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 Land Value Taxation and the Issue of ConfiscationNicolaus Tideman, Ph.D.
 [A paper presented at the Joint Georgist Conference,
 University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1989]
 
 One reason why a society might want to tax land values is because it
          is efficient. The efficiency of taxing land values arises from the
          fact that a tax on land can be levied in such a way that no action by
          the holder of the land can affect the amount of the tax. When this is
          true, and the tax is not greater than the rental value of the land,
          then, unlike virtually all other taxes, a tax on land generates no "disincentive"
          effect, no discouragement of productive activities.
 
 This efficiency argument might be offered as a reason for collecting
          the greatest possible proportion of a government's revenues from taxes
          on land. However, such a proposal seems to many people to be unjust.
          Such a tax system would bring land prices down to virtually zero,
          thereby substantially reducing the wealth of individuals whose
          financial assets contained disproportionately large amounts of land.
 
 It is understandable that people would be concerned about the justice
          of such a proposal. One of the principles of limited government,
          enshrined in our Constitution and recognized around the world, is that
          the Government does not take the property of individuals unless it
          compensates them. The introduction of a tax system that produces a
          fall in the prices of a class of assets to virtually zero seems
          indistinguishable from a taking of those assets. To permit such a
          thing to occur, without compensation, seems to invite people to seek
          to use the political process to take whatever they can from others
          through legislation, thereby inducing anyone who has anything that
          might be taken to devote extraordinary amounts of resources to
          defending against political appropriations.
 
 For this reason the efficiency argument is not an adequate
          justification for 100% land value taxation. Nevertheless, a concern
          for the confiscatory potential of land value taxation is not a valid
          reason for property tax reform that substitutes additional taxes on
          land for taxes on improvements. Because this measure leaves the total
          tax on an average site unchanged, while allowing additional
          improvements without additional taxes, it generally raises land values
          rather than lowering them. Thus confiscation should not be an issue
          when considering property tax reform of this sort.
 
 If such a property tax reform is applied to rural land with little or
          no development potential, it is possible that its value will fall. Is
          this confiscation? If the tax reform does not take all or nearly all
          of the value of the land, it would generally be regarded not as
          confiscation, but only the kind of "accident" that people
          must tolerate for the sake of an efficient society. Nevertheless, it
          is sensible to seek boundaries of tax jurisdictions and variations in
          tax rates if necessary so that everyone receives at least as much in
          services (or potential services if land is undeveloped) as he pays in
          taxes.
 
 Suppose that taxes on improvements have been entirely eliminated and
          additional taxes on land are considered, replacing sales taxes and
          income taxes. Is there a reasonable concern for confiscation? It
          should be noted first that again, the replacement of one tax by
          another leaves the average taxpayer paying the same total tax bill The
          fact that the tax on land has no disincentive effects would make the
          average taxpayer better off. Still, there would be some persons whose
          total tax bills rise. Have they experienced confiscation? Again, if
          the tax reform does not eliminate all or nearly all of the value of
          land, the generally accepted criterion for confiscation would not be
          met. Furthermore, to the extent that the taxes are used to pay for
          services that raise land rents, the taxpayers will only be paying for
          what they might reasonably have been charged.
 
 But it is possible that a tax on land will be of sufficient magnitude
          that it will eliminate nearly all of the sale value of land. And it is
          possible that the revenue will be used not for services that will
          raise the value of land, but rather for something like a nationwide
          guaranteed income that cannot be expected to raise land rents. How
          then is the confiscation issue to be addressed?
 
 To make such a change not a confiscation, it must be not ordinary
          legislation, where narrow interests so commonly prevail, but rather a
          process of changing our Constitution. A reconsideration of our
          Constitution is an activity we take up only rarely, and when we do so
          the whole society is engaged in a way that does not occur with
          ordinary legislation. Thus the gains and losses to individuals that
          occur through Constitutional changes do not set precedents for
          unconstrained majorities to take them from minorities. Thus it is in
          the process of Constitutional reconsideration that we would be able to
          say, "All these years we have been wrong. There is no just way in
          which individuals can appropriate disproportionate amounts of land to
          themselves in perpetuity. The land belongs to all, and the rent of
          land must be shared equally." This is not confiscation, but only
          the correction of a misperception.
 
 
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