, in Shipwrecks, Plagues, and Wars, the Good and the Evil are indiscriminately jumbled together, and their Merits mingled in Confusion: If, when Trees labour with Fruit, and Corn is white for Harvest, and Grapes are drunk with Wine, all is spoiled by casual Rain: If Fortune is the lawless Queen, who rules the World with arbitrary Sway: If all this be true, what will become, as *Cicero* observes *w*, of Piety, Sanctity, and Religion? For all these Things are the Tributes

w. Sunt Philosophi, et fuerunt qui omnino nullam habere censerent humanarum rerum procuratorem deos: quorum si vera sententia est, quæ potest esse pietas? quæ sanctitas? quæ Religio?
Hæc

butes of a pure and chaste Mind to the Divinity of the Gods, on Presumption of their Delight therein, and in Consideration of the Blessings they convey to Mankind: But, if the Gods neither can, nor will help us, if they neither animadvert upon, nor regard what we do, and no Emoluments are derived from their Benefi-

Hæc enim omnia pure, ac caste tribuenda deorum numini ita sunt, si animadvertuntur ab his, et, si est aliquid a diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum: Sin autem Dii neque possunt nos juvare, nec volunt, nec curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertunt, nec est quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanere possit, quid est, quod ullos diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? in specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita pietas inesse non potest, cum qua simul et sanctitatem, et religionem tolli necesse est; quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitæ sequitur, et magna confusio: atque haud scio, an pietate adversus deos sublata, fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et, una excellentissima virtus, justitia tollatur. *Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 1.*

cence for the Use of Human Life, what Reason can be assigned, why we should pray to them, or wherefore we should honour, or worship them? For Piety is a Justice toward GOD, but how can there be a Right, where there is no Intercourse, nor any Communication of Offices? For Piety cannot bear a Counterfeit, any more than other Virtues, and, when that is taken away, Sanctity and Religion must fall with it, and Perturbation of Life, and great Confusion necessarily ensue: Nay, I am afraid, when we have parted with our Piety toward the Gods, nor Faith, nor Society of Human Kind, nor even Justice, that most excellent of Virtues, can long subsist.

EPICUREAN

EPICUREAN Deists, who deny Providence, think the Force of this Argument sufficiently eluded, and their Religion made very consistent with their Opinion, by affirming, That GOD is to be honoured and worshipped on Account of the Excellence of his Nature, abstractedly from any Regard to the OEconomy of the World, or any Inspection into Human Affairs: We affirm, say they α , That there is a Natural

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α . Solus Epicurus vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura; quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem deorum?——cum enim non instituto aliquo, aut more, aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensus, intelligi necesse est, esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus——quod quoniam fere constat inter omnes

Anticipation of a Deity in the Mind of MAN, antecedent to Reasoning from outward Things, and from this Principle argue, That what is Natural, must be true: We affirm moreover, that Nature, which furnished our Minds with the Notion of his Existence, printed on them a strong and

nes non philosophos solum, sed etiam indoctos, fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere five anticipationem, five prænotationem deorum — hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et immortales putemus; quæ enim nobis natura informationem deorum ipsorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus, ut eos æternos et beatos haberemus: quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, id nec habere ipsum negotii quidquam, nec exhibere alteri; itaque neque ira, neque gratia teneri, quod, quæ talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia: Si nihil aliud quæreremus, nisi ut deos pie coleremus, et ut superstitione liberaremur, satis erat dictum, nam et præstans deorum natura hominum pietate coleretur, cum et æterna esset et beatissima; habet

and full Assurance of his Tranquility and Happiness, which cannot consist with being moved by Favour, or actuated by Revenge, which would be the Natural Consequence of interfering in the vain Tumults and Pursuits of Men : But Worship, we own, is a Tribute due to the transcendent
Perfection

bet enim venerationem justam quidquid excellit, et metus omnis a vi, atque ira deorum pulsus esset : intelligitur enim, a beata immortalique natura et iram, et gratiam segregari, quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere metus——querere a nobis, Balbe, soletis, quæ vita deorum sit, quæque ab iis degatur ætas ? ea videlicet qua nihil beatius, nihil omnino bonis omnibus affluentius excogitari potest ; nihil enim agit, nullis occupationibus est implicatus ; nulla opera molitur ; sua sapientia, et virtute gaudet ; habet exploratum fore se semper cum in maximis, tum in æternis voluptatibus : hunc deum rite beatum dixerimus, vestrum vero laboriosissimum : Sive enim ipse mundus deus est, quid potest esse minus quietum, quam nullo puncto temporis intermisso

Perfection of the Nature of a Divine Being, who hath, solely on this Account, a just Right to the highest Veneration, and therefore, the Duty ought to be paid, without any Apprehension of his Intercourse with Men, or any Expectation of Recompence for the Worship, which we pay.

BUT to this System of Deistic Theology the Academic Philosopher

termisso versari circum axem cœli admirabili celeritate? nisi quietum autem, nihil beatum est; five in ipso mundo deus inest aliquis, qui regat, qui gubernet, qui cursus astrorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vicissitudines ordinesque conservet, terras et maria contemplans hominum commoda, vitasque tueatur, ne ille est implicatus molestis negotiis et operosis; nos autem beatam vitam in animi securitate, et in omnium vacatione munerum ponimus. *id. ibid.*

y argues

y argues with great Clearness: How can the Divine Nature be the Best and most Excellent, when supposed

y. Quid est enim cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas? Cum Dii non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant: at est eorum eximia quædam præstansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad colendum elicere sapientem: an quicquam eximium potest esse in ea natura, quæ sua voluptate lætans, nihil nec actura sit unquam, neque agat, neque egerit? quæ porro pietas ei debetur, a quo nihil acciperis? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei deberi potest? est enim pietas justitia adversum Deos, cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homini nulla est cum Deo communitas?——Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum Diis immortalibus et gratiam et opem sustulit; cum enim optimam et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam; tollit id quod maxime proprium optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ: quid enim melius, aut quid præstantius bonitate et beneficentia?——si maxime talis est Deus, ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat: quid enim dicam, propitius sit? esse enim propitius potest nemini, quoniam, ut dicitis, omnis in imbecillitate est et gratia et caritas. *id. ibid.*

destitute

destitute of emanant Acts of Benevolence and Goodness, this very Supposition being destructive of an Attribute, most peculiar to the best and most excellent Nature? Is there not a Natural Tenderneſs and Propenſion to Acts of Kindneſs, inherent in the Diſpoſitions of all Good Men, which is ſo far from being a Mark of Imbecillity and Imperfection, that it is a very ſtrong Principle of all Virtue, and is often productive of the nobleſt and ſublimeſt of Virtues, a diſintereſted Friendſhip? Can that Perfection, then, be denied to the Divine Nature, which is an eminent Attribute of the Human? On the Contrary, is it not rather ſtrictly conſiſtent, that the Benevolence of GOD toward Mankind is as much ſuperior to that of Men toward one another,

another, as the Divine Nature is raised in Excellency above the Human ?.

IN what lively Colours might this Deistic Argument for the Excellency of the Divine Nature be viewed, were it placed in a different Point of Light ? Reflect, thou Nominal Philosopher, as well as Nominal Deist, on the manifold Productions of the Earth, the Variations of Times, and Mutations of Seasons, from which Grains and Fruits derive Life and Maturity for the Service of MAN ! Consider the vast Expanse of Heaven, and the Rapidity of its Motions ! View it with sagacious Eye, either when studded with Stars by Night, or enlightened with the Sun by Day ! Consider the con-

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stant and regular Vicissitudes of Light and Darknefs, for alternate Reparation of Rest and Labour! Contemplate the goodly Order of the Year, the Spring with Flowers, the Summer with Harvefts, the Autumn with Fruits, the moist and unctious Winter, all ministring, in their Turns, to the Use and Pleasure of Man! Behold this Globe of Earth you live on, which is a minute inconfiderable Spot in respect of the Universe, cantoned out into Hills and Dales, and Plains; the great Variety of Animals it is stocked with, and the various Artillery for the Defence of each; some armed with Horns, or hedged with Teeth, or fortified with Hoofs and Claws, or speared with Stings; and others, either swift of Foot, or Wing!

Wing! Contemplate, I say, the amazing Magnitude of the Creation! The prodigious Number and Variety of Creatures, contained in this immense Space! the exquisite Minuteness of the several Parts, of which each Creature, whether animate or inanimate, is composed! The Beauty Order, and Regularity of every distinct Species of Things! The harmonious Correspondence of each Part of Nature to other, and more particularly, the curious Structure of so many different Species of Animals; the delicate Formation of their Parts, and the nice adapting of them to their several Uses, in such Manner, that there is nothing either of Superfluity or Defect, but every Thing properly tending to the Preservation, Continuance and Propagation of

the several Kinds, through all Generations, with a suitable Provision for all their Natural Wants and Desires, so as to rejoice in their several Beings! What Source can this marvellous Disposition and OEconomy of Things be derived from, even on Principles of Natural Reason, but the Wisdom, and Goodness, and Power, and operative Superintendency of a Divine Mind, pervading the Universe, his Government of the World not interfering with the Tranquillity of his Being, nor his Love of Mankind with the Excellence and Perfection of his Nature!

CICERO, in his accurate Dissertation concerning the Nature of the Gods, introduces *Balbus*, a warm Zealot for the Stoic Theology, in a
very

very different Strain of Argument, from that of the *Epicurean* Deist, and makes him infer the Existence of a Divine Being from the Equability of Motion, and Conversion of the Heavens ; from the Distinction, Variety, Beauty, and Order of the Sun, Moon, and Stars, the bare Sight whereof is sufficient Indication, that they are not the Works of *Epicurean* Chance ; such Viscissitudes, and such marvellous Motions, with the regular Ordination of so many, and so great Things, which have not erred, or been impaired, through immeasurable Length of infinite Age, being plain Evidences of their being governed and directed, in their respective Operations, by an intelligent Mind—Are not the Agreement, the conspiring Accord, the harmonious Relation

lation and Procedure of Natural Things in continual Order, a cogent Proof of what I assert? Could the Earth be covered, at one Time, with Flowers, and, at another, with Ice and Snow? Or the Approaches and Retreats of the Sun be known, amidst such a Number of Things in continual Self Variation, by the Solstices, and Winter-Seasons? Or the Ebbings and Flowings of the Sea, and Compressions of the Waters be moved by the Wax and Wain of the Moon? Or the different Courses of the Stars maintained by the uniform conversion of the whole Heaven? That all this should be effected; that there should be such an harmonious Concert of all the Parts of the World, is utterly unimaginable to Human Reason, were they not contained and directed, in
their

their Causalties and Effects, by a regular, constant, and divine Spirit—— Suppose there were some Men, who had always lived under Ground, though in convenient Habitations and noble Apartments, finely adorned and furnished with all Accommodations, which tend to make the Life of Man abundantly happy, yet had never at any Time come from under the Earth, but had only heard of a Deity, or divine Power, by Report: Suppose, now, these subterraneous Men should some time after, by the Opening of the Earth, come forth from their hidde Regions into this habitable World, and be surprized with a clear View of the Earth, of the Sea, and of the Heavens, and should observe the Vastness of the Clouds, and the Force of Winds, and, seeing the

the Sun, should consider its Magnitude, Splendor, and prodigious Influence, spreading Day, by Diffusion of Light through the whole Heaven; and, when Night shades the Earth, imagine them to behold the Face of Heaven adorned and distinguished with Stars of different Magnitudes, and the various Phases of the Moon, and to observe the constant regular, and sempiternal Motions of the heavenly Bodies; when they have seen, and considered all these Things, they would undoubtedly conclude, that there are Deities, and that all these great and stupendous Works were raised by their Efficiency——Can he be called a rational Creature, who, when he sees the constant Motions of the Heavens, and the established Order of the Stars, and all Things so corresponding

corresponding with, and depending upon each other, in such admirable Harmony, should yet deny that there is Reason and wise Design in them, or should imagine that such great Things were effected by Chance, which shew a Wisdom, infinitely beyond the Reach of our intellectual Faculties? When we see any Piece of Movement, as a Sphere or a Clock, or any other curious Machine, we make no Scruple to say, that it is the Work of Reason and Art, though we see not the Artift; and when we behold the admirable Motions of the heavenly Bodies, of which all other Movements are but faint Imitations, and consider with what Regularity and Uniformity their constant Revolutions are performed, through so many Ages, without Mistake, without Failure, and without

any Disorder or Impediment to each other, notwithstanding their vast Bulk and prodigious Swiftneſs, all tending to the Health and Conſervation of Beings, can we doubt, whether they be contrived and governed by a moſt excellent, and divine Reaſon?

GIVE me Leave, continues the Stoic, without Subtilty of Diſputation, to take a ſpeculative Survey of the Beauty of Things, which we affirm to be the Conſtitutions and Appointments of divine Providence: View then the univerſal Earth, ſituate in the middle Region of the World, ſolid, and round, and Naturally tending, by proper Inclinations of all its Parts, to form a Globe: Behold it clothed and diverſified with an incredible Number of Flowers, and Herbs,
and

and Trees, and Fruits; add to this the never-failing Course of Springs, the liquid Lapse and lucid Transparency of Rivers, the verdant Garniture and Embroidery of their Banks, the hollow Depths of Caves, the craggy Roughnesses of Rocks, the Heights of impending Mountains, and the immense Diffusion of Plains——How many and various are Beasts, both wild and tame? How different the Flights and Notes of Birds? The Food, and Pastures of Cattle? And the Savage Life of the Sylvan Race! What shall I say of the Human Kind? who, being ordained to cultivate the Earth, nor suffer it to grow wild through Fierceness and Immanity of Beasts, nor to be over-run and laid waste by Rudeness and Asperities of Shrubs and Trees; and by whose

Labour also, Fields, Islands, and Coasts, are variously distinguished with Houses and Cities——How beautiful is the Sea? How agreeably surprizing the Form of the Universe? The Multitude, and Variety of Islands? The pleasing Situation of Coasts and Shores? How many, and different are the Kinds of Maritime Creatures, some immersed and flouncing in the Deep, some floating on the Surface, and others in Native Shells cleaving to Rocks——Could the whole Terraqueous Globe be as easily taken in by the Sight of the Eyes, as it is by the Contemplation of the Mind, who could doubt of a Divine Reason!

IN

IN Consequence of this plausible Way of Reasoning, how very different does the Opinion of the Stoic appear, from that of the *Epicurean* Deist, though in the final Issue of Argument, they will be found to stand, nearly on the same Foot; For, when *Balbus* hath seemingly derived the Government and Administration of the World from the Power and Energy of a Divine Mind, or of something, in his Apprehension, similar to it, his magnificent Structure of Providence is all laid Waste by his making every Thing subject to Nature, or, to a Plastic, Operative, Efficacious Power, which pervades the Universe: For, *Zeno*, who was the Founder of the Stoic Sect, defines Nature, in such a Manner, as to make her a Kind of
artificial

artificial Fire, tending in a regular Method of Efficiency to Generation: For, saith he, it is the peculiar Property of Art, to create and to generate; and Operations, performed by Labour of the Human Hand, are, by the Efficacy of Nature, that is, by artificial Heat, which presides in a magisterial Way over all other Arts, effected with more Ease, and greater Dexterity: In this way, I own, every particular Nature, of whatever Kind, is artificially operative, in Proportion as it proceeds in a certain Path, or Tract, peculiar to its Power and Efficacy; but the Nature of the Universe, which binds and holds every Thing in her Embrace, is not only artificial, but a complete Artist, consulting, and providing for all useful Conveniencies, and omitting no Opportunities

Opportunities of answering that End :
As, then, all particular Natures, respectively, derive Being, Growth, and Support from their proper Seeds, the Nature of the World is endued with voluntary Motions of every Kind, and with Tendencies, Affections, and Appetites, productive of suitable Actions, in like Manner, as we are moved and excited by Mind, and Sense : Since the Mind, therefore, of the Universe is of such Nature, and, for that very Reason, may justly be called Providence, her Care and Foresight are chiefly directed to these Ends, That the World may be of such a Form, whereby it is most apt to persevere : That it stand not in Need of any Thing, the Want whereof may contract Deformity : And, more especially, That it may have all Advantages

vantages of Beauty and Order, in the highest Perfection.

DEISTS of this Sect, who impute all Issues and Events of Things to the Power, Influence, and Efficacy of Natural Causes, every where prevail, through want of Advertence to the sole, Original Cause of Causes, secondary Causes being merely menial, and absolutely subservient to the Divine Direction of all the Powers and Energies of ministerial Nature : Whoever hath Curiosity to be informed of the Method, wherein Nature, according to the Principles of the Stoics, proceeds to act and to generate, may find the whole Process of her operative Faculty, in the second Book of *Cicero's* Treatise of the Nature of the Gods, too long to be here transcribed.

ON

ON the other Side, then, let the Deist take as spiritual a God as he pleases, if he suppose this God to have framed the universal Machine, in such Perfection, that no Wheel, no Spring, no Counterpoise can ever fail to perform the Functions, for which he designed them, but all Effects are necessarily produced by Virtue of an uninterrupted Chain of Causes, in their Operation and Efficacy independent of his Interposition in the Government of the World, the Consequence of such Belief upon my Mind is worse, than mere Atheism; for, if I am only an inconsiderable Part in a stupendous Piece of excellent Clockwork, which moves by Influence of necessary Causes; if I have no Power to resist the Force of the fatal Chain, by which I am dragged;

H h

If

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H h

If

If I am not capable, under such Circumstances, of doing any Moral Good or Evil, the Inference is very plain, That the Irregularity of the Action, be it never so Immoral, is fairly chargeable upon the Being, who necessitated me to act.

IN Consequence of this Principle, Moral Evil loses its Obliquity and its very Name, for Moral Evil implies, in the very Nature of it, a voluntary Breach of a known Law, but That cannot possibly be a voluntary Act, which is caused by irresistible Power in the way of Efficiency, and, consequently, Laws, Religion, and Providence must entirely vanish, for there can be no Government by Law, where Freedom of Will is taken away, nor any Religion or Providence, where
there

there is no possible Ground of Reward or Punishment, which in their Nature and Essence pre-suppose Liberty of Action: A Will, then, lying under Necessity, from Operation of second Causes, is a flat Contradiction, because no Man can be said to act voluntarily, who acts by Influence of immutably coherent Causes, and, therefore, in Consequence of this Principle, there is no such Thing, as Vice; or, if there be, GOD, who made Vice necessary by a continued Series and Chain of Causes, is the Author of it, and, therefore, Man is not capable of Merit or Demerit, of Reward or Punishment.

NOR hath the Opinion of Deists better Influence on Moral Virtue, who allow a general Providence, which preserves all Kinds and Species of Beings in their continual Vicissitudes, but hath no more regard to the Actions of Men, than of the meanest Brutes, such Opinion, in its Natural Tendencies, giving as much Licence to Men to commit Sin, as any of the former, by freeing them from all Sense of the Superintendency of a Divine Being, and, in Consequence, from all Fear of Punishment, or Hope of Reward.

THE ancient, Stoical Deists were, I own, great Assertors of particular Providence, but effectually weakened the Force and Influence of it on the Lives and Morals of Men, by maintaining

taining z, That Virtue in Man depends entirely upon Himself : That it is a Folly to lift up his Hands to Heaven for Aid : That his Soul,

z. See *Senec. Epist. Cap. 31, 41. Balbus in Cicer. de nat. Deor. l. 2 and 3. Arrian. lib. 1. c. 29. Plutar. de Stoic. repug. & alibi adv. Stoic.*

The Stoics destroyed Providence also by making that God, to whom they assigned the Administration and Conservation of all Things, to be only, saith *Plutarch* *σωμα νοερον*, an intelligent Body, and *Jupiter* to be Fire : This Opinion, which some would free them from, their Friend *Lipsius* confesseth. *Diogenes Laertius* saith, that the *Stoics* owned two Principles, an Agent and a Patient, *αλλα και σωματα ειναι τας αρχας*, but held these Principles to be Bodies ; and this Reading is to be retained, as being confirmed by *Plutarch*, by *Porphyry* in *Eusebius*, and by *Origen* against *Celsus*, in diverse Places : Now, this *σωμα νοερον*, this intelligent Body is a Contradiction to it self, and to make all Providence to depend upon it, is, in Effect, to deny Providence, it being in the Nature of the Thing impossible, that Body should have Wisdom, and Foresight to discern, or Power and Will to act. See Dr. *Whitby's* Necess. of Revelation.

which

which is the Source of Virtue, is a Part of GOD: That a wise Man excells GOD, in this particular, That Man is wise from his Nature, not from his Choice : That a Man ought, indeed, to pray to GOD for Wealth and Safety, but not for Justice, Temperance, and Wisdom: That he is praise-worthy for his Virtue, and hath a Right to glory in it, which could not be true, if Virtue doth not proceed entirely from himself, without Derivation of Influence from GOD.

BUT, notwithstanding this magnificent Boast of the Self-Sufficiency of the Human Mind to all the Means and Purposes of Virtue, the Stoical Deist does, in Fact, destroy and lay waste the main Foundation of all
Virtue,

Virtue, by asserting, That the Issues, Events, and Effects of Things are entirely owing to inexorable Fate, and a continued Series of determining Causes, previous, in their Influence and Efficacy, to Deliberation in the Intellect, and to Election and Operation in the Will.

IN Consequence of this fatal Necessity, by Virtue of which every Thing, that happens, flows from a Continuation of Causes, the Theology of the Destinarian is of as little Use to Religious or Moral Purposes, as that of the *Epicurean* Deist, the Doctrine of Fatal Necessity being as effectually destructive of Piety and Virtue, as the Denial of Providence: However, therefore, the Stoical Deist may talk with Eloquence of the
free

free Motion of the Human Will, and place his Happiness in being only concerned in Things entirely in his own Power, this Confidence in the free Use of his presumed Natural Strength is no more, in Fact, than a plain Evidence, as *Plutarch* expresses it, of the Stoical Repugnancies: For, all the Freedom, which can, on such Principles, be allowed to the Human Will, is, that a Man may chuse to do That, which, if he had not willed to do, Fate would compel to; and may refuse to do What, if he had willed to have done, he is forced by Fate to leave undone: A Will, then, under Necessity of Operation from pre-determining Causes, is, in Reality and Effect, no Will, because a Man cannot be said, with any Propriety of Sense,

Sense, to act Voluntarily, who is under Necessitation to act, or not to act: In Consequence of the same Principle, the very Notion of Providence cannot subsist, for Providence, in the lowest Acceptation of the Word, is a Divine Appointment of certain Things to be done, in a certain Manner, in order to a certain End, but if a Man is under Necessitation to act from Destiny, or a Fatal Impulse of pre-determining Causes, providential Appointments of Means and Ends of Action entirely vanish, and all true Sensations of Religion and Virtue utterly cease.

THERE can be but one Point of Truth in any given Question of a simple Nature, because every given

Truth of this Kind is the Affirmation or Negation of the Properties of one uniform, undivided Thing: If the Question, then, is put, is there Destiny, the Solution is obvious and plain, if there be Providence, there can be no Destiny, if Destiny, there can be no Providence, because Providence and Destiny are inconsistent, essentially divided Things, and, therefore, consist of diverse, incompatible Properties: Or take the Matter thus, a Man cannot Be, and not Be, in the same given Point of Time, nor can he, in any Point of Time, cease to be what he essentially is in the given Point of Time, and become a quite contrary incompatible Thing, and yet operate, uniformly, without Inconsistency and without Opposition to former Self; consider

consider, then, Providence, as a Man subsisting and acting in a certain given Manner, and Destiny, as a Man subsisting and acting, in all respects, in a quite different Manner, Providence and Destiny, situate in this Position, can no more co-exist, and, at the same Time, co-operate, than the same Man can at once Be and not Be, can do and not do the same given Thing in the same Point of Time.

Appointments of general Providence manifestly appear in the uniform Propensions and Tendencies of Things to the Preservation of their Being, and Propagation of their Kind: In the Suitableness and Subservience of one Thing to the Existence and Use of another: In Dispositions of Things to Places and

Ranks, most useful, and, in Consequence, preventive of that Confusion and Disorder, which contrary Qualities would otherwise produce: In the Subordination of particular Inclinations of Things to the Prevention of whatsoever is contrary to the Laws of the Universe: And in the admirable Concurrence of Things, of contrary and mutually destructive Qualities to the Constitution of mixt Bodies :

ALL these Propensions, Inclinations, Suitablenesses, Dispositions, Subordinations, and Concurrences of Things, in the vegetable and animal World, which are, on the Destinarian Principle, attributed to Agency of Second Causes, in contradistinction to Providence, evidently conspire

aspire to discover and manifest a Power, which tempers and directs their Causalities and Operations to their respective Ends : But, as the Nature of Things is different in their Original Constitution, their Perfections are also different, in Proportion to the Degrees of their respective Excellence : Man, in respect of his Animal Powers, is on a Level with mere Brutes ; but, as Man is endued with Intellect and Will, he was Originally fitted and directed by his CREATOR to act, in Consequence of such Powers, in a way suitable to the superior Excellence and Perfection of his Nature, and is, therefore, accountable for any Deviation from the Rules of Action, which he was enabled to know, and to obey :

UPON

UPON the whole, then, there is no Predetermination of Human Will, nor Destiny, nor Fatal Necessity, but every Thing in Nature is governed and carried on by Providence under OEconomy of certain Laws, which reasonable Beings are left free to obey, or not to obey, and, therefore, have rheir Actions, and the natural Consequences of them, in their own Power.

As to Particular Providence, which on the Destinarian Principle cannot subsist, we meet with many Events in the Course of Things, which cannot be accounted for by the Laws and Influences of Natural Causes, and, therefore, are as plain Evidences of the Source they flow from, and of the special Interposition of GOD in the Government of the World, as
Rays

Rays of Light, issuing from the Sun, are Indications of the Existence of a luminary Body, though such Events are, I am confident, considered by the Bulk of Mankind, as Things of Course, and the necessary Effects of independent Causes.

1. WHEN Effects are produced without Mediation of Natural Means, Providence supplies, by Supernatural Efficacy, the Defects of Means Natural :

2. When Effects, produced, exceed the Efficacy of their Natural apparent Causes, an Accession of Force and Power must be superadded to the Agency of such Causes by an invisible Hand :

3. WHEN

3. WHEN a Cause makes use of Means, Naturally fit and proper and likely to produce a particular Effect, the Unfuitableness of the Effect, produced, to the Nature and Tendency of such Means, must be resolved into an higher Cause :

4. WHEN Means, employed by any Cause, are, in the ordinary Course of Operation, unfit and unfuitable to produce the intended Effect, and the Effect, intended, notwithstanding follows, the Production of such Effect, by such Means, must be attributed to the Co-operation of Divine Power with the Agency of such Cause :

5. WHEN various Causes, in their Nature and Operation contrary, and which have no mutual Dependence
nor

nor any Coherence one with another, shall, in diverse Places, at several Times, and in various Ways, harmoniously conspire, and at length unite their several Forces, to produce the same Effect, the Production of such Effect is a plain Evidence of the Special Providence of GOD, directing and combining various, arbitrary, concurrent Causes to a particular End.

PROPOSITIONS of this Sort, many more whereof might easily be collected, are so evident in their Nature, and confirmed to be true, in Fact, by so many signal Instances of extraordinary Issues and Events, pertinently related, with great Variety, by Histories almost of every Kind, that I industriously mean not to de-

prive the curious Reader of the Pleasure of the Application.

ALL I mean, at present, in Consequence of such Propositions, in their Nature evident, is only to remark, That there are certain Shades and faint Colourings of this very *Notion* of the Interposition of Providence, which I am now contending for, visible in the Writings of ancient Historians, Poets, and Moralists: *Herodotus*, in the Person of *Artabanus*, observes in the Case of *Xerxes*, That great Armies are often defeated by a small Number of Men, for, when struck by the jealous GOD with panic Fear, or terrified by the Noise of his Thunder, they become destitute of Vigour and Courage, and the Reason, which the Historian assigns for such surprizing Events,

Events, is very remarkable — Be-
cause GOD will not suffer any Mor-
tal to think magnificently of Himself:
Consistently with this Notion, *Homer*
frequently introduces his bravest He-
roes dispirited, trembling, and sink-
ing into Death, under the feeble Ef-
fort of an impotent Arm, strength-
ened and supported by the invifible
Prefence of a GOD: But *Cicero*
speaks more clearly and directly to
the Point, and afferts, it was a com-
mon Opinion among the Ancients,
That whatever brought great Benefit
to Mankind, was the Result of Divine
Goodnefs toward Men: In Confe-
quence of fuch Opinion, extraordi-
nary Events, manifefly tending to
fecure the pricipal Interests and public
Weal of Mankind, are plain Eviden-
ces of the Special Interpoftion of
K k 2 G O D,

GOD, in the Government of the Word,

BEFORE I proceed, suffer me to expatiate for a Moment on the Preservation of Religion and Civil Government, which, I am afraid, is reflected on with as little Sense of pious Gratitude, as the Motion of the Air, or the Light and genial Heat of the Sun, and yet is a Blessing, which the Welfare of Human Kind, in this World, and the next, entirely and absolutely depends on, as being commensurate to all the Concerns and Ends of their Being, from the Origin of its Existence to all Eternity ;

WHEN I consider, in what Variety of Error, Men deviate from the very Grounds and Principles even of Natural

tural Religion : The Biggotry, which false Opinions are supported with, and the zealous Endeavours, which are used to subvert the true : When I consider the Denial of the Being of a GOD, by some ; and of his Providence, and the Manifestation of his Will, by more : In Consequence of this, when I consider the Prostitution of Things, most sacred, to the vilest Uses : The open and daring Impieties, which are countenanced and avowed by the Great, and thence diffused, under false Colours of Lustre, through the meaner Herd, which is more struck and affected with Glitter of Grandeur, than Reality of Things : Above all, when I consider the vast Diffolution of Morals, which is of greatest Danger to Religion, because it might, I presume, be easily proved to

to Demonstration, That bad Opinions are oftener the Consequences of bad Practices, than bad Practices are of bad Opinions : When I consider all this, I may fairly conclude upon the whole Matter, That, amidst the present great Corruption, both in Theory and Practice, the Preservation of any clear Sense of true Religion among Men is an evident, Signal Act of the Special Providence, and Interposition of GOD:

AGAIN, when I consider the different, particular Interests, and various Humours of Men in Society : The Avarice and Ambition of Some, and the Cruelty, Oppression, and Fraud of Others : The small Reverence of public Faith, and great Contempt of Justice : The Insolence of Men in Power,

Power, and the Male-contentedness of those, who are out: The little Regard, that is had to Oaths, which alone can give a religious Sanction to Government and Laws, and establish them on the Hearts and Consciences of Men: The Aversion to every Form of Government in Some, and to the Administration of any particular Form of Government in Others: The strong Temptations great Men are under from their Situation, their Power, and Popularity to engross, or divert the Course of public Revenues from their proper Channels: The Factions, which are formed and carried on by Men, probably on no other Principle, than because Things are not transacted agreeably to their private Interests, or particular Inclinations: The Misconstructions, which
are

are often made on the Actions of Princes, and the Jealousies, which are apt to spring from such Apprehensions: The vast Difficulty, which Governors meet with, in uniting Men, of different Inclinations, Pursuits, Opinions, and Religions, in one Interest, for the Common Good: The Necessity, which they are under, in order to the Ends of Government, of inflicting Punishments, which, though never so just, are generally deemed severe: When I consider These, and numberless other Circumstances, all naturally tending to the Dissolution of Civil Society; Good GOD! How doth it subsist! Is not the Preservation of Government, so circumstantiated, an Effect of Providence, almost Miraculous!

CON-

CONSISTENT with the Deistic Principles, already mentioned, is another Opinion, equally destructive of the very Essence of Moral Virtue, That the vast Effusion of Evil, which prevails in the World, is an inevitable Effect of the irreclaimable Perverseness and Obstinacy of Matter, which, being Eternal and uncreated, cannot be altered in the Constitution of its Nature, and the Effects of its Power, even by GOD, and, therefore, it is consistently inferred, That Prevention of Evils is impossible, because they inseparably cleave to Human Nature, and are inherent, unalterable Affections of Matter: In Consequence of this Principle, Religion and Virtue cannot subsist, Moral Evil being so essentially intimate to Matter, form-

ed into an Human Body, that nor Man, nor GOD can separate them, and, therefore, Man, who hath a Body of Moral Evil, substantially mixed with his natural Body, is no more accountable for the Immorality of his Life, than for the Constitution of his Frame.

Plutarch, complaining that the Wicked are more numerous than the Sand of the Sea, and the Dust of the Earth, infomuch that Men do not even dream of Virtue, and not being able, in any other Way, to account for this Profusion of Evil, asserts, there must be a Natural Principle of Evil, as well as of Good, which, saith he, was the Opinion of the Best, and Wisest Men, who affirmed there were two Gods, emulous each of other, One,
the

the Author of Good, whom they called GOD, the Other, the Author of Evil, whom they called Dæmon; And adds, That this Opinion was a Tradition of great Antiquity, derived from Divines and Lawgivers to Poets and Philosophers, the first Author whereof cannot be found :

Now, in Consequence of the Existence of this Anti-God, as powerful in the Production of Evil, as the other Being is of Good, Moral Evil is manifestly the Result of an irresistible Principle, operating in the way of Efficiency, and is, therefore, unavoidable and necessary.

AGREEABLE to this Principle is the Concourse, or Concatenation of Causes, so greatly insisted on by the Def-

tinarian Deist of *Malmesbury*, which is a vast Number of Chains, joined together in the first Link, GOD, and also in the Effect, in so close and inseperable an Union, that they form one total adequate Cause of every Event, in such Manner, that the Human Will, with each Propension, even during the Time of Deliberation, is as much necessitated, as any Thing in Nature, and that Man hath no more Power not to act, as he doth, than Fire hath Power, not to burn :

IN Consequence of this Principle, GOD, who is the first Cause of Beings, is more the Author of Moral Evil, than Man, in Proportion as the Motion of a Watch is more from the Hand of the Artificer, who made and wound it up, than from the Spring

Spring or the Wheels or the Thread, which are only ministerial Means, devised and fitted to keep the Machine in Motion: Or, to speak more directly to the Point in Question, if GOD doth by special Influence necessitate the Operations of second Causes, and second Causes, thus determined, necessitate the Human Will by irresistible Efficacy in every Act, the Consequence is very plain, That Man cannot Sin, but that every Act, which is called Immoral, proceeds, in the Natural and Necessary Course of Operation, from the Cause of Causes, which, in an essential Subordination of Influence and Efficacy on secondary determined Causes, is ever the Cause of the Effect: For, Man, being extrinsically and inevitably predetermined in all his Acts by Influence
of

of irresistible Causes, is a necessary Agent, and, therefore, not accountable for his Actions, but GOD, who is Author of such Causes, and necessitates their Operations, being free to act, is, in Consequence, the Author of all Effects, of whatsoever Kind, which arise from such Operations.

IN Consequence of the Prescience of GOD *a*, which this Deistic Philosopher makes a principal Link in his Chain

a All, that the greatest Opposers of Liberty have ever urged, or can urge, on this head, amounts only to This, That *Fore-knowledge* implies *Certainty*, and *Certainty* implies *Necessity*: But neither is it true, that *Certainty* implies *Necessity*, neither does *Fore-knowledge* imply any other *Certainty*, than such a *Certainty* only, as would be equally in Things, though there was no *Fore-knowledge*:

For,

Chain of necessary Causes, I very clearly conceive, That the Divine Mind sees every Thing, which was, or is, or ever shall be, in one simple undivided

For, 1. the Certainty of Fore-knowlege does not cause the Certainty of Things, but is it self founded on the Reality of their Existence: Whatever now Is, it is *certain* that it Is; and it was Yesterday and from Eternity as *certainly* true, that the Thing *would be* To-day, as it is *now certain* that it Is: And this Certainty of Event is equally the same, whether it be supposed that the Thing could be Fore-known, or not; for whatever at any Time Is, it was *certainly true* from Eternity, as to the Event, that *That Thing would be*; and this certain Truth of every future Event, would not at all have been the less, though there had been no such Thing as Fore-Knowlege: Bare Prescience therefore has no Influence at all upon any Thing, nor contributes in the least towards the making it necessary: We may illustrate this in some measure by the Comparison of our own Knowlege; we know certainly that some Things are, and when we know that they are, they cannot but Be, yet it is manifest our Knowlege does not at all affect the Things, to make them more necessary

vided View, without Succession of Time, or Ideas, but surely every Man of common Sense will allow, That there is wide Difference between the
Divine

cessary or more certain: Now Fore-knowlege in GOD is the very same as Knowlege; all Things are to Him as if they were equally present, to all the Purposes of Knowlege and Power: He knows perfectly every thing that *Is*, and he fore-knows whatever *shall* be, in the same Manner as he knows what *Is*: As therefore Knowlege has no Influence on Things that *are*, so neither has Fore-knowlege, on Things that *shall* be: It is true, that the *Manner* how GOD can foresee Future Things, without a Chain of Necessary Causes, is impossible for us to explain, but so also are numberless other Things, which yet no Man doubts of the Truth of; and if there were any Strength in this Argument, it would prove, not against *Liberty*, but against *Prescience* it self: For, if these two Things were really inconsistent, and one of them must be destroyed, the introducing an absolute and universal Fatality, which evidently destroys all Religion and Morality, would tend more of the two to the Dishonour of GOD, than denying him a Fore-knowlege, which upon this Supposition

Divine Mind seeing in an undivided View every Thing, which Men will do, and between Men being necessitated to act in a certain determined

Manner;

sition would be impossible, and imply a Contradiction to conceive him to have; and the denying of which would in such case be no more a Diminution of his *Omniscience*, than the denying him the Power of working Contradictions is taking away his *Omnipotence*: But the Case is not thus, for though we cannot indeed explain the *Manner* of GOD's fore-seeing the Actions of free Agents, yet thus much we know, that the bare Fore-knowledge of any Action, that would upon all other accounts be Free, cannot alter or diminish that Freedom, it being evident, That Fore-knowledge adds no other Certainty to any Thing, than what it would equally have, though there was no Fore knowledge: Unless therefore we be antecedently certain, that Nothing can possibly be Free, and that Liberty is in it self absolutely an inconsistent and contradictory Notion, bare Fore-knowledge, which makes no Alteration at all in any Thing, will not be in any wise Inconsistent with Liberty, how great Difficulty soever there may be in comprehending the *Manner* of such Fore-knowledge: For, if Liberty be in

Manner, so that no Man can act in any other Manner : That is, there is wide Difference between the Divine Mind, seeing in one View what every Man will do, and between every Man acting,

it self possible, the bare Fore-sight of a free Action, *before it be done*, is nothing different (to any purpose in the present Question) from a simple Knowledge of it, *when it is done*, both these Kinds of Knowledge implying plainly a *Certainty* only of the Event, (which would be the same though there was no such Knowledge) and not at all any *Necessity* of the Thing :

For, 2. As Fore-knowledge implies not any other *Certainty*, than such as would be equally in Things, though there was no Fore-knowledge, so neither does this *Certainty of Event* in any sort imply *Necessity*; for, let a Fatalist suppose (what he does not yet grant) that there was in Man (as we assert) a Power of beginning Motion, that is, of acting freely, and let him suppose further, if he please, that those Actions could not possibly be Fore-known, will there not yet, notwithstanding this Supposition, be in the Nature of Things, the same *Certainty of Event* in every one of

acting, in the very Manner he doth act, by Destiny or Fatal Necessity, and, therefore, though the Divine Mind is Prescient, the Human Mind is notwithstanding Free.

of the Man's Actions, as if they were never so Fatal and Necessary? For Instance, suppose the Man by an internal Principle of Motion, and an absolute Freedom of Will, without any external Cause or Impulse at all, does some particular Action *to-day*, and suppose it was not possible that this Action should have been fore-seen *Yesterday*, was there not nevertheless the *same Certainty of Event*, as if it had been fore-seen? that is, would it not, notwithstanding the *supposed* Freedom, have been as *certain a Truth Yesterday* and from Eternity, that this Action *was* in Event *to be performed to-day*, (though supposed never so impossible to have been Fore-known) as it is now a *certain infallible Truth* that it is *performed*? Mere *Certainty of Event*, therefore, does not in any measure imply Necessity, and consequently Fore-Knowledge, however impossible to be explained as to the *Manner* of it, yet since it is evident it implies no other Certainty, but only that Certainty of Event, which the Thing would equally have without being Fore-known, it is evident that it also implies no Necessity. Dr. Clarke.

THAT Celestial Bodies, and other sensible Objects, operate upon Human Bodies by Motion, Light, and occult Qualities, which we call Influences, I readily grant; but that Influences, issuing from outward Objects, determine rational Agents in their Deliberations and Counsels by Natural Efficacy, and necessitate the Will, and, in Consequence, the Action, I positively deny: The Human Will can then only be Naturally determined, when GOD, besides his general Influence, whereon the Powers both of Operation and Being in all second Causes depend, doth moreover, at certain Times, in Cases extraordinary, concur by special Influence, and facilitate the Will to move to certain particular Acts: But this special Influence is so far from being

a Proof of the Liberty of human Will being thereby destroyed, that it only proves, that GOD, who formed the Soul, and is present to all its Motions and Operations, can, without Alteration of Essence or Diminution of elective Power, infuse into it a clearer Light, whereby it guides and directs its Motions to an eligible End.

THIS Deistic Notion *b* of the Natural Efficacy of celestial and other Bodies on the Deliberations and Moti-
of

b. Mundi divinitate perspecta, tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas, quæ ex mobilissima, purissimaque ætheris parte gignuntur, neque ulla præterea sunt admista natura, totaque sunt calida, atque perlucida, ut ea quoque rectissime, et animantia esse, et sentire, atque intelligere dicantur: atque ea quidem tota esse ignea duorum sensuum testimonio confirmari Cleanthes putat, tactus et oculorum; nam solis candor illustrior est quam ullus ignis, quippe qui immenso

ons of the Human Mind is probably derived from Part of that System of Stoical Theology, which *Cicero* Paints in lively Colours in his Treatise of the Nature

menso mundo tam longe lateque colluceat, et is ejus tactus est, non ut tepefaciat solum, sed etiam sæpe comburat, quorum neutrum faceret, nisi esset igneus: Ergo, inquit, cum sol igneus sit, oceanique alatur humoribus, quia nullus ignis sine pastu aliquo possit permanere, necesse est, aut ei similis sit igni, quem adhibemus ad usum atque ad victum, aut ei, qui corporibus animantum continetur; atque hic noster ignis, quem usus vitæ requirit, confector est, et consumptor omnium, idemque, quocunque invasit, cuncta disturbat ac dissipat; contra ille corporeus, vitalis, et salutaris omnia conservat, alit, auget, sustinet, sensuque afficit; negat ergo esse dubium, horum ignium sol utri similis sit, cum is quoque efficiat ut omnia floreat, et in suo quæque genere pubescant: quare cum solis ignis similis eorum ignium sit, qui sunt in corporibus animantium, solem quoque animantem esse oportet, et quidem reliqua astra, quæ oriuntur in ardore cœlesti, qui æther vel cœlum nominatur: cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aere aliorum, absurdum esse

Aristoteli

Nature of the Gods, where *Balbus*, a strenuous Defender of the Principles of that Sect, is introduced explaining and supporting the Ground, on which
this

Aristoteli videtur, in ea parte, quæ sit ad gignenda animalia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare; sidera autem æthereum locum obtinent, qui quoniam tenuissimus est, et semper agitur, et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu acerrimo, et mobilitate celerrima esse: quare, cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse, et intelligentiam, ex quo efficitur, in deorum numero astra esse ducenda; etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia, et ad intelligendum aptiora eorum, qui terras incolant eas, in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis, quam illorum, qui utantur crasso cœlo, atque concreto; quin etiam cibo, quo utare, interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant, probabile est igitur, præstantem intelligentiam in sideribus esse, quæ et ætheream mundi partem incolant, et marinis terrenisque humoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur: sensum astrorum atque intelligentiam maxime declarat ordo eorum, atque constantia, nihil est enim, quod ratione et numero movere possit sine consilio, in quo nihil est temerarium, nihil
varium,

this Notion seems to be raised: After having endeavoured to prove, That the Universe is God, because what contains all Things, must be most perfect,

varium; nihil fortuitum; ordo autem fidelarum, et in omni eternitate constantia, neque naturam significat, est enim plena rationis, neque fortunam, quæ amica varietati constantiam respuit; sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte, suo sensu, ac divinitate moveantur: nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo, quod omnia, quæ moventur, aut natura moveri censuit, aut vi, aut voluntate: moveri autem solem, et lunam, et sidera omnia; quæ autem natura moverentur, hæc aut pondere deorsum, aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret, propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam majore fieri, ut contra naturam astra moveantur, quæ enim potest major esse? restat igitur, ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius: Quæ qui videat, non indocite solum, verum etiam impie faciat, si deos esse neget; nec sane multum interest, utrum id neget, an eos omni procuratione atque actione privet; mihi enim, qui nihil agit, esse omnino non videtur—— nulla igitur in cælo nec fortuna, nec temeritas, nec erratio, nec vanitas inest,

perfect, and what is most perfect, must be endued with the highest Degree of Life, Sense, and Intelligence, that is, must be God, the Stoical

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Deist.

inest, contraque omnis ordo, veritas, ratio, constantia——cœlestem ergo admirabilem ordinem, incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio, et salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipse mentis expers habendus est. *Cic. de nat. Deor. l. 2.*

This Doctrine of the human Will lying under Necessity from Influence of outward Causes greatly prevailed not only among the Vulgar, but saith *Simplicius*, most Men hold Fate to be the Cause, not only of the *περιφορὰ* or Revolution of all other Things, but also *καὶ τῶν ὀρεξεῶν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῆς προλήψεως καὶ αἰρέσεως*, of the Anticipation and Election of our Wills and Appetites: Of this Opinion, saith *Cicero*, were *Heraclitus*, *Democritus*, *Empedocles*, and *Aristotle*; to whom we may add from *Diogenes Laertius*, *Philolaus* and from *Stobæus*, *Mercurius*.

Now this Fate, which they assigned for the necessary Cause of Election and Volition, this *αὐτεξέσσιον μετ' ἀνάγκης*, most of them ascribed to the Motions and Conversions of the Stars, and hence, saith

Deist goes on to attribute Divinity to the Stars also, on Principles so unphilosophical, that it is Matter of vast Surprize, how Men could be persuaded into the Belief of such Opinions :

saith *Porphyrus*, the Gods foretell τὰ μεμοιραμένα γινώσκοντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀστέρων πορείας, knowing what Things shall fatally come to pass by the Revolution of the Stars, καὶ τὸτο σχεδὸν πάντες ἐξηφέναν οἱ ἀλφειοὶ τῶν θεῶν, and this almost all have declared, who speak truly of the Gods: They, saith *Simplicius*, who made Fate to be the Cause of our Elections and Desires, μαρτυροῦνται τὴν ἀστρολόγειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ γενέσει τῶν ἀστέρων θεσεως, maintained this Opinion upon the Testimony of Astrologers, foretelling from the Position of the Stars at a Man's Birth, that, one will be a lover of Pleasure, and another of Riches——*Sextus Empiricus* adds, οὐ γὰρ μὴ πάντα γινέται κατ' ἐμαρμένην, ἐκ ἑστὶ χαλδαϊκή, That if all Things are not effected by Fate, there can be no such Art as that of the *Chaldeans*, who, as well as the *Egyptians*, foretel, from their Knowledge and Observation of the Stars, to what Fate every Man is born, and what should happen to every Man——*Mercurius* saith, that Fate is the Effect τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων διαθέσεως of the Disposition of the Stars, and that no Man can avoid

nions : The Stars, faith he, are also Gods, because they are generated out of the most pure and noble Parts of the Sky, have no Mixture in them of contrary Natures, are of a Sub-

N n 2

stance,

avoid the Force of Fate, *οπλον γαρ εμαρμένους οι ἀστέρες*, for the Stars are its Armory, and all Things happen to Nature, and to Man, according to their Direction and Influence——*Origen* complains also, That this Opinion, that all Things happened upon Earth, and to every Man in particular, according to Fate, resulting from the Complication of the Planets, and the Stars in the Zodiac, was not only the Doctrine of the Gentiles, alien from the Christian Faith, but also of many, who had embraced it——This Doctrine of the fatall Influence of celestial Bodies on the Actions of Men was maintained by the *Stoics*, *Pythagoreans*, *Platonists*, and *Plutarch*, who, having asserted that there ever must have been Causes, producing the same Effects in every Thing, illustrates his Assertion to his Friend *Piso* in this manner, Know therefore that by the same celestial Beings, which are the Causes of all Things, it is, *και το ἐμέ γράφειν τάδε, και ὡς σε τε πράττειν ἄπερ και ὅπως τυγχάνεις πράττειν*, that I
now

stance, fiery and transparent, and, therefore, may justly be presumed to be endued with Life, Sense, and Understanding, for nothing can be moved in a regular, uniform, constant
Order

now write these Things, and that thou doest what thou doest, seeing that cannot be without some certain Causality or Influence of the Stars upon us, which shall necessitate all Men, upon a certain Revolution of them, to do the same Things, which they had done before, whether they be Good or Evil——in consequence of this, *Mercurius*, in teaching his Son *Tatius* this Doctrine, forbade him to discourse of it to the vulgar Sort, for, saith he, if they know that all Things happen according to this over-ruling Fate, they will ascribe to Fate the Causes of their Wickedness, and never cease from Evil,
τάς δὲ αἰτίας τῷ κακῷ ἐμαρμένῃ αναφέρουσιν, ὅν ἀφίξεται ποτὲ πάντος ἔρξῃ κακῷ.

The *Platonists* and *Pythagoreans*, notwithstanding their pompous Assertion, That all Things happened *κατὰ θεαν προνοίαν* according to divine Providence, laid all this Providence waste by asserting, that Fate depended upon the Revolution
 tion

Order without a Mind, which hath nothing in it, that is rash, various, or fortuitous, since therefore, the Regularity of their Motions, as being perfectly Rational, cannot be the Effect of Nature, nor yet of Fortune, which

tion of the Stars, by Virtue of whose Disposition every Thing was effected——This, saith *Origen*, *οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος* the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* assert, and in Consequence, saith he, I know not how τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν σωθήσεται the Liberty of the Will can be preserved, or how our Actions can deserve Praise or Blame——

That this was the Assertion of *Pythagoras*, that *κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γινόμενα πάλιν γίνονται*, at certain Periods all Things are done as they were before, so that nothing is simply New, we learn from *Jamblicus*; and that *Plato* was of the same Opinion, his own Words, cited from his *Timæus* by *Plutarch*, plainly prove——

Diogenes Laertius, after having told us, that it was the Opinion of *Pythagoras*, that God takes Care of Men, immediately adds, that he held also, *εἰμαρμένην τὴν τῶν ὅλων εἶναι, τῶν κατὰ μέρος, αἰτίαν διοικήσεως*, that Fate was the Cause of the Administration

which is a Friend to Change, they must move by an intelligent, voluntary, inherent Principle, capable of operating in the way of Efficiency on the Intellectual and Moral Powers of the Human Mind.

THERE is not any Thing said, with more plausible Appearance of Reason, by the *Malmesburian* Philosopher, in Opposition to true Liberty, than that Acts of the Will always follow the last Judgment of the Intellect, and

ministration of all Things, both in general, and in particular: And *Plutarch* saith, that according to *Plato*, Fate was λόγος θεῖος ἀπαράλλατος διοικτικὸν αἰτίαν ἀνεμπόδιστον, a Divine Decree, immutable by virtue of a Cause, which cannot be hindered. *Simplic.* p. 18. *Cic. de Fat.* c. 29. *Diog. Laert.* l. 9. p. 551, 573, 543. *Porphyr.* ap. *Euseb.* *Eccl.* p. 18. *Orig.* ap. *Euseb.* *Mercur.* ap. *Stob.* *Orig. adv. Cels.* *Jamb.* de vit. *Pythag.* *Pl. Timæ.* *Diog. Laert.* p. 509. *Plut.* ex *Phæd.* de *Fato.*

are,

are, therefore, necessary : Yet this Proposition will be found, on fair Examination, absolutely false, and, on Supposition of the Possibility of the Proposition being, in certain Cases, true, the Inference drawn from it is notwithstanding directly inconclusive :

THAT very Act of the Intellect, which is called the last Dictate of Reason, is both an Effect, and Testimony, of the Power and Liberty of the Will ; for the Object of the Will being Good in General, which is the End all Human Actions tend to, however the End in particular Cases may be mistaken, it is the Business of the Will to move the rational Powers of the Soul to their several Acts, and especially to apply the Intellect to ponder
and

and weigh the Moments of Things: Whatever Obligation, then, the Intellect can lay upon the Will, is derived from its own Power and Consent, because the Will is not necessitated to move the Intellect to consult: And, when the first Consultation is not sufficient, the Will freely moves the Intellect to farther Deliberation, from which free Power in the Will the Judgment of the Intellect doth, in many Cases, receive Alteration:

THE Intellect, then, determines the Motions of the Will, not in a Natural, but Moral way, not by efficient causal Influence into the Effect, but only by proposing and representing the Object, and, therefore, it is as ridiculous to say, that the proposing the Object by the Intellect to the Will is the Cause of Willing,

Willing, as it is to say, that the Object of Sight is the Cause of Seeing : The Object of the Will being some intelligible Good, real or apparent, if the Intellect should not previously propose it, the Will would operate without an Object, which is absurd ; but because the Judgment of the Intellect is previously required toward our making a proper Choice, it doth not necessarily follow, that we are obliged to make such Choice, since we may notwithstanding, even though all Things are rightly disposed for the Action of the Will, have a Power to act or not to Act, according to such Disposition : And herein, I conceive, principally lies the Immorality of the Will, That it does not always follow the Light of the Intellect, even when it appears most bright, but instead of

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following this faithful Guide with obsequious Care, is too often found to run before it, without waiting for the full and distinct Orders of Reason, which, upon mature Deliberation, would represent Things in a View, proper to determine its Choice of the better Part : The Intellect, therefore, hath no Place in that Concourse of Natural Causes, which are said to necessitate the Will :

As to Moral Efficacy, the Will is then only Morally determined, when an Object is proposed to it with persuasive Reasons and Motives to induce it to act : If the Will, upon such Proposal being made, doth not suspend, but assent, the Act is Necessary ; but, because the Will may suspend, and not assent, the Act is
not

not absolutely necessary, but necessary, only on Supposition, that the Will doth assent, which is perfectly consistent with true Liberty :

THE Intellect is not always practically operative, much less of such Nature in it Self, as, by Virtue of an inherent Special Power, to oblige and determine the Will to every particular Act : . In the usual way of Operation, the Intellect, in certain Cases, proposes several Means, equally conducive to the Attainment of the same End, but leaves the Will at perfect Liberty to chuse the Means, by which it moves ; and, though the Intellect should judge one of the proposed Means to be more expedient than another, yet as in the less expedient Mean, there is found the Reason of Good,

the Will, in Consequence of that Dominion, which it hath over it Self, may refuse or accept that Mean, which, the Intellect judges more or less expedient : Sometimes too the Intellect dictates this or that particular Good eligible, and fit to be chosen, but not so necessarily eligible, that it must be chosen ; and may judge this or that particular Mean, fit to attain the proposed End, but not the only Mean, by which the End can be attained : The Will also doth not move so efficaciously to every End proposed, as never to be diverted from the Prosecution of the End by Difficulty of the Means, and therefore the Will, in Opposition to the Judgment of the Intellect, may suspend its own Act : And farther still, supposing, but not granting, that the Will doth necessarily

rily follow the last Dictate of the Intellect, this Supposition proves no Antecedent Necessity, but a Necessity co-existent with the Act, nor extrinsic, because the Intellect and Will are Faculties and Powers of Operation, inherent in the same Subject: The very Men, therefore, who maintain, That the Judgment of the Intellect determines the Will, must, in Consequence of their own Principle, oppose absolute antecedent Necessity of Effects; for, suppose the Will to apply the Intellect to deliberate, and, after Deliberation, not to require a Review; suppose the last Dictate of Reason positive and authoritative, and suppose also the Will to operate efficaciously, and not to suspend its own Act: Then, indeed, there is a Necessity in the Act, but neither absolute,

lute, nor antecedent, nor, extrinſical, flowing from a Concourse of previous Causes, but a Necessity, only upon Supposition, That the Will concurs with the Intellect, in which Case the Man, who acts, freely determines his own Action, and his Liberty to act still subsists in the elective Power of his own Will, in Conjunction with the Predecision of the Intellect, after free Consultation concerning the Convenience or Degrees of Convenience of any Thing, which falls under Deliberation.

VARIOUS Deliberations and Affections in Men are, I own, Causes of various Resolutions, and, concurring with outward Causes, compound a total adequate Cause to the Necessary Production of an Effect, for when all concurrent

concurrent Causes are determined to act, the Effect may, then, be said to exist, and is, therefore, Necessary: But this Necessity is so far from being absolute in respect of the Will, that it is founded upon Supposition, That the deliberating Agent hath determined his own Liberty, without which Determination, and an Act of Assent arising from it, the Effect could never have been produced into Act by any Concourse of Causes, which, in their Nature and Efficacy, are only subservient and ministerial to its Production:

WHEN a Question, therefore, arises, whether Effects are Necessary, the Question is not, whether they are Necessary, when produced in Act, or Necessary in the Compound Sense, after

after a Man hath resolved, and finally determined what he will do; But the Question is, whether Effects are Necessary in previous exterior Causes, before they are determined by his own Will: It is not inconsistent, in any Sense, with true Liberty in the Human Will to determine it Self, otherwise no free rational Effect could ever be produced, and every Thing would remain in a State of Suspension; but it is absolutely inconsistent, in every Sense, with the Liberty of the Will, to be determined by a Cause exterior to it Self, otherwise every Effect produced would be the necessary Result of Causes, previous and superior, in the Efficacy of their Operation, to the Moral Powers of the rational Soul, and, in Consequence, destructive of the

the very Being of Virtue; which cannot subsist without Liberty of Will :

IN Consequence of this Reasoning, a Power in the Human Will of acting or not acting, or of acting in a certain particular Manner, is absolutely inconsistent with Necessitation to act, be the assigned Necessary Cause what it may : Even Resolution to act, in the lowest Sense, which the Words can bear, presupposes Deliberation in the Intellect, and implies Dominion in the Will over its own Acts, with a determinative Power in its Manner of Acting : But Deliberation cannot subsist, if Things are previously determined, and a Man must resign his determinative Power of acting in any particular Manner to absolute Necessity, and the fatal Direction of previous Causes.

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BUT, saith the Destinarian Deist of *Malmesbury*, a Man is indeed Free to do a Thing, who may do it, if he hath Will to do it, and may forbear, if he hath Will to forbear ; but, if it is necessary that he shall will to do it, the subsequent Act is necessary, and if there is a Necessity that he shall will to forbear, the forbearing Act is also Necessary :

THAT the Human Will is not under Necessitation to act or to forbear, which Necessitation, is the Supposition, upon which this Deistic Argument is founded, hath been already proved, and in order to give more Light to the Proof, suffer me to explain and ascertain the Nature and Difference of Acts, in respect of their Objects and Powers, and see to what they amount :

ACTS,

Acts, which proceed wholly from an external Cause, are violent; and, when from an internal Cause without any Knowledge of the End, Natural: Acts, proceeding from an internal Principle, with imperfect Knowledge of the End, and Appetite to the Object, without deliberate Election, as Acts of Children, Madmen, Fools, Beasts, and inconsiderate Men, are Spontaneous or Voluntary; and Acts, proceeding from an internal Principle, with more perfect Knowledge of an End, elected upon due mature Deliberation, are strictly and properly Free Acts: To this Class must also be reduced all Acts, which are done in Consequence of precedent Deliberation, for Habits of acting, contracted by frequent Use of particular Acts, facilitate the Will to move more

determinately, and precedent Deliberations, when clearly proved by Experience useful, save the Labour of subsequent Consultations: Acts, then, which are done by Virtue of Habits, so acquired, are as free, as if particular Deliberation co-existed with the particular Act:

TERMS being thus cleared, and appropriated to the Ideas, whereof they are Signs, Liberty is various, in proportion to its Objects and Powers; for Instance, Good and Evil being contrary and opposite Kinds of Things, to be able to chuse both Good and Evil is Liberty of diverse contrary Objects; but to chuse a particular Thing, and not to chuse the same given Thing being contradictory, to be able to do or to forbear to do the same

same given Act, to chuse or not to chuse the same Object, without varying the Kind, is Liberty of Exercise, or of Suspension of Power :

IN Consequence of this, the Liberty of Man is larger in Respect of the Extension of the Object, than the Liberty of GOD, whose Object, by Virtue of the Purity and Perfection of his Nature, is only Good continually : Man can, not only, do or forbear to do Good only or Evil only, but can also do or forbear to do both Good and Evil ; Man, therefore, hath not only Liberty of acting or not acting, but hath also Liberty of contrary Objects and Acts : GOD can do or not do this or that particular Good, but cannot do or not do both Good and Evil, and, therefore, hath Liberty, of
Exercise,

Exercise, or of Suspension of Power, but not Liberty of contrary Objects and Acts: But the Liberty of Man falls infinitely short of the Liberty of GOD in the Intension of the Power, the Goodness of GOD, in Respect of his Acts, being boundless as his Nature, and inseparable from his Essence:

UPON the Whole, therefore, Man is a voluntary Agent, and the formal Ratio of his Liberty is Freedom of Election, which cannot consist with Necessitation to Will, and, consequently, to act:

THE Objection, which the Desti-

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ons of Children and Fools, of Madmen and Beasts proceed from Deliberation and Election, and, That inconsiderate Acts are often found in the wisest Men, therefore Necessity and Election may consist: But, if all this could appear, it would concern the Objector greatly, who, when he should prove that Rational Men are not free from Necessity, undertakes to prove, That even Beasts deliberate and elect, that is, are, in Effect, Free Agents:

BUT to proceed in the Way of the Objection, That Wise Men do indeliberate Acts, I readily admit, but, That because Wise Men do some indeliberate Acts, therefore no Act, which they do, is free, I positively deny, because no Man of common
Sense

Sense will infer a general Conclusion from particular Premises :

THAT Beasts deliberately act is a false Proposition, for Deliberation cannot subsist without Reason, but Acts of Beasts, which seem to have the greatest Appearance of Reason, proceed chiefly from the Sensitive Passion of Fear, which in them is only a Perturbation in the Phantasy, arising from disturbed Organs, or from strange Objects, which strike them with sudden Surprise : But this Commotion in Beasts, arising from disturbed Organs and sudden Appearances of groundless Fear, is widely different from the rational Sagacity and deliberation of Men, who, in Cases really perilous, compare several Means

Means of averting the Danger, and regularly pursue the most eligible :

CHILDREN, when young, can no more deliberate and elect, than Brutes, but, in Proportion as by slow Degrees they collect from outward Things, and from other Means of Information, proper Materials of Reason, they gradually proceed to deliberate, and, in Consequence, become Free Agents : The Rod may be a Mean to make them use their Reason, when they have Power to use it, but the Rod cannot produce Power into Act, before they have it :

To say mere Madmen, or mere Fools, who have not the Use of Reason, can deliberate, and, in Consequence of that Deliberation, elect,

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implies a Contradiction, and is, therefore, an idle absurd Proposition: Men indeed, who are mad by Fits, have, in their lucid Intervals, the Use of Reason, and can, then, deliberate, because they are, then, not mad; and Fools also, who are only comparatively so, may deliberate, but surely not so clearly, as Men of Reason and Judgment.

IN all the Schemes of Deistic Theology, which I have hitherto pursued, there is not the least Trace to be found of a Solid Foundation, whereon to ground any true Principles of Natural Religion, and Moral Virtue: And if we add to the Opinions, already mentioned, the Notion of the Natural Mortality of Human Souls, which is the main
Deistic

Deistic Creed of the Nominal Sect, what other Sensation can this Notion raise in the Mind, than that a Man should gratify his Body with Sensual Pleasures, as having no Law, more than Human, to restrain him, nor any Expectation of a future Subsistence: For, if Men, like other Animals, are mere Concretions of Atoms, which in Death they are again resolved into, the Inferences of the *Epicurean* Deists, in the Moral Writings of an ancient Author, are just and rational: The whole Passage is so pertinent to the Point, which I am speaking to, and so enlivened with a Spirit of Poetry, suited to the Genius and Taste of the Men, whom this polite Writer introduces, that I cannot forbear to transcribe it:

OUR Life is short and tedious, and in the Death of a Man there is no Remedy, neither was any Man found to return from the Grave: For we are born at all adventure, and shall be hereafter as though we had never been; for the Breath in our Nostrils is as Smoke, and a little Spark in the moving of our Heart, which being extinguished, our Body shall be turned into Ashes, and our Spirit vanish, as the soft Air: Come on, therefore, let us enjoy the good Things, that are present, and speedily use the Creatures, like as in Youth: Let us fill our selves with costly Wine and Ointments, and let no Flower of the Spring pass by us: Let us crown our selves with Rose-buds before they be withered; let none of us go without his Part of our Voluptuousness: Let us leave Tokens of
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our Joyfulness in every Place, for this is our Portion, and our Lot is this : Let us oppress the poor righteous Man, let us not spare the Widow, nor reverence the ancient gray Hairs of the Aged——Let our Strength be the Law of Justice.

IN Consequence of all This, let us take a View of an Epicurean Deist, contemplating himself on his own Principles :

THAT GOD takes no Care of Man ; That Man hath no other Being, than his Body ; That Death shall annihilate the Whole of his Existence, for ever ; That the only End and Happiness of his Being is to gratify his Appetites with Sensual Pleasures, are the known and confessed Principles of his Philosophy :

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By Virtue of these Principles, he must consider himself, subsisting on the Fund of his own Strength and Providence, independent of the Influence and Aid of a Supreme Being, the only true Source of Security and Happiness: Pursuing vain and fugitive Delights, on woful Experience too empty to satisfy, and too fickle to last: If visited with Pain or Poverty, very usual and common Circumstances of Human Life, he finds himself destitute of all the Comforts, which are able to support the Mind — GOD regards him not — And the Sense and Conscience of Virtue is a Stranger to his Breast: At length, when pining under Grief and Ægritude of Mind, or broken with Intemperance, or borne down by Pain, or worne out with Age; to consummate his Misery,

fery, all the Refuge, which he can find in Death, is this wretched Consolation, That when Death is, he is not, which is much such a Comfort, as *Plutarch* images it, as if one should tell Mariners in the Article of Danger, That their Ship will quickly sink, and then the Storm shall no longer affect them.

Now, in Consequence of what hath hitherto been said, I ask the Nominal Deist, would the World receive any Advantages, Moral or Civil, from the Influence and Efficacy, which such Opinions, in the ordinary Course of Operation, are Naturally apt to have on the Lives and Manners of Men? Would Men become more Just, and Faithful, and Friendly to one another, in Proportion as they
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more strongly disbelieve a Deity, superintending their Actions in order to Reward or Punishment? Can Religion, Virtue, and Social Integrity increase, in Proportion as the Grounds and Principles, whereon they can properly be raised, are laid desolate and waste? If GOD doth not interpose in the Administration of Human Affairs, Religion of Course cannot subsist, and, when That is taken away, Perturbation of Life, and great Confusion must necessarily ensue, and, in Consequence, nor Faith, nor Justice, nor Civil Society can be maintained among Men:

Why, then, are Deists so industrious in propagating their Notions, and gaining Profelytes? They would appear to be Men of Sense, and of great

great Benevolence to Human Kind, which, when properly founded, is the main Principle of all Virtues, which have a natural Tendency to the Establishment and Welfare of human Societies: Surely, therefore, they must pursue some End, proportional and adequate to the Diligence of their Endeavours, and, as far as I can learn, the Account, which they give of their manner of Reasoning and Acting, is to this Purpose:

1. THAT the Belief of a Superintending GOD is perfectly useless to the Direction of human Actions to the true Interests and Ends of Civil Society:

2. THAT Human Laws, enforced by Human Powers, are sufficient to

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restrain

restrain the Injuries, to which innocent Men might otherwise be exposed :

3. THAT this Effect, arising from the Interposition and Influence of such Powers, hath already appeared, in a great Measure, true in Fact :

4. THAT injurious Practices, which still continue among Men, are so indifferently found among the Professors of all Sorts of Religion, that Religion, of any Sort, is of no Use :

5. THAT the Expectation and Dread of a future State, wherein Men must give Account of their Actions here, are apt to intimidate, and fill their Minds with Anxiety and Fear :

6. THAT

6. THAT Perturbation of Mind weakens and debases the Spirits, and, in Proportion, renders Men incapable of discharging many important Duties, with that Diligence, Resolution and Courage, which is necessary to the Interest of the Common Weal :

7. THAT upon the Whole, therefore, Religion is not only useless, but hurtful.

Now, let us examine the Merit of these Pretensions, and see what Force they bear c : If there is an intelli-

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c. The Belief of GOD's Existence is necessarily supposed in all, who willingly shew any Sort of Veneration toward such a Being: Even *Epicurus*, who denied Providence, was forced to own some Sort of excellent and happy Beings, whom he called Gods, though he founded the Decency of his Veneration of them only upon
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gent superintending Being, infinitely powerful, wise and good, who dispenses Justice and Mercy to the Sons of Men in Proportion to their Merit or Demerit, which, on Supposition of his Existence, he must do by Virtue

the Excellency of the Nature of Gods above Men, and not upon any Concern they had for Mankind upon his Principle:

But because there are some, who think Religion and Morality to be Things so distinct in Nature, that they may be separated in Fact, and, therefore, though they allow that no Man can be a Religious Man, without believing some Religious Principle, yet, as to all Human Duties arising from them, as Men, wherein they think the Sum of all Morality consists, they would persuade us, that such Duties may well enough be secured without any such Belief, and consequently, that no Moral Principle can oblige a Man to the Belief of a GOD and Providence, but that all Duties, incumbent on us, as Men, may be performed without respect had to any Thing above or beyond our own Nature:

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true of the essential Integrity and Perfection of his Nature, the Affirmations and Inferences of Nominal Deists cannot be true, the Knowledge of such a GOD, and the Consequences of Love and Reverence and Duty, which
Naturally

In Answer to this, it has always been found true in Fact, that in those Places, where there has been little Sense of GOD and Religion, or where the Notions of Religion have been corrupted, so as to have very little Effect upon the Minds of Men in their Moral Conduct, there the Manners of Men have been always most brutish; and, on the contrary, where Men have had the justest and most lively Sense of a Deity and a Providence, there all Moral Virtues between Man and Man have flourished, the most worthy and generous Actions have been performed, and the Manners of Men ever most Humane and civilized: I own indeed that Men's Notions of Religion it self may be so much depraved and perverted, by the Craft of some, and the Weakness of others, as to become the Occasion of much Mischief; and Superstition may so far prevail over some, as even to overwhelm the Common Principles of Morality in
diverse

Naturally flow from that Knowledge, being by no Means insignificant, much less prejudicial, to the Civil Happiness of his reasonable Creatures :

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diverse Instances: On the other hand, there may possibly be found, now and then, a particular Man of so singularly good a Natural Disposition, as to behave himself with Decency in all the common Offices of Life, without any previous reflecting upon the Obligations of Religion, and whose Practice is therefore better than his Principles: But, as it would, in the first Case, be very unreasonable to charge those Evils upon Religion, which are occasioned purely by the Corruption of it, and which, if truly and sincerely practiced, it would entirely prevent; so, in the second Case, to form a general Argument of the Usefulness or Uncertainty of Religious Principles from some single Instances, would be equally absurd and unreasonable: For what if a Man now and then be found better than his Principles? Is this any Commendation of those Principles, which, if pursued, would make him much worse, than Nature made him? We are not to seek for Truth in the uncertain and variable Practices of Men, but in plain and necessary Deductions from the Nature of Things, and such as the generality of Men, when under

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I own, if Human Laws, enforced by mere Human Powers, are alone sufficient to the Weal of Mankind in Societies, any farther Aid is superfluous, and impertinent in order to that End: But I demand of the Nominal Deist

no Prejudice, will naturally make: In likemanner, we can by no Means conclude, that Principles of Atheism or Deism are either capable of producing, or even consistent with, a perfect Morality, only because it may happen, that a Man, who by Chance embraces them, may possibly be sober and temperate, and may exercise the outward Acts of Justice or Beneficence, Gratitude or Friendship, in some particular Instances:

The Question, then, is not, whether a particular thoughtful Man may not see the Natural Fitness and Propriety of many Moral Actions, and accordingly practice them, abstractedly from all other Considerations, and without reflecting upon any future Consequences, as the Reward or Punishment of them: Nor, whether some Men may not hold inconsistent Principles, which, if duly attended to, would in their Consequences,

Deist any one Instance of a Nation or considerable Body of People, since the World began, who formed themselves into a Society, and lived in any Degree, I will not say, of Happiness, but even of such Misery, which can
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sequences, naturally destroy one another: But the Question is, whether, if the Minds of Men were not generally influenced by the Apprehension of some Thing distinct from this Principle of mere Fitness and Congruity of Actions to the Nature of Things, that is, of some Being, upon whom the Existence of Things themselves, and consequently their Natures, and the Congruity of one to another depends, not by Chance, but with Design, it could ever be possible for the Generality of Mankind to have any such firm Notions of Moral Good and Evil, as to keep awake what we call Natural Conscience in them, and fill them with Hopes and Fears, according to the Tenor of their Actions: My Meaning is, that without the Belief of a Supreme Intelligent Being, upon whom the Nature of Things depends, and who has a Power of exacting from all free Agents a Conformity of their Actions to that Law of Nature, which
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be counted tolerable, on the mere Foot of Civil Institutions and Penal Laws, without a Mixture of Religion to give them Sanction : The Opinion of *Plutarch* in this Case is very pertinent, and the Inference, deduced
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he has established, and who will some way or other take Cognizance of them ; such a Law, supposed to arise merely from the Fitness of Things, would have but very little Influence, and prove as ineffectual to the greatest part of Mankind, as a Human Law without any Sanction annexed, or the Apprehension of any Magistrate to put it in Execution :

Moral Actions do depend still more upon the Acknowledgement of Principles, remote from Sense, and superior to Chance ; and our Obligation in Conscience to the steady Performance of such Actions, must be founded upon the Belief of an intelligent Legislator, who is also an Inspector of our Behaviour : For let Virtue be defined after what manner you please, let it be the Love of Order, Harmony, or Proportion of Mind ; let it be Living agreeably to the Perfection of Nature, or acting for the Good
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from it, very strong — who asserts, he would sooner believe a City might be built without a Foundation, than a Government could be framed and supported without the Belief of a Deity: Since, therefore, the Men, whom I am speaking to, are forced to

of the whole Human Species, of which we are but a Part; call it by what fine Names soever, (which perhaps are less intelligible than the Thing it Self without such Defining) yet still the Question returns, who constituted this Order of Things? Who first made this Harmony or Proportion? Or who is the Author of this Nature? For he must be the ultimate Legislator, and this Law of Nature, this Rule of Morality, must be his Will, though not arbitrary and mutable, but directed by his Supreme Reason, whether it be made known to us by the Observation of that Natural Order of Things, which he hath established, and from whence, by reasoning, we gather the Fitness and Decency of every Moral Action, or whether it be discovered to us by any more immediate Direction or Revelation from himself:
And,

to allow Government and Laws to be absolutely necessary to any competent Degree of Civil Happiness, they must, upon, Evidence of Matter of Fact, allow Religion to be of the same Necessity, because the One never subsisted without the Other, it being evident from the least Knowledge of the Histories and Religions of

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And, if there be not an Opinion or Persuasion, that this Supreme Being is a Witness of Human Life, and conscious of what we do, even in our most secret Recesses, it is hard to conceive, how our Consciences should be affected with Shame and Regret, though Men applaud us, when we do ill ; or with Pleasure and Satisfaction, though we incur the Censure of a mistaken World, when we do well : These Effects of Conscience suppose in us a Belief of the intimate and constant Presence of One, whose Favour or Displeasure is more to be regarded, than any outward Consideration whatsoever : From whence it will follow, That whatever Opinion sets Men loose from the Restraint of their own Consciences,

the World, that the more or less easy and comfortable Way, wherein any Nation subsisted, hath always held, and still doth hold Proportion with a greater or less Sense of true Religion, unmixed with Superstition: And therefore, before I proceed, I think my Self obliged to explain what I understand by the Terms, as far as they are concerned in the present Question :

Consciences, will make their Justice, Fidelity, Gratitude, and all other Moral Virtues, respecting their Fellow-creatures, very precarious, See Bishop *Leng's* Lectures.

Hanc igitur video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohibendique sapientia: ita principem legem illam et ultimam, mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei. Cic. de legib. lib. 2. and again,

Lex vera atque princeps, apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis. ib.

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By true Religion I mean no more, in this Place, than an Acknowledgement of a Being infinitely Powerful, Wise, and Good, superintending the Actions of Mankind in order to a future Retribution of Rewards and Punishments, attended with a Sense of Obligation to Duties, which Naturally flow from that Belief:

By Superstition I mean an Acknowledgement and Dread of this Superintending Power, accompanied with false Opinions of the Means of pleasing him, resulting from Ideas, unsuitable to the Perfection of his Nature :

LET me add also, that by Irreligion I mean an utter Insensibility of
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any Obligation to Duty arising from the Idea of GOD, or perhaps, according as the Idol may be framed, a positive Persuasion, that no Obligation can arise :

TERMS being thus cleared, in respect of the Sense wherein I use them, I positively assert, That the more any People cultivated Religion, with less Mixture of Superstition, and more Sense of Obligation to Duty, arising from their Notions of GOD, they always formed themselves into more orderly Societies, and, I am persuaded, whoever will apply the Assertion to particular Cases and Facts, will find the Rule true, in exact Proportion :

BUT leaving this Appeal to History to the Examination of the curious Reader,

Reader, I am desirous to weigh the Nature and Reason of the Point in Question, and see whether Penal Laws *alone* are sufficient to the Ends of Government: In order, therefore, to clear the way to the Solution of this Question, I shall premise,

1. THAT Penal Laws cannot effectually bind, without being enforced by a Sanction, equal and commensurate to the Ends, for which they are made:

2. THAT the Ends of Penal Laws are confessedly the common Good of Society:

3. THAT there must be a Failure in the Quantity of this Good, in Proportion to a Failure in the Observance
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of the Means, whereby it is to be obtained :

4. THAT the only Sanction, by which Laws can effectually operate in order to their End, must equally affect every Member of Society, at all Times, in all Places, and on all Occasions :

5. THAT this Equality of Force, which alone can give Sanction to Human Laws, can be derived from Religion only :

6. THAT Failure, therefore, in the Profession and Practice of the true Principles and Duties of Religion, is, in Proportion, destructive of the Happiness and Being of Civil Society.

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As these Propositions are too evident to require a formal Proof, give me leave to reason upon them in a way of Argument, which, I presume, will clear and confirm their Truth :

If we examine the Nature of Mankind, we shall find little Probability, that any considerable Number of Men is able, purely by Virtue of Laws, which derive their sole Sanction from Civil Power, to establish and maintain such Methods of Government, as can preserve them in any tolerable Degree of mutual Security and Happiness, which is the main End of Civil Coalition :

I am apt to infer from the Natural Impetuosity of the Passions and Tempers of Men, unreclaimed by Culture

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of Religion, and by some Sort of Apprehension of the Grounds and Reasons of Social Union, That it is very difficult they should ever agree upon any Terms of Government whatsoever: It cannot be supposed that Men, who found their Advantage over Others in Strength of Body, will easily submit their Necks to the Yoke of Laws: They find themselves secure in the Possession of that Natural Superiority, and, in Consequence, averse to any Terms of Composition with their Inferiors:

BUT be the Thing never so difficult, I am ready to admit it, upon Supposition, that it is possible: Imagine, then, a Combination of a vast Number of weaker Persons able to force a less Number of Stronger into Compliance,

pliance, from which forced Coalition
Something, like a Common-wealth,
may in the End result : Imagine also
an excellent Lawgiver to frame this
miscellaneous Concourse of Men into
a Political Body, without blending
with it any Mixture of Religion to
give it Cement, and to preserve the
Structure in Being :

To this Form of Government,
however well contrived, certain Ma-
gistrates and Officers are necessary to
keep the Laws, which it is founded on,
in Force, and to put them in proper
Execution, for to suppose all Members
of the Society so exactly regular, that
there is no Occasion for Coercion,
and Judicial Inspection into their Ac-
tions, is to suppose, in Opposition to
Fact and Experience, that Govern-
ment is useless:

MEN, therefore, imbodyed into Society, must have Senators to deliberate on the Weight and Measures of Things; they must have Judges to determine, precisely, in the way of final Decision, the Differences, which arise between Man and Man; and, in Consequence of this, they must have Officers, Civil and Military, to execute with Care and Fidelity whatever is resolved upon, for the safety and Interest of the Common Weal:

IN order to these Ends, Men of Integrity must necessarily be employed in the Service of the State, any Failure in the Exercise of this fundamental Virtue producing great Disorders in the whole Frame, and the total Want of it, inevitable Ruin; for Nothing of any Moment can be transacted without

out Trust, and Breach of Trust is always hurtful, and, in most Cases, destructive to the Thing, in which it happens : For Instance,

1. A Senator, who deliberates on the weighty Affairs of Peace and War with neighbouring Princes, may have Overtures made to him of more considerable Advantages from such Princes, than he can receive in his own Country, and, without Danger of Discovery, reveal and betray the Secrets of a State :

2. A Judge, biased by Affection, or bribed by Interest, may, in many Cases, so order the Circumstances of Things, or at least the Methods of his own Proceedings, as to condemn the Innocent, absolve the Guilty, and

and dispose of the Property of Goods or Lands, contrary to all Right and Equity, and yet cover his Corruption with very specious Colours of Justice :

3. A Commander of Fleets, or Armies, by Debauchery grown Supine, or through Avarice intent on Profit, may sacrifice the public Interest to his Luxury, or Gain :

4. PUBLIC Receivers and Treasurers may, by mutual Consent and Intelligence, falsify Accounts, and divert great Branches of the Public Revenue to private Uses, without Possibility of being detected :

5. WITHOUT Integrity, then, in the Management of Public Affairs, every Thing must necessarily go wrong,

wrong, and Ruin follow ; for where the principal ruling Functions of a Body, Civil or Natural, are perverted, and made to operate, contrary to the Interest and Safety of the Whole, that Whole must be in a very desperate State :

6. UPON the Sum, therefore, of Things, however useful other Virtues may prove to a faithful Discharge of Trusts, which every Government must repose in certain Officers, that Virtue, without which the rest cannot even subsist, is Integrity : A Man, who hath not a Principle to act on, known and allowed by others, capable of influencing him in secure Secrecy, being absolutely unfit to be trusted with any Thing, which can be hid from Witnesses.

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IN all Parts of the Administration of any Government, there occur frequent Opportunities of perverting the Ends of it, Secretly, to evil Purposes: Now, what Security can a Man, who makes open Profession of Irreligion, give to the Public of his Fidelity in any Trust, where there is a Possibility of perverting the Ends of it, without Discovery? An Oath is the most useful and highest Pledge of this Kind, with which Mankind are acquainted: But can a Man, who proclaims his Disbelief of the Animadversion of a Superintending Deity, pretend to deserve any Degree of Credit, on Account of his Attestation of a Name, which in his Mouth is a mere Sound, void of Sense? It would be ridiculous, either for such a Man to offer himself, or for a Government to

to receive him, to the Solemnity of an Oath; and, if any whole Society entertained the same Principles, it must unavoidably dissolve, and sink into Ruin: For what can influence any Man of this Cast of Mind in secure Secrecy? Honour, and Shame, and Human Laws are of no Force, because no body sees——Interest, only, can, in this Situation, stick close to every Man, and, therefore, Advantage or Pleasure must operate uniformly and constantly, and, when nothing intervenes to check it, irresistibly:

A Man, then, secure of absolute Secrecy from all other Men, and who hath no Apprehension of an invisible Being superintending his Actions, must of Necessity, in the

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ordinary Course of Things, pursue private Ends: Natural Appetite and present Interest prompt him to the Pursuit: No Prospect of repugnant Interest, at a Distance, makes him hesitate: No inward Sense of Law or Duty restrains him, for what can be called Law, or Duty, where no Superior animadvert with Punishment, nor any Natural Advantage, in the way of Reward, attends the Act: Nothing, from without, interposes, for all Human Animadversion is excluded: A Man, who, in such Circumstances, doth not pursue his private Interest, acts contrary to that general Inclination, the Desire of his own Good, which is by Nature made the Spring, which moves all Mankind.

OBSERVATIONS ON Civil Government, when viewed in this Light, may convince any Man, who is not wilfully blind, that Decay of Integrity, and Irreligion, which is the Reason of that Decay, are the true Original Causes of Misery in all Societies : The Neglect, the Fraud, the Corruption, the Treachery, which any where runs through the Course of a mismanaged State, evidently issues from that Source : and where very few, if any, make Conscience of their Ways ; where a superficial specious Shew is all that is aimed at toward the Public Good, while Private Interest, unchecked by inward Remorse, is the sole private Measure of Human Conduct, the Virtues of Men in Proportion vanish, their Minds grow corrupt, their very Nature degenerates,

and their Government tends inevitably to Ruin.

‘ It is a fatal Thing *d*, both to
‘ Religion and Morality, to distin-
‘ guish so far between them, as to
‘ imagine, That either of them can
‘ be perfect without the other : For,
‘ as we have all the Reason in the
‘ World to suspect the Sincerity of
‘ that Man’s Professions of Religion,
‘ who is willingly deficient in Moral
‘ Honesty, so he, who openly de-
‘ clares himself to be under no Re-
‘ straint of Conscience from the Be-
‘ lief of any invisible Principle, must
‘ excuse us, if we doubt whether his
‘ Integrity may, in all Cases, be safe-
‘ ly depended on : He, who believes
‘ the Principles of Religion, hath all

d. Bishop Leng.

‘ the

the other Engagements to Virtue,
which an Infidel can pretend to,
and also That, which is looked up-
on to be more binding, than all
the rest: What Reason, then, can
I have to be secure of his Virtue,
who owns himself to be under fewer
Obligations to practise it, than other
Men:

BUT these Principles will be found
still more deficient, when it is con-
sidered, That, if there be a GOD,
who hath any Concern with us, or
for us, a complete Morality must
necessarily have respect to Him, as
well as to our Intercourse with one
another: This is what cannot rea-
sonably be denied, unless there
should be any, who think, because
GOD is a Spirit, and invisable, that
there

‘ therefore Men, who are clothed
‘ with Body, have no Means of shew-
‘ ing him any Honour or Reverence,
‘ or of acting or doing any Thing,
‘ which can have Relation to such
‘ a super-eminent Being : But if there
‘ be any such Persons, they have
‘ a very odd Notion of the Mora-
‘ lity of Human Actions, which
‘ depends upon the internal Dispo-
‘ sition of the Mind, of which out-
‘ ward Actions are only the Sign,
‘ and that too not always certain :
‘ But, if we are capable of know-
‘ ing or believing any Thing of
‘ GOD, as a Supreme Mind govern-
‘ ing the World, we are also capa-
‘ ble of inwardly owning this, and,
‘ consequently of giving him inward
‘ Adoration : — If therefore Mora-
‘ lity cannot be complete, without
‘ acting

acting suitably and becomingly to every Relation, in which we stand to any Beings, and especially rational Beings, who are known to us, the chief part of it must be in proper Acts of Piety to the first Being, from whom we derive our Reason: Upon this Account *Cicero* e, in stating the Law of Nature, which is the Rule of Moral Actions,

e. Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius, eaque et in homine et in Deo, prima homini cum Deo rationis societas, &c, De leg. l. 1.

Jam vero virtus eadem in homine ac Deo est, neque ullo alio ingenio præterea: est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura; est igitur homini cum Deo similitudo; quod cum ita sit, quæ tandem potest esse propior certiorque cognatio? ibid.

Sit igitur hoc jam a principio persuasum civibus dominos esse omnium rerum ac moderatores

' Actions, and from whence all other
 ' Laws ought to be deduced, justly
 ' lays the Foundation of it in that
 ' Original Society, which is between
 ' GOD and Man; and makes the
 ' Acknowledgement of a GOD, and
 ' Providence over Human Affairs,
 ' and the different Regards, which
 ' that Providence hath to the good
 ' or evil Actions of Men, to be the
 ' first Principle, which every Mem-
 ' ber of Society ought to be per-
 ' suaded of.

res Deos, eaque, quæ gerantur, eorum geri ju-
 dicio ac numine, eisdemque optime de genere
 hominum mereri, et qualis quisque sit, quid
 agat, quid in se admittat, qua mente, qua pie-
 tate religiones colat, intueri, piorumque et im-
 piorum habere rationem; his enim rebus imbutæ
 mentes haud fane abhorrebunt ab utili, et a vera
 sententia. de Leg. 1. 2.

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IF the Decay of Religion, by which I mean, in respect of the present Question, a true Sense of the Superintendence of a Deity, and of the Consequences Naturally arising from it, which is the Ground of all Religion, is not the Cause of the Decay of Integrity, and, in Consequence, of the Misery or Ruin of Societies, I desire any Nominal Deist may inform me, What is, and what other Remedy is able to cure the Evil :

EXAMINE, as strictly as you please, the Principles of Human Nature, and, removing that Sense of Religion I contend for, tell me what Notion, or Natural Quality in the Human Mind is of Force sufficient to divert a Man from the Enjoyment of a Good of any Kind, that is sui-

table to his Humour or Genius, Pleasure or Interest :

Good Nature, and a radical ingenerate Love of the Human Species, are, I conceive, the most plausible Means, which can be contended for, in order to this End:

A few Men, educated perhaps from their Infancy in good-natured Principles, may, I own, find an habitual Force of this Love of Mankind in their Hearts, which may therefore seem to be Natural : But if they say these Principles have the same Strength in all Men, they deny Fact and Experience, the Savage *Africans* and *Americans*, who, for Want of such Education, are proper Instances in the present

present Enquiry, being plain Evidences of the Contrary :

BUT, if these few good-natured Persons endeavour, by all Means in their Power, to destroy the Belief of certain Things, by which only the Societies of Men can be supported and preserved in any tolerable Degree of Happiness, without substituting any other Thing of greater or equal Power in order to this End, they evidently contradict the Character they pretend to, and, notwithstanding their Instances of good Nature to Persons within the Sphere of a particular Acquaintance, instill into Society the most virulent Poyson, which can possibly be conveyed by direct Enemies of Mankind :

IF, then, we find upon the Whole, That, wherever Principles of Irreligion are propagated, Integrity hath decayed in Proportion to their Growth: That, through Failure of Integrity, the Strength of any Constitution of State is weakened: That, in proportion to its Decay, Societies grow disordered, and naturally tend to Confusion, and at length to Ruin, which we may be convinced of, even in Countries, where the general Principles of Religion, though not yet quite extinct, are in a State of deep Decay: If all this be true, what would be the Condition of a People, wholly void of any such Principle, which is the Supposition, upon which we now reason, and our Enquiry is, how a People, who
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do not believe the Superintendence of an invifible Power, nor think themfelves accountable to any Judge, fave the Magiftrate, can maintain an Order of Government, capable, in any moderate Degree, to make their Lives fecure and eafy:

AMONG fuch a People, it is plain, there can not be one fingle Perfon, who is virtuous on a Principle, fuit- ed to the general Nature of Man- kind; and they, who are fo, only by peculiar Excellence of Natural conftitutional Inclinations, or Habits cafually acquired, and, therefore, not common to others, are not to be taken into the Queftion, becaufe their Number is every where too fmall to be of Weight: Their Per-
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sonal Qualifications may deserve high personal Esteem, but, I am persuaded, Nothing can properly be called Social Virtue, of which the main Body of a Society is incapable of having any true Sensation :

I conclude, therefore, that a People is necessarily very unfit to maintain Rules of Society in any Sort of Order, when there is not one honest virtuous Member in the whole Body, for I count none such, nor will any, upon strict Trial, be found to be such, who do not act on a Principle, capable of making them Honest in the Dark, of which Men of the Deistic Theology, whom I am now speaking to, can have no Apprehension :

IF, then, upon the Sum of the Argument, I have given competent Evidence from Reason and Experience, that Religion is so far from being insignificant and useless to the true Ends of Government, that Government cannot subsist without it: That whatever Motives may force Men into Societies, it is only the Belief of a Superintending Deity, and Religion, which is the Natural Consequence of that Belief, which makes a Cement, able to unite Societies in any manner of Stability, I think I need not say any Thing in Answer to the Nominal Deists, who pretend, that Religion is not only useless, but hurtful: For, if it is useful, which, I presume, I have proved, it cannot be hurtful, because

because the Terms are contradictory, and, therefore, cannot be said, in the same respect, of the same Thing.

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