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THE SOURCES OF NEW DEAL REFORMISM

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I

WITH the coming of industry (of the modern sort) the cities expanded enormously, but they also lost their coherence. The reasons for this are easy enough to see. The sudden new growth and mobility of populations broke through and levelled the medieval walls within which there had been preserved most of what was precious to men. Of course there never were in the American hemisphere more than rudimentary cities of this sort. What the North American pioneers, within their stockades, had to defend from the Indians was precious enough, being life itself, but there was no great accumulation of culture, such as was represented in the European universities, libraries, and art collections. Still the relation to European traditions was direct. The American share in them was as legitimate as that of concurrent generations whose ancestors merely had not migrated. And so our loss and confusion were as great as theirs when the idea of the city degenerated. That Americans were able, on their new sites, as they pushed westward, to begin quite anew, guaranteed no guidance. It was a magnificent opportunity, but the circumstances did not approve its exploitation.

It could be seen from L'Enfant's plan for Washington that the purposive tradition was in his mind. Here was to be a city built for a purpose. And that for Washington was not the only functional plan produced in eighteenth-century America. "The Renaissance" as Mr. Elbert Peets has said, "still lived in the cultural air. . . . Plans of Philadelphia, Reading, Savannah, and Williamsburg can be printed alongside plans of Charleroi, the town of Versailles, Bloomsbury, and Edinburgh. The average statesman or the average architect of 1790 was better prepared by education and experience to find meaning in L'Enfant's plan than were the average statesman and architect of 1890."[1] What had happened in that century? The answer to this is that planning cannot be done without objectives and that American cities had grown with the absolute minimum of provision for corporate activity. What is meant can be understood by examining the 1811 plan for New York. It was, in the first place, done by "the Commissioners of Streets and Roads," which in itself shows that by then the public control of civic functions had been reduced to provision for access to property; the uses of this property were not to be determined by the commissioners; and there was no assumption that there

ought in future to be any limit to land speculation or any rules established for its guidance; there was merely a minimum physical design within which it would be contained.

Even with so limited a mandate, however, some justification for what came to be called the gridiron plan had to be made. So the Commissioners did consider "whether they should confine themselves to rectilinear and rectangular streets or whether they should adopt some of those supposed improvements by circles, ovals and stars which certainly embellish a plan whatever may be their effect as to convenience and utility." This last was, of course, an engineer's fling at fancy planning. But those "circles, ovals and stars," of L'Enfant in Washington did not have only to do with beauty nor even only with the management of traffic. They were signs on the drawing board of civic objectives in people's minds—where there should be stores, factories, and service establishments; what their size and functions should be; how, in other words, the relations of citizens should be arranged was what was meant by those symbols on a map. But the map of New York represented the abdication of public authority. L'Enfant lost out. From 1800 the American city sprawled meaninglessly across the countryside completely at the mercy of its internal enemies.

It is true that the New York Commissioners, for instance, were unable to remain wholly uncontaminated by social responsibility; they did set aside areas for a parade ground, a reservoir, and a public market; they were even a little apologetic, saying that it might to many "be a matter of surprise that so few vacant spaces have been left and those so small." But the rivers on either side really made parks unnecessary; furthermore, the price of land was high and prudence was called for.[2] They would have felt themselves justified by time, too. For city planning from then on was to be confined to routine civil engineering.[3]

II

Typical American progressivism was always rooted in country soil. Why was it that, during the nineteenth century, the ills of the farmers bred creative discontents but those of urban workers had such belated embodiments in movements looking toward reform? The answer must have something to do with the decline of the city. During this time it suffered the impact of many technical changes to which adaptation was difficult. Its neighborhoods were destroyed by the application of electricity to transit. There was a gradual division into working, dormitory, and amusement sections, which was facilitated by the telephone, the automobile, and such public works as bridges and tunnels. There was, besides, a gross growth which was overwhelming. It was not unusual for population to double itself in several successive decades. At the end of the century a number of metropolitan areas had populations as great as that of the entire continent at its beginning. All this induced that hasty and unplanned extension of buildings and public services which produced, finally, congested urban jungles—ugly, inefficient, difficult to live in with that comfort and dignity to which America pretended, and quite without any organic cohesiveness.

By 1870 the density of population in several representative wards of New York was much greater than that of corresponding ones in London.[4] Out of those English slums came the great reforms of the late nineteenth century. Out of New York's, which were worse, there came no corresponding movement. There were

riots at widely spaced intervals—such as that desperate one during the Civil War brought on by the unequal application of the draft for military service and by the flagrant profiteering of merchants and capitalists. And there were strikes—sometimes almost civil wars—in the great industries. But the Interstate Commerce Act, the Anti-Trust Act and its successive amendments, and other such national fruits of progressivism were put through by representatives rather of rural than of urban areas. There was little relief for crowded workers until the twentieth century was well under way.

Perhaps it might be said that the cities were too preoccupied with their own ills, and the frustration of all attempts to cure them, to have much interest in national problems. But the sufferings of the workers could no more be settled at home than could those of the farmers. Rural folk learned this lesson earlier and more thoroughly. They tried state legislation, conspicuously in Wisconsin and the Northwest, and found but little relief. They then adjourned to Washington with at least some success. But the cities sank into the clutches of their boss-managed machines, and the influence of even the slum-dwellers went toward perpetuating the misery in which they lived rather than toward relieving it. Only in a few states, and that mostly in the second decade after the turn of the century, were there the beginnings of protective laws to guard the conditions of living and of work.

The fact that city folk exerted so little creative influence on progressive national legislation affected its character profoundly. Reform was suited to the desires of the small property holders—after the Jeffersonian ideal—rather than to the very different aspirations of the "proletariat" (as it was called in Europe; it is perhaps significant that Americans never found the need for such a word). Those aspirations, wherever they developed, were collectivistic in a sense in which corresponding American movements never were. The idea of an orderly functioning mass to which the individual had unlimited duties of contribution but rights of receipt severely adjusted to his needs was as foreign to the American scene as a Gothic tower in an Iowa cornfield. The general idea in the United States was that governmental activity was something quite apart from that of the individual. Its function was to protect each citizen as he went about his business. Only very reluctantly did Americans come to admit that the rights each had might possibly interfere and conflict so that some adjustment, some mediation, was necessary; and that government was the proper instrument of protection.

This fundamental belief that citizens have many rights but few duties was in the sharpest contrast with the competing belief in many duties but few rights, which was developing wherever Western civilization had an urban cast. The corollaries to this were laissez faire as against socialism and growth carried out at the will of those who expected to gain by speculating in it as against planning for civic amenity and for conservation. The implications of the American attitude could not be seen in all their vividness until after the Civil War, when the intensified industrialism of the war years was released into the uses of peace. There were indications that Lincoln, in the midst of his troubles, had some wonder. But the act of most consequence in which he had any hand, aside from the war, was the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, which set the character of American life for more than half a cen-

tury to come. That Act determined that the small-holders, the freemen, should be the most powerful political force in the land for many decades, a determination which was reinforced, of course, by the multiplication of states. These, because of soil and climate, were bound to be sparsely populated and rural, and yet would have equal representation in the Senate. If the Connecticut Compromise, so called, had not been carried out at Philadelphia in 1787 and if the Homestead Act had not been passed in 1862, Americans might possibly have developed some variety of collective state, and the thousand arid miles to the east of the Rockies might have been preserved as pasture land. Also the settlement of workers' problems might not have been delayed until the miseries of city life had grown bitterly intolerable. But such speculations, in view of what did actually happen, can hardly be regarded as useful.

III

These cities without objectives grew wildly in the century of industrialism. The cult of feeble government, which was shaped in the eighteenth-century struggles for political rights, survived into the period when the threat to human liberties had transferred itself from political to industrial despotisms. What formerly had been a salutary check on would-be invasions of human liberty later became a barrier to the use of the only instrument which could preserve it. It was a wide barrier too, with deep foundations in human history; and the legal defenders of capitalism had only to preserve its integrity with a certain vigilance—which, on the bench and at the bar, it was greatly to their interest to do. They were so successful that the last President before the great depression was moved to deprecate "Federal interference" with business. Indeed the party he represented would soon become officially committed to the enhancement of state's rights as a move away from governmental control of the business system, thus reversing the positions on this issue of the great parties. But as a matter of fact this was not a party matter. Neither Republicans nor Democrats believed in government interference except in their progressive interludes; and even then interference was for the purpose of restoring competition.

This attitude was even more marked in municipal matters. During the nineteenth century there was a junction of ideas and events which was devastating in its cumulative effect. Many industries grew quite beyond the possibility of city control, since it was more and more a matter of indifference to their planners where they were located, and any regulation simply led to migration. But attempts to regulate were becoming more and more foreign to American ideology in any case. Rights which had once belonged to individuals were now being conferred on corporations. That individuals and corporations could not simultaneously possess them was merely a disagreeable minority opinion to which no attention was paid. What belonged to government and what to business came more and more to be defined by businesses. They developed the services and furnished the goods which people needed; and they took over the revenues, too. Where it was necessary they devoted part of the revenues to the systematic corruption of officials or to the installation of puppets. There ensued that period in city life which R. S. Baker, F. C. Howe, Lincoln Steffens, Brand Whitlock, and others documented so thoroughly just at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The muckrakers were men who, like the elder La Follette, believed in the system of business enterprise but thought that it needed reform. They were indignant when aldermen sold a franchise for a street railway or when the police accepted fees for permitting gambling houses to operate. They traced the history of treasury-looting from the outright stealing of the early and middle years, when methods were crude, to the later hidden manipulation of contracts and the merely biased management of city finance which could hardly be spotted even by professional reformers. The wisest and bravest of this group never came to the conclusion which was to seem so obvious to later students—that industry and government were in many aspects indistinguishable, that it was false to set up dividing lines between the two and to call one function private and the other public, and that this was mostly done to secure immunity from public inspection and control of that area which could be said to be private.

Industry had grown so enormously that such distinctions came to have less and less meaning in a municipal sense; yet the cities were affected in many matters over which their controls were given up only because their legislatures were bribed to do it. Transit, gas, and electric services were lost, however, without great dispute, except as to who should get the graft. This was because they came along at the apogee of corruption. But it was really this accompanying corruption which re-established something of a public point of view and even led, in some cases, to formidable movements for public ownership, sometimes faked for blackmail purposes, but sometimes also really reformist.

The city reformers were, of course, not men of their own time at all. They belonged back in the Middle Ages or forward in some new regionalized era. They still considered that the city had objectives, whereas, actually, it had become merely the creature of entities which did have objectives.[5] Business was running industry. Nothing could be more natural than that it should run government too. The entrance of Hanna, the businessman-politician, on the national scene was not more smoothly accomplished than that of Murphy in New York, Conners in Buffalo, Cox in Cincinnati, and so on. There came a time when city government was almost reduced to a ceremonial survival. In some places, like New York, even the police functions had been taken away. This extinguishment was quicker and more complete than that of state or federal government, though the states had lost much power by the beginning of the century. The reformers were confused by the structure which remained and which still seemed to function, much as the physical life of a mentally ill individual still goes on. They always looked for the giant to throw off its chains. But the trouble was in the giant's blood. The time for reform had passed. Only reconstruction could be of any use. And to this the barriers in American ideology remained!

The city reformers who tried to revive a distinction between the sphere of government and that of industry were attempting the impossible. The causes of the merging were not, as the reformers supposed at first, merely surface phenomena. They ran deep, so deep, indeed, that what was left of the old marks of identity were a false indication of possible reformation.

IV

It was not the fault of the reformers that they took too literally contemporary

standards. They assumed for their purposes that the talk of the preachers and the teachers was a guide to conduct. This was devastating. The going conventions required that one sort of morality should be professed but that, when it came to action, another should be followed. There are particularly good openings for reformers at such moments in history as the beginning of the twentieth century. Social conduct is not infrequently at variance with ideals; but at a time when all old relationships have been irregularly disturbed by outside forces, the variances are apt to be striking. Throughout Lincoln Steffens' reporting, he kept coming upon corrupt relations between government and what he called "Big Business." This Big Business bought franchises, bribed officials to ease up on regulations, swung elections by buying votes, supported racketeers, and made alliances with bosses and their machines. The total effect was a change in the locus of power over economic matters from the electorate and its representatives to businessmen. Legislators submitted to an unofficial and hidden direction. This, to the reformers, was the perversion of an ideal; and they made it the center of attack.

This was one of those occurrences which happen in democracies because they respond so slowly to the impact of outside changes. But, recognized or not, the change happened. The tides could not be kept back with a broom—or with a stubborn wish. They could at best be ignored for the time being. The electorate no doubt wished business to remain small and unco-ordinated; people wanted to believe that prices were controlled by competition; they wanted enterprise—and even speculation—to be free because they expected, even if only in a small way, to join in and to profit by such ventures. If they had been asked, they would doubtless have said also that the cities were getting too big and that people lived better in the country. The bright lights were symbols of sin; the great city was a dangerous environment. Americans not only wanted rural values; they professed still to have them.[6] They pretended that the neighborliness of village life still governed human relations, and their list of immoralities was cast in the mold of this pretense. This refusal to recognize reality was an asset to the practical pirates about whom the reformers wrote. They knew what had happened. They knew that reformers would always fail until they went to the root of the matter, and that, they saw, could be put off for a long time. Meantime the pickings were easy. It was true that methods had to change; but that was what lawyers were for.

The result of this general devotion to unreality was the delivery to private interests of virtually all economic functions—that is, all which could be made to yield a profit. The cities lay supine, yielding themselves to the looters while their leaders preached and taught the old moralities, usually with subsidies from the looters. There would come a period when morals would become practical too, when the distinction between public and private functions, and between prices and taxes, would be seen to be utterly unreal. Then the city might again be re-created as an instrument of social life, a functioning entity, an idea in peoples' minds and a reality in their lives. But only time would do that, not the reformers—time and the great depression which would syncopate decades of history, discredit orthodoxies, and force the recognition of reality.

There was never—until the cataclysm of 1929—a more successful enterprise in

piracy than the looting of the cities. It went on and on for decades; it survived one reform wave after another, and its insiders were seldom embarrassed. Occasionally the so-called "higher-ups" would be exposed, but almost never the businessmen and the bankers who went respectably and piously about the remote management of the rape. Steffens, before he finished, knew that he was dealing with something beyond a reporter's power of comprehension. He knew, too, that Big Business was only a slipshod name for it. La Follette never went as far as this. To the end he believed that regeneration lay in the freeing and making honest of small businessmen. Steffens was not thus fooled. But he was confused and wholly at a loss. Until just before he finished with critical appraisal, he believed that public functions lay on one side of a line and private ones on the other and that different rules applied to each. That it was merely an instrumental matter, a practical choice, whether the service should be undertaken or the goods made for profit or without profit, for what was called a price or for what was called a tax, he did not understand.

The success of the confusion-makers in piling propaganda on prejudice was best measured perhaps by their success in keeping the reformers, until 1929, completely away from the issue they feared most of all. Communist hunts and red-baitings had to be resorted to more frequently than was desirable or genuinely effective in the later years; but still the success was tolerable. The vast mass of people regarded city government as an ineffective—when not inevitably debauched—instrument for doing anything. It had usually to be trusted with police and fire protection and the maintenance of streets. Such functions had never been reached for seriously by private interests for reasons of their own.[7] But beyond these functions city government was not to be trusted.

On the other hand there grew up a myth concerning the efficiency of private business which survived even the depression. This myth had not the slightest substantiation in fact; but the significant thing was precisely that it needed none. The discordant note in the symphony of exploitation came from the country. There was insistence on antitrust action which even had a certain mild approval among small businessmen, trade unionists, and, of course, all those who called themselves economists. But this was not sufficiently strident to drown the paean of praise for the private management of economic functions which was called business or to modify the alternate hymn of dispraise for government which was joined in so unanimously by those who profited, those who hoped to, or those who, for moral reasons, believed that others should.

V

These attitudes, as attitudes do, had ways of becoming institutionalized. The orthodox tax system of the cities, which sought to avoid burdens on business, settled on a foundation of realty taxes. Municipal revenues therefore had their source in a system of values based on perpetual private property in land; and the city's officials became the most ardent defenders of real estate speculators' gains. No one who ever considered the problems associated with planning for city life was blind enough to miss the fact that low values meant better living for citizens; they said so innumerable times because it seemed so obvious; yet mayors and their tax departments felt compelled to combat any change looking to lower prices for the use of property be-

cause their one or two per cent of tax interest might be jeopardized. Thus the fixation in institutional structures of false attitudes helped to prevent or defeat necessary change. This particular one had more important results of this sort than some others. Of all the areas in which choice between public and private activity was possible—not excepting utilities—the ownership and management of land and the manipulation of its values were perhaps the most unsuitable from the point of view of resulting social good. Yet from the first it had been in the United States, in contrast with European cities, reserved rigidly for private exploitation.

VI

What the reformers called corruption was only one result of the maladjustment inherent in the economic changes which were sweeping over the whole Western world. The beginnings lay far back in the basic inventions of culture—inventions in mathematics, chemistry, physics, and biology; social organizations were affected when inventions emerged, as, for instance, electric motors, new materials, scientifically arranged processes, and greatly increased output in agriculture and industry. Ultimately the leaders of business were forced to violate all the standards of morality—that is, they had to disorganize government to protect the organizations for which they felt responsible. They felt no proprietary interest in government. To them it was only a nuisance. It was made up of talkers, not doers, of demagogues with their hands out asking to be bribed. If government had been running the railroads, making electric motors, and so on, all this technical change would have forced organizational changes there, just as it did in the Pennsylvania Railroad or the Standard Oil Company. It is true that city governments, and even state governments, changed somewhat, but belatedly and not greatly, and not in such ways as to make them much more effective economic instruments. Why should they? They possessed no economic functions. The cities might conceivably have owned and managed at least their land, their utilities, and many of their service industries. If that course had been taken, as it was in Europe, the corruption would not have arisen, since there would have been no need to push contentious officials out of the way, and since government would then have evolved toward an efficiency related to an object.

This possibility was suggested over and over again; but the suggestions fell on stony American ears. Once the turning had been taken, far back, which began the concession to profit-making of everything out of which a profit might possibly be made, the psychological and institutional reinforcements of the system began to build themselves up irresistibly. The illustration of realty taxes has been used, and, earlier, the psychological myth of freedom in the midst of crowding compulsions was spoken of. There was something in people's minds, something in their accepted principles, which prevented them from seeing that a street railway, an electric light company, a milk-distributing organization—that these *were* government and that the prices they paid for them were taxes. They always resented the taxes they paid for police and fire protection; they formed taxpayers' leagues to keep such charges down, and they maintained citizens' committees to enforce economy. But no one thought it necessary to force the electric light company or the milk plant to economize, for no one doubted that they were being run as efficiently as possible, though their rates came under scrutiny. There was, it is true, a

"quasi-public" category set up and commissions appointed to regulate the "utilities." This was done on the ground that they were "natural monopolies" whose prices competition could not be expected to rule. But the most significant end of regulation was not better service and lower rates but more obstruction, more bribery, more "corruption." By the time of the great depression, the disillusion of the informed was pretty complete. Industries could not be controlled from outside. Only recognition of their essentially governmental function, laying aside the false distinction between public, quasi-public, and private, would have done. But there was one more experiment to be tried—the mixed management device which would have its national manifestation in NRA.

The idea of mixing government and business was not strictly new, but it would still be novel, in 1933. This would be because it had grown directly out of the kind of relations the bosses and businessmen had set up in the cities and which had been so thoroughly exposed by the muckrakers. By the going conventions it would be an alliance with vice. It would violate all the traditions so usefully brought together in the Federal Trade Commission Act and in the various regulatory commissions of the states and cities. And convention would defeat necessity and drive it underground again for the moment. There would be no alternative short of almost universal public ownership if this device failed. But that the reformers had not taught Americans to understand.

Lincoln Steffens was a thoughtful and honest man. His *Autobiography* was the odyssey of a conscience which was like those of all good Americans. He was confused and indignant at first, coming gradually in age to tolerance and the certainty of permanent evil. No man did so much to reveal America to itself in all its contradictions, all its humbugs, its vices, its hypocritical acceptances of necessary corruptions so long as they were hidden from the light. One time, as he sojourned in Boston, muckraking with E. A. Filene's support, he went to President Eliot of Harvard and asked permission to "give a short course to seniors on 'the forms in which the first steps to bribery and corruption come to young men in all walks of life' " (for one of the things Steffens had discovered was that there was less honesty and more corruption among the good and respectable folk than there was among the reputed crooks). Says Steffens, "he was almost moved to a consideration of my proposition till he happened to ask me what my course would lead up to.

" 'You would teach those things to stop the doing of them?' he asked. 'Oh, no,' I blurted. 'I don't mean to keep the boys from succeeding in their professions. All I want to do is to make it impossible for them to be crooks and not know it. . . .' That ended me with Mr. Eliot. . . ."[8]

That was a puzzling experience. Eliot was interested only in reform, Steffens only in knowledge of evil. But he knew it for evil. And he must have known that identifying it was only the beginning of eradication. Far from wanting to draw industry and government together again, he was still unable to conceive of anything but separation.

Yet close to this passage, another equally characteristic one told of a businessman's inability to escape. Mellon, it was, president then of the New Haven Railroad, who called him in and asked him how he could get himself and his railroad "out of politics."

I asked him why he asked that, and the long answer was that he had "done politics" out West, realized what that meant to him and to

society and had made up his mind, when Morgan called him East, to cut it out. And he was finding that he could not cut it out; when he did not do what had always been done in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut and New York, his railroad was held up and his directors made it hot for him.

"Well, that's the answer, Mr. Mellon," I said, "that's what I hear all over this country. You can't run a railroad without corrupting and running the government."

He was amazed that I, a reformer, should say that. "You tell me that? You!" he repeated.

"Yes," I said, "I tell you that; it's evidently a fact, a truth, a hateful truth, which most men who acknowledge it don't feel the hatefulness of, as you do. They excuse it, they ignore it, they are not intelligent."

"But what, then, shall I do?" he almost cried!

My suggestion was that since he knew and hated what he had to do, he should stay on the job and do it up brown. If we can have all such positions filled with intelligent men, who, knowingly, corrupt government, it would be a great step ahead of where we are now—betrayed by a lot of honest men who think they are moral pillars of society!

That is about as far as Steffens got—at least until he had long been done with muckraking. There is more, perhaps, in these quotations of the typical journalists' hatred of humbug than there is of wisdom for the governance of society. But that was all the wisdom he had. Or was it? There were glimpses here and there in his observations of something more profound, nothing connected or systematic, nothing clearly illustrated, a chance phrase or an isolated sentence. But they were fugitive, half-understood.

VII

Would it have been reading something into the reflections of Steffens, Howe, Whitlock, and the others whose recollections issued in memoirs to suggest that almost unconsciously they were on the track of something else, and that that something else was a more useful understanding of the phenomena with which they were preoccupied throughout their lives? It happened that all three spent their active younger years either in city reform movements or in close professional observation of them; and that all three had later years of leisure for meditation and for writing. It was Howe who made the famous observation, growing out of his experience with city government, that he believed it to be corrupt because neglected, neglected because unimportant, unimportant because shut out of those economic affairs which are closest to people's concern. The logic of this he never quite pursued to the end; it was not clear to him then, but a formidable later movement toward the public ownership and operation of utilities would indicate, that a re-establishment of the city's importance might come by that route, though not, perhaps, because of a conscious development of reasoned action from his premises.

That movement toward public ownership evolved out of necessity. Traction companies, electric concerns, and other utilities had the best of reasons for growing to be citywide in extent. Those reasons were technical. But the economic power generated by technical progress was usually dissipated in graft paid for the necessary franchises and for protection against the wringing out of water from the capital structure. Consumers gained little or nothing. The need for protection where they were most vulnerable forced these organizations to perfect wider and wider combinations which had no technical reasons for existence and whose overhead organizations were, in fact, merely a method of disguising vulnerability with the false whiskers of pseudo-efficiency. These city monopolies would ultimately return to the city; Howe's suggestion would in the end re-

semble prophecy. The good effects of civic care about utility management would spread to other city services as well; but this would be when all the reformers had passed from the scene.

Not only Howe but most others of that early-century group as well discovered that in struggling with the problems of the city they were at grips with one tentacle—or perhaps two or three—of an octopus whose vitals they could not reach. Sooner or later it led all of them into state or national politics or into consideration of national problems where, they came to feel, the solutions lay. Because the higher-ups kept getting higher up, the real control more remote, the system of holding corporations became more and more complex. Stock issues which began as water, necessitated by overpayment to reluctant members of a potential combine, or as payment to underwriters for the slick work of creating several shares of stock where before there had been only one, were in the end held by innocent investors—the "widows and orphans" for whom so many crocodile tears were shed. The elaborate innocence of the face these combines turned to the public and the protection given them by the press made it difficult to separate the technical and honest from the financial and dishonest reasons for the growth of scale on which operations were conducted.

As time went on these problems were by way of being solved; and who could say that the worrying attacks of reformers had not helped? The moves were toward city ownership of consumer services and toward national ownership of the sources and means of heavy production; but they were not easy moves, accompanied as they were by wails of anguish and hymns of hate for the agents of the evolution. If public ownership always turned up as the long-run solution, it was for reasons which Steffens, particularly, seemed to glimpse time after time but never could see wholly and clearly. It was for similar reasons also that NRA would be stopped by the Supreme Court, in the early years of the New Deal, from experimenting with half-way measures. Americans were bound by conventions in these matters and were not willing to believe, even in the midst of depression, that new approaches were necessary.

The grave danger in generalizing about the widespread lodgment of democracy and individual dignity in the minds of Americans was strongly felt by Steffens and sensed by Howe; but neither, because of some fear of this sort, was able to center on the contrast between public and private enterprise which was of more significance than any other. This contrast was that, in industry, what had begun as the personal liberty of little enterprisers had ended up as the absolute despotism of the financiers and businessmen who controlled the great combines. Liberty had been preserved in what was left of government; but that was so unimportant that it scarcely mattered. The great struggle was to be between despotic industry and democratic government. They could not exist peacefully side by side—one or the other had to conquer. The great struggles of the future were to center in the democratizing of industry.

Steffens lost the thread in his search for the center of modern disturbance.[9] He traced it out of the cities to the national capital; and he had some bitter words to say about what he found there. Then he was drawn back to industry and there discovered a parallel whose fascination was fatal. Big business, he found, was bureaucratic; it was crooked; its

managers were grafters who sold out their stockholders and profited by inside rings. From this he came to the sad but tolerant conclusion that he had simply been tracing through all the manifestations of human organization something which human nature generated whenever its operations expanded. He never came to see that government in his time had had its functions emasculated or stolen; that it was corrupted because it had no positive, only obstructive, functions; and that, therefore, the one remaining area within which the equality of man, his spirit of choice, the exercise of his judgment, for which presumably the race had fought all the way upward from the slime, had lost its significance; and that in all that counted, in work, in the management of society, in the influences on the home and the school, in the determination of income, in the location and the conditions of living—in everything except bare protection from one another—the principle of organization ran from the top down, without representation, without regard for the individual, with ruthless pressure and public neglect.

The shocking logic with which business would take over the remnants of government in some other nations, Steffens, Howe, and Whitlock would all live long enough to see. Their recoil would be instinctive rather than analytical. Their contributions were finished before the Nazis and Fascists had come to power; and before the New Deal began to struggle with the accumulation of problems in the United States.

VIII

Yet both Whitlock and Howe had been members of reform administrations. Tom Johnson, with whom Howe had worked as a young man in Cleveland, had called his vision of a Cleveland remade the "City on a Hill."[10] This was, perhaps, a sentimental and high-flown idealization. Yet those were days, as we can see now, when a kind of civic romanticism was at work within the sprawling, blowsy, municipal body. There were many signs of it. Lord Bryce had said that if what was fine in America was to survive, there would have to be a revival of city life; he made specific reference to democracy. Tom Johnson, so little understood because he had in his nature a sweet directness which always disconcerted those whose conduct was guided by that devious smugness which permitted sin without approving it, had made a fortune in that very utility manipulation which depended on municipal corruption. He had had a kind of conversion from reading Henry George—whose influence was, indeed, immense on all that generation but especially on city reformers, because his remedy, the single-tax, could so obviously be applied there. He had turned on his class, and with his knowledge of business methods and an administrative genius which enabled him to provide effective city services even while he seemed to devote all his time to politics and propaganda, had transformed the sodden shame of Cleveland into what for the moment seemed like a movement for regeneration. Golden Rule Jones of Toledo and Pingres of Detroit had preceded him by a little; and even after the defeat and death of these old champions, there still remained in Ohio "the three boy mayors," all reformers: Whitlock of Toledo, Baker of Cleveland, and Hunt of Cincinnati. From the time of Golden Rule Jones on, there was hardly an interval when, somewhere in one of our cities, there was not at work one of these evangelistic groups.

They would not have liked posterity to regard them as reformers. None of

them had many illusions, either about human nature or about the permanence of the reforms for which they worked so hard. Whitlock, who had two other careers after his experience as mayor—he was Ambassador to Belgium during the War, as well as a professional novelist and biographer—closed the city-service phase of his life with a book called *Forty Years of It.* It was the history of a fine nature wrestling with all the ugly problems of those years in which the struggle of government with industry was most intense. "I did not know much about municipal government in those days," he said, "except what I learned in Jones' campaigns. . . . But . . . nobody knew much about it except that Mr. James Byrce had said that it was the most conspicuous failure of the American commonwealth." He went on in this same passage to speak of the contrast between American cities in these respects and those of Europe. And on the same page he marvelled that Steffens should have seen so clearly what most others had not had even the sensitivity to feel:

> He went at his task quite in the scientific spirit, isolating first that elementary germ or microbe, the partisan, the man who always voted the straight ticket in municipal elections. . . . Then he discovered the foul culture this organism blindly breeds—the political machine, with its boss. But he went on and his quest led him to the public service corporation, the street railway company, the gas company, the electricity company, and then his trail led him out into the state, and he produced a series of studies of politics in the American cities which has never been equalled and so had a noble and splendid part in the great awakening of our time.[11]

The members of this group all knew about each other; they were extraordinarily conscious of what they were doing and literate about it too. Being well read and urbane also, they had a sense of their own unimportance which was remarkable. In this they differed from the generation which preceded them. Of those older leaders Whitlock thought, as he said, that it was a "peculiar instance of the whimsical and profligate generosity of the fates that the three cities grouped at the end of Lake Erie like those cities Walt Whitman saw, or thought he saw, 'as sisters with their arms around each other's necks,' should have had at about the same time, such mayors . . . though the three men were different in everything but their democracy." They were alike in more than that, as Whitlock would have known if he had had less interest in pure literature and more in economics. But economics always bored the reformers, and because it did, they oversimplified it for themselves and for their constituents. Yet they knew that an economic problem lay at the heart of the evil they faced. They realized sadly, sometimes, that at best they could do little in their time:

> Steffens came to Toledo occasionally. . . . I took him to see Jones, and as we left the City Hall in the late afternoon of that spring day, Steffens was somehow depressed; we had walked a block in St. Clair street in silence when he said:
>
> "Why that man's program will take a thousand years!"
>
> It did seem long to wait. There was a time when I thought it might be done in a shorter period, but I have found myself under the necessity of extending the term from time to time. I fear now that Steffens' estimate of the length of Jones' program was rather short, but I know of no other way that the program can be carried out. Steffens himself is not so impatient now. . . . Great as was the data he collected, before all the conclusions could be drawn . . . it would be necessary to have the data of all life, of which the cities are microcosms. . . .
>
> But to some it seemed simple enough; were there not policemen patroling their beats ready to arrest the bad people? . . . This was the form which awakening took in many places,

and many reputations were built up in that wretched work. . . . I suppose that such efforts do accomplish something . . . but mostly they seem to me to gratify a taste for cheap sensation, and reward that prurient curiosity which has always made the contemplation of sin so very fascinating to our race. The reformer was abroad seeking to make mankind over, but since he has no model than himself to offer, his work never goes very far.[12]

No, these were not reformers in the old sense. Golden Rule Jones himself was no more insistent on the equal goodness of human nature than was Steffens, or, for that matter, later city men like La Guardia. In fact it was the reformers of this breed who were constantly confusing an issue which at best it was not easy for politicians and reporters—even public-minded ones—to define. Yet they were reformers of another sort—reformers, as Whitlock said of himself, in an unguarded passage, of "conditions."

Whitlock used to visit the Cleveland group. He described it thus:

It was delightful to be with them. . . . The geniune reform of conditions in that city possessed them all like a passion; they were stimulated by a common ambition, which was, as Johnson used to say, to make Cleveland a city set on a hill, and though he was not a poet nor a maker of phrases everyone instinctively knew what he meant. . . . I do not know how much of history he had read, but he knew intuitively that the city in all ages has been the outpost of civilization, and that if the problem of democracy is to be solved at all it is to be solved first in the city. . . . And how delighted he was when Fred Howe brought out his book *The City: The Hope of Democracy*. He had the joy of seeing marshalled there in the thesis of a scholar all the arguments he had apprehended but had never reduced to terms. . . . I used to like to go over to Cleveland and meet that charming group Johnson had gathered about him. There was in them a spirit I never saw in such fullness elsewhere; they were all working for the city, they thought only of the success of the whole. They had the city sense, a love of their town like that love which undergraduates have for their university.

IX

When Golden Rule Jones died, Whitlock himself saw that the greatest tribute his friend's memory received was not the lamentations of those he had befriended; it was the fact that the stock of the street railway company went up twenty-four points next morning. So great was the dependence of the reform movement on the throwing-up from time to time of a strong personality! This was, of course, only partly because it required a strong-minded man to resist the moral reformers and center attention on more fundamental needs.[13] It was more because the system was weighted against government and in favor of business. Even a strong-minded man could not prevail in such circumstances. The corporations, which perverted the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Fifth, and gained immunity from national as well as state regulation, were not likely to be checked by so small an annoyance as a city. Nevertheless, because the city was a natural unit for some industries—such as utilities—and because the exploitation of consumers somehow seemed more wicked when what was being sold was electricity or transit than when it was shoes or building materials or drugs, it was in the city that serious inroads on business power were first made.

This change began back in those Ohio days. Whitlock referred to it: "We had organized . . . an association of the mayors of the cities in the state[14] for the purpose of making changes in the municipal code that would give the cities a more mobile form of government and greater powers . . . it was the first definite movement in favor of home rule for cities, a liberation for which we struggled for almost a decade before we achieved any measure of success."[15] There ensued the long fight in every state which looms so

large in American social history. For this was no academic argument. The states had been found to be easier to corrupt than the cities, where every once in a while the citizens found a champion and revolted. This seldom happened at the state capitals because growth was so often accompanied by degeneracy. This matter, too, was described by Whitlock in a lucid passage which showed that he felt, though he could not see, the writhing of an economic colossus in the net of reform:

> Aside from my political principles, which I presume may as well be called liberal, and certain theories which were called radical . . . I had been able to make, or at least to recognize when others made them, as Mr. Bryce and most of the students of municipal government in America had done, two or three generalizations which, on the whole, after four terms in a mayor's office testing them, I still believe to be sound. The first was that, whatever the mere form of local government, our cities were directly ruled by those small coteries we had come to call political machines; the second, that these machines ruled the cities for the benefit of public utility corporations; and the third, that the legal power through which this was accomplished was derived from legislatures controlled by the same persons in the same interest. That is, the people had no voice in their own affairs; representative government itself had disappeared. Therefore these remedies seemed to be indicated, as the doctors say—non-partisan city elections, municipal ownership, and home rule for cities. This was the task, this was the program.

There was started, in this Ohio group, a movement which would eventually hunt profit-making out of city business. Home rule would turn out to be a formula which would drive utilities into the holding company swindle, whose strength would at last be matched with that of the federal government itself in a famous fight. But meanwhile there were many obstacles, of which the worst, perhaps, was the rural domination of state legislatures, a condition which arose because the cities grew more rapidly than country districts and were for that reason constantly falling behind in representation. Said Whitlock:

> Down at Columbus the legislature still was sitting, controlled by rural members who knew nothing of cities or of city life or city problems, farmers and country lawyers and the politicians of small towns, who, in the historic opposition of the ruralite to the urbanite, could not only favor their party conspirators from the city—machine politicians to whom they turned for advice—but gain a cheap *réclame* at home by opposing every measure designed to set the cities free. Thus the bosses in both parties, the machine politicians, the corporations, their lawyers, promoters, lobbyists, kept-editors, ward-heelers, officeholders, spies, and parasites of every kind were lying in wait on every hand. And besides, though inspired by other motives, the "good" people were always insisting on the "moral" issue; urging us to turn aside from our larger immediate purpose, and concentrate our official attention on the "bad" people—and wreck our movement. Our immediate purpose was to defeat the effort of the street railway company to obtain a franchise, to prevent it from performing the miracle of transmuting twenty-five millions in green paper into twenty-five millions in gold, and thereby absorb the commercial values of half a century. . . . More than this, we had to obtain from reluctant legislatures the powers that would put the city at least on equal terms with the corporations which had always proved so much more potent than the city. Such was the struggle our movement faced, such was the victory to be won before our city would be free from the triumvirate that so long had exploited it, the political boss, the franchise promoter, and the country politician. The Free City! That was the noble dream.[16]

Consciences were touched by the muckrakers; and here and there sporadic efforts at reform were made in local government, efforts which resulted not only in periodic overturns of the city machines in favor of administrations committed to change, but also, and more importantly, in the growth of clubs and associations dedicated to the study and improvement

of local government. These last were the continuing support for experiments in new forms and new systems of management—the commission form, for instance, and the city manager, conceived to be quite free from political control. The Blankenburgh administration in Philadelphia and the Mitchel regime in New York were typical of convulsive overturns; they were typical also in being merely convulsive—they did not last. They did furnish glimpses of better possibilities with inspired leadership; but their weakness was just that they depended too much on leadership and were not anchored in an educated and determined citizenry. There was not the necessary widespread view of the city as an expression of civic aspirations. There were no understood standards to measure by. What they wanted their cities to be and do, the American people had no definite conception. And notions of honesty and efficiency were not enough, lacking a clear idea of what honesty and efficiency were to accomplish.

So the corruption of government was never permanently outlawed; it tended to creep back after every campaign to "throw the rascals out." City officials still had something to dispose of which was profitable to many citizens. This began with small matters—overlooking infringements on public property, the maintaining of fire-traps or minor nuisances which inspections were supposed to correct, or blindness on the part of the police to establishments habitually used for vice or gambling. It ended by running these privileges into a system. They were too profitable to be left to inspectors, firemen, and policemen; and these minor officials tended to become a collecting and enforcing organization for their superiors. Meanwhile the vice and crime pyramided into syndicates. The bosses of these systems carried on their competition in small private wars, reducing their number to a few and gradually organizing a city-wide government of their own. This, of course, was the familiar pattern of big business which was everywhere being shaped out of the processes of competition among little businesses.

The muckrakers, early in the century, had discovered that all this was going on. They had discovered also that the links between what was considered "legitimate" business and what was criminal were very intimate indeed. In the city it was hard to determine just where one left off and the other began. These relationships did not end as a result of the muckrakers' exposures. It is probable that these efforts had no retarding effect on them at all. Certainly many years later the same kind of exposures would reveal the same kind of relationship functioning fully blown, reaching into the highest circles of both business and government—except that there would be quite definite evidence that the tendency was, as again in business, for the city gangs to link up into nation-wide organizations, more powerful than ever and more immune to attack. There was still a latent conscience to which reformers could appeal. Occasionally a newspaper went on crusade; occasionally the "racketeers," as they came to be called, became overbold, and some public prosecutor made a reputation by indicting and convicting the more repulsive characters among them. Mr. Thomas E. Dewey became Governor of New York in this way; and there were others; but it was to be noted that a few years later bigger and better rackets had been organized. Exposures of corruption acted somewhat as the antitrust laws did. They taught the racketeers to hire better lawyers, operate more carefully, and protect themselves

with fewer flagrant offenses against public order.

The ineffectiveness of reform, even after many exposures and after several examples of decency in city government, indicated that the time had not yet come for any permanent change. The firm basis had not yet been established. Corruption was too short an extension of what was approved in business; it was, in fact, too closely connected with business. So long as business remained what it was, there existed no extensive ground in which the seeds of virtue could grow. It was not true that the seeds did not exist or that they were not being cultivated against the future. They were. Outside of business, competition was not acknowledged to be the chief end of man. Getting the best of one another was not a definition of human relationships which was seriously defended. And the community, enlarged into the city, was quite capable of engaging the impulses of good citizens. They saw too that better institutions were needed as an expression of decent impulses. In the universities the study of local government had become realistic. In the Wharton school, at the University of Pennsylvania, the first and strongest of the schools for administration, not only the methods of business but the methods of government were seriously studied and taught. And others followed.

But also, mostly in graduate schools, such teachers as J. W. Burgess and Frank W. Goodnow had begun to explore governmental problems in the careful German way in which they had been trained. It was not until 1926, however, that the first systematic study of public administration appeared. It was the work of Leonard D. White of the University of Chicago. It was Professor White also who proposed to the Social Science Research Council the formation of a committee to survey public administration at work and to make recommendations for its improvement. He became the chairman of this group, being succeeded by Luther Gulick in 1930. This did not directly result in any change, but it stimulated the various discussions and considerations which led to many subsequent developments—such, for instance, as the immensely useful Public Administration Clearing House.

By 1933 the educated younger generation was well enough aware of the possibilities of betterment. And in Philadelphia the university circle widened out into a devoted city club. But there were citizens clubs and unions in New York, in Chicago, and in other cities as well. Harold Ickes, in Chicago, was by now an old hand at reform, defeated but not reconciled. Charles E. Merriam, another Chicagoan, not content to be only a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, had served as alderman and had made a powerful bid for the mayoralty.

But in New York there had grown up the most effective group of all—perhaps naturally, since New York was most noted for its corruption, and such a reaction was to be expected. The work of the City Club and of other associations of first citizens would issue later on (in 1936) in a new charter for the city, giving it the most effective institutional setting for government yet devised in America. This particular reform would be led by Fiorello H. La Guardia, who was not only a progressive but a very effective citizen. Even before the beginning of the century such basic preparation had been going on. There existed a Municipal Government Association of New York State, for instance, when Franklin D. Roosevelt was a state senator (from 1910 to 1913), and it was at the instance

of this Association that he introduced legislation at Albany looking toward home rule and better government.[17]

It would be important if it could be shown that young Senator Roosevelt had had a real interest in this city movement; but it does not appear to be true. There would be many others in his administration who would have been old hands in the cause, not only Harold Ickes, but Frances Perkins, Harry Hopkins, Charles E. Merriam, Louis Brownlow, and many others of lesser prominence. Of these, perhaps William Fielding Ogburn, also of the University of Chicago, would be typical. The impulse which would lead him to serve in various New Deal capacities—the most important being his Consumer Counselship in NRA—would have begun long before in that extraordinary center of governmental invention, the Pacific Northwest. During his professorship at Reed College, he had, in fact, been one of the founders of the Oregon Civic League. "I recall," he has said, "that in the last autumn I spent in Oregon (1916), I made 45 speeches off the campus in addition to my teaching."[18] A similar service was being performed at the same time in Philadelphia by Simon Nelson Patten, Scott Nearing, Clyde King, and other Pennsylvania professors.

There seems to have been somewhat less active concern in Boston for civic reform; but Harvard professors were equally active in their own way. Franklin Roosevelt had been an undergraduate at the height of the muckraking fervor. Unless he did a good deal of outside reading, it probably would not have been presented to him as an interesting field of exploration by his teachers—A. Lawrence Lowell or A. Piatt Andrew, for instance. But, although there is no evidence, it seems unlikely that its pervasive influence could have failed altogether to reach him. Lincoln Steffens' experience with Harvard's President, already referred to, occurred after Franklin Roosevelt had left; but it points to an official attitude which may have been discouraging to dissent. Still Theodore Roosevelt was a heroic figure, adventurous and colorful, and part of his experience, now behind him, had been in New York City as police commissioner. What a police commissioner knew of corruption, Franklin must at least have heard about.

Franklin, as a young man, made a very unlikely transition from conservatism to progressivism, one which has given some trouble to students of his career. They are inclined, in despair, to conclude that a kind of conversion occurred at the time of his illness; and they put the date at about 1921. But he had graduated from Harvard seventeen years earlier; he had practiced in New York's municipal courts for Carter, Ledyard, and Milburn; he had been a state senator and had had a historic tangle with the Tammany bosses; he had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Josephus Daniels; and he had run for Vice-President in 1920. In all this experience he must many times have come both directly and tangentially into contact with city problems. He certainly knew all about bosses and their systems and had consistently opposed them whenever opposition had been called for. It cannot be said that, like his uncle Frederick Delano, who was so prominent in both the Chicago and New York reform movements, he had a vision of the city as a high expression of human aspiration and saw the cities in vision as places of freedom and happiness in co-operative endeavor. He always did, and always would, think people better off in the country and would regard the cities as rather hopeless; but that did not imply

that he was ignorant of their problem and unsympathetic to reform.[19] Quite the contrary. Still he was not a city progressive but a rural one. He believed in farmers and trusted them. When he had come to the White House, he had not brought with him quite the same intellectual freight as Harold Ickes, Charles Merriam, his uncle Fred, or Will Ogburn. But all roots of neglected ideas went into the New Deal potpourri. Their origins were not required to be examined, only their usefulness in a crisis which threatened to make reforms irrelevant and total reconstruction necessary.

X

As a matter of fact Herbert Hoover had had more notion of the city's essence, its beautiful organic possibilities, than had Franklin Roosevelt. Hoover was, after all, the Great Engineer. It is sometimes forgot that the Hoovers belonged to the Franklin Roosevelts' social circle in the years between 1913 and 1920 when both families were in Washington. It would be interesting to know what they talked about—whether they helped to educate each other—although there is no record of any sort on the point. Hoover, then, and until 1920, might have been a Democrat. He served in Wilson's administration as part of the war apparatus; and there was a time when the 1920 ticket might well have been Hoover and Roosevelt instead of Cox and Roosevelt. It is entirely possible that the older man's sense of organization and efficiency was very good for the Assistant Secretary of the war-time Navy. When Hoover became Secretary of Commerce in 1921, there did issue from his department the first model city planning law as a guide to local governments; and he, generally, had a high regard for the possibilities—too high a regard in the circumstances of nation-wide depression—of self-help and of reconstruction in the cities.

It ought to be recalled that Hoover's program for the depression, feeble as it was in such a debacle, did include several efforts which, during the New Deal, would be simply enlarged and reactivated. One of these was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation through which at least some unemployment funds were loaned to local governments; another was the Federal Emergency Stabilization Board which began to gather together a shelf of plans for public works—mostly local building projects. Colonel D. H. Sawyer, its head, would have something, even if not much, in the way of projects to turn over to the Public Works Board headed by Harold Ickes from 1933.[20]

Hoover's superior sense of form and order, even if not touched by the muckrakers' revelations of dishonesty and hypocrisy, would have led him to think of the efficiency to be gained by better organization. It is not hard to conceive him among those groups of better citizens who supported the city manager movement and the efforts in various places to install institutions for planning. The Stabilization Board was at least partly the product of a sense of balance and design (although it got its impetus from the unemployment crisis), just as the model city planning law of 1928 had been. It would be possible to make too much in this connection of the city planning movement. In practice it was usually blunted and distorted by the real estate interests who very early saw that they could make use of it for their own purposes. It is usually said to have begun officially in New York in 1916 when the first zoning ordinance was passed to prevent a repetition of the conditions resulting from the vast Equitable Building which, by stealing light and air

from surrounding properties, seriously reduced their values. Zoning by itself was not planning; it was a kind of mutual protection granted by the city to property owners whose competition in building had become chaotic. Until there existed a view, a design, for the city of the future, there could hardly be any intelligent use of the means—of which zoning was one—to achieve the design.

But the designing was here and there undertaken too, not by the cities themselves, at first, unable as they were to struggle free from realty interests, but by these same groups of good citizens. The most notable effort was that in New York, sponsored and largely paid for by the Russell Sage Foundation. That study had been begun in 1911 and had been directed by a distinguished British planner, Thomas Adams. By the thirties it would have emerged in those handsome great volumes which first gave an American city a view of what it could and ought to become. It was a purely physical plan. There was united with it an estimate of the cost; but none of the resources likely to be available in New York.[21] It was, however, not a long jump to the conclusion that such a design would be useless if no effort was made to achieve it. The result of that conclusion would be that the Charter of 1936 would provide for a City Planning Commission with the duty not only of continuing to work out the design of the future—called a Master Plan—but also of making from year to year the city's capital (or improvement) budget. For the first time in the United States the vision of the organic city was given the governmental means for working year by year toward its realization.

The issuance into legal definition and the shaping of institutions for city planning had been, as in so many other instances, preceded by a long period of gestation. It seemed hopelessly slow to transform the cities and to eliminate their worst weaknesses; but nevertheless, generation by generation, it proceeded. As long before as 1909 the movement had progressed to the point of national conference. This first meeting was held in Washington, D.C., and was participated in by many of those who are now honored as pioneers: Henry Morgenthau, Frederick Law Olmstead, Frederick R. Ford, John Nolan, and many others, some of whom were actually working city planners and some of whom were interested citizens; and the meetings were presided over by cabinet members. It was noticeable that many participants appeared as chairmen or secretaries of civic associations; and praise was heard for the work of the American Civic Association and the National Municipal League. It was obvious that the planning movement was not only respectable but already formidable. There were suitably pious references to even earlier beginnings. Frederick R. Ford, City Engineer of Hartford, Connecticut, said in the course of his address that beginnings were traceable to 1902:

> The movement for city planning in an intelligent and comprehensive manner really started in 1902 with the publication of the report upon "The Improvement of the Park Systems of the District of Columbia" by a commission of widely recognized experts consisting of Daniel H. Burnham, Charles F. McKean, Frederick Law Olmstead and Augustus St. Gaudens, and it is especially fitting therefore that the first national conference on city planning should be held in the same city. . . . Starting in this local way, the movement for intelligent city planning has grown until it has reached into the largest cities and the smallest towns and villages, so that today it is as much a question of national importance as is the conservation of our national resources.

Robert Anderson Pope of New York was more cautious. He spoke of the

movement in America, as compared with Europe, as being "in its infancy." We had, he thought, no more than a limited aesthetic approach: In most large cities there had been huge expenditures "for extensive park systems, with broad boulevards and bridle paths, for far outlying reservations; inaccessible improvements designed to protect the needs of future generations, now, however, made available to but a small part of the community—the wealthy and leisure classes, who, of all society, need these advantages the least." And John Nolan, asking what was needed for the planning and rebuilding of American cities, said the temptation was to answer "everything." Yet it was impossible to conclude, after the reports of civic activity in many cities, that a powerful movement had not been initiated out of which something significant might come.[22]

It would not be realistic to link too closely this city planning movement, which issued in such a significant institutional change in New York, and in lesser changes elsewhere, with similar ideas for creating and realizing a vision of the future for the nation. Perhaps they were parallel movements. But many of the same people were interested in them. Chicago was very early in the visionary movement; it was the Burnham Plan for that city, following the inspiration of the Columbian Exposition, which was the prototype for all those following ones which became fashionable for cities to have, even that of New York. And when Harold Ickes, Chicago progressive reformer, should become not only Secretary of the Interior but chairman of the Special Board for Public Works, it would be natural for him to think of planning in connection with it; and one of his first acts would be to establish a Public Works Planning Board. The identification of Charles E. Merriam and of Frederick Delano with this board would carry over the associations of a city movement for which both had worked all their lives. And another member, Wesley C. Mitchell, would have been chief of the price section of the War Industries Board during the World War and the greatest living authority on the financial implications of planning. It would seem in that moment of enthusiasm as though the concept of an organic nation, part linked intelligibly with part, advancing to the fullest extent of its capabilities, might be realized. But such a conclusion would be premature. The special interests battening on divisiveness would prove too strong to be merged involuntarily in such a scheme. We were not yet a nation, except in crisis and great distress, and the budding hope would soon enough fade.

There would, however, be a residue in the cities. And, indeed, even in the circumstances of 1933, the cities could be seen to have a working approximation of that organicism so lacking in national life. New Deal administrators would do a good deal to foster this self-conscious development, with the consent, if not the active leadership, of President Roosevelt.

XI

To a curious historian it seems something of an anomaly that the muckraking episode should have originated and run its course in the first decade of the twentieth century. For by that time there had been substantial progress toward municipal reform. This progress consisted more in the exploration of possibilities than in the actual setting up of institutions—that is, changes in municipal government—but nevertheless the steps had been taken which are the necessary pre-

liminaries to basic reform. They had originated, as a matter of fact, in severe reaction to the scandals in the post-Civil War period. The Tweed Ring in New York had been overthrown in 1871, and there had been several investigations of municipal affairs whose chief permanent result had been the setting-up of citizens' organizations to combat franchise grabs or to correct peculiarly corrupt situations. These groups usually developed no definite long-run program for betterment; but there was one group which was bent on eliminating the "spoils system" and which did have such a program. It was believed that the establishment of a merit system as a substitute for political appointment was the necessary condition for reform.

Henry Adams had written an article in 1869,[23] afterward designated by Professor John Gaus as "the first example of public recognition and consciousness of administrative problems,"[24] which was followed by others—for instance, Woodrow Wilson, in his academic phase. In New York a Civil Service Reform Association was set up in 1877; and in 1881 this and twelve other similar associations had a first meeting at Newport, whose result was a National Civil Service Reform League. From then on, a civil service was fought for consistently by an active and influential group who knew what they wanted. They were responsible in large part not only for municipal progress in this direction but for the passage of the Pendleton Act by the Congress in 1883. From then on, so far as this reform was concerned, it only remained to extend coverage and enforce effective administration. The city machines found numerous and ingenious ways of circumventing enforcement; but improvement, under sporadic citizen pressure, did take place.

At the time of the muckrakers, this movement, like several others of a similar sort, was about ready to pass into the more positive stage of employment management and effective personnel work. This change ultimately resulted in bureaus for municipal research which were so important in the later development of city management. Philadelphia's Municipal League was founded in 1892; the City Club of New York in 1892; and the Municipal League of Boston in 1894. Out of these there came the first Conference for Good City Government in Philadelphia in 1894, to which eleven cities sent delegates. There the National Municipal League was founded; and within a year there were 180 branch leagues. By 1899 this group had reached a set of guiding principles considerably more comprehensive than that of the Civil Service Reform League. These included widened home rule for cities, unicameralism, the strong-mayor plan—with all department heads except the controller appointed by the mayor—the separation of municipal from state and national elections, the merit system of appointment and promotion, and auditing of municipal accounts.

The research bureaus grew out of a certain disillusionment with mere reformism. The thought behind them was that experts of a disinterested sort could bring to bear on city functions techniques of analysis and comparison which, if made available to city administrations, might immensely improve their operations. The bureau in New York was incorporated in 1907. It was financed by R. Fulton Cutting, Andrew Carnegie, and John D. Rockefeller. It found a field of operations very rapidly and conciliated even the opposition of the Tammany chieftains. It provided experts for the installation of accounting and budget

systems, showed the way to reorganization of several departments, developed purchasing methods, and revised personnel and salary classifications. It became almost an unofficial arm of official government.

The same developments occurred in Philadelphia, Cincinnati, and Chicago. It was ironic that the funds for these efforts at administrative improvement should have been furnished by those same big businessmen who had been pointed to by Steffens and his co-workers as the corrupters of the cities. There is an analogy to be drawn here with the devotion of many of the large fortunes, put together in pre-income-tax times, to philanthropy—an attempt, as the more radically minded liked to point out, to salve consciences grown tender in age. It is fact that the great foundations, into whose keeping so much of the Rockefeller, Carnegie, and other fortunes were intrusted, were the principal support of the basic movements for civic reform and the improvement of city management; and this is sometimes cited as adequate defense for a system in which such fortunes may be accumulated. This defense was not sufficient to prevail against the powerful trend toward the equalization of income which was to characterize the thirties and forties of the century. But it has to be noted as having gone a long way toward laying the foundation for permanent administrative reform.

The support of the Rockefeller Foundation, as well as such others as the Carnegie and Russell Sage Foundations, was indispensable. Lincoln Steffens would doubtless have characterized this loosening of control over vast funds as a weakness of character, essentially unintelligent, since at worst it worked against the very system which had enabled them to be accumulated and at best tended to correct conditions which would not have existed except for the operations of the individuals concerned. And evidently this would have been a just characterization. For although these funds were usefully employed, they were without doubt used to lay the basis for fundamental changes whose effect would be to equalize incomes and to make impossible the profitable corruption of government. And it is doubtful whether Rockefeller, Carnegie, or Sage ever believed that the free-enterprise system under which they had prospered so enormously ought to be modified as it would be in the generation succeeding theirs.

There were intelligent members of that generation who knew exactly what the results would be and who would have welcomed them. Joseph Fels, for instance, who was won over in age to the single tax, said openly that he meant to devote his fortune to "tearing down the damnable system which had enabled him to build it up." But he was a notable exception. Much more often the movement for reform was camouflaged as "good business." The businessmen were perfecting a gun that they somehow believed would not be loaded, or at least would not be pointed in their direction. It did seem a simple proposition that city business—and eventually the business of the federal government—ought to be efficiently run. And it seemed an even simpler conclusion that tax burdens might be reduced by the economies reachable only by better procedures. One of the most notable achievements of the century would be the introduction of budget systems which were uniformly presented by their advocates as economy measures. This happened first in the cities; but it was obvious that once planted there the idea of visualizing income and expenditure would quickly be seen to be equally

appropriate to the federal system. The instinct of the politicians was to oppose this as they had the other reforms. How, they might have asked, can we maintain the freedom to grant those favors, concessions, and privileges the businessmen demand unless we are able to proceed without the interference of experts equipped with rational plans? Plans tended to be constructed with a view to the creation of a functioning entity, part related to part; and any departure from such a plan puts a heavy burden of proof on a politician who would manipulate public improvements in response to interested pressure.

Budgeting was presented as "economy"; actually the budget is an indispensable device of planners. And once accepted it accumulates its own momentum. Congressmen, like the city politicians, would be very reluctant to accept any such addition to the executive establishment. But no one except the professional politicians were against it; and when it became clear that the business community was for it, they gradually, even if protestingly, with mutterings and misgivings, gave ground.

Actually the federal budget resulted from the work of a Commission on Economy and Efficiency appointed by President Taft. Frederick A. Cleveland, director of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, was made chairman of the commission at the instance of Taft's secretary, Charles D. Norton;[25] so city reform moved on to Washington. The other members of that commission were William F. Willoughby and Frank J. Goodnow, honored names in political science. In 1912, the commission's report, entitled "The Need for a National Budget," was transmitted to the Congress by the President.[26] The Congress was moved to condemn the President for permitting officials to waste their time working on "this new and unauthorized plan of a so-called national budget."[27] And the commission went out of existence. But something had been begun which could not be stopped. In 1916, Norton organized a continuation of the commission's work. There was established an Institute for Government Research, with W. F. Willoughby as its director. It was financed by Rockefeller funds—a connection which was not missed by those opposed to the effort. But between 1916 and 1918 the Institute published five volumes on budgeting and fiscal administration which left the opposition with very few arguments against the adoption of the device. And a federal budget did actually come into existence in 1921—not that the Congressmen were tamed; far from it; they went on making budgets of their own with very little reference to executive budgets, and would continue to do so for years to come. But the days of whimsical expenditure were limited, even though they were far from having been ended when the New Deal was beginning.

There is a direct, if somewhat tenuous, relationship between the fight for the administrative budget and the New Deal. The connection is made by Franklin D. Roosevelt himself. As many still living can testify, one of the most obsessive preoccupations of Roosevelt as President was to be the reorganization of government; and he had an intense interest in budget matters, which was part of his whole concern for detail and arrangement. This was a built-in characteristic. It appeared in Albany when he was a legislator trying to reorganize the administration of conservation; it had much to do with his success, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, in improving all construction and operational activities. But the point here is that when the exec-

utive budget was under discussion in the Congress, he was one of those who appeared to testify in its favor. In this testimony he not only argued for the budget but went on to argue for other principles of better management he had learned from his Navy experiences. He thought that more might have come from this labor of the Congress, and was rather bitter in discussing it early in 1920 with Harvard students.

For students of his career this is something of a preview of his sophistication, as he entered the Presidency, in such matters. One of his first acts, it will be recalled, was to be to ask for blanket reorganizing powers; and it would be he who would move the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury into the executive office directly under himself.[28]

The Institute for Government Research went on to become an early clearing house for the agencies engaged in working for the reform of government; furthermore, it encouraged—with some success—requests from various departments for its expert services. Eventually it merged with the Institute of Economics (established by the Carnegie Corporation in 1922) and with the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government (set up in 1925 in connection with Washington University) to become the Brookings Institution (in 1922).[29]

XII

I have spoken before of the weakening of government.[30] That was with reference to the emasculation of the Presidency during the regimes of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, to the over-effective operation of the Constitution's checks and balances, and to the consequent escape of very powerful interests from public regulation. But it will be seen, even from the brief résumé here, that there were forces at work which might, when the proper time arrived, emerge very rapidly, equipped with the devices and expertise necessary to arrest that decline. Energetic and courageous leadership from the White House, also, might be expected to rejuvenate the Presidency and overcome the imbalance resulting from the Senate's attritions on the executive. Such leadership would be likely to result from any national crisis which threw the business system into disrepute and caused widespread distress. And that is what happened with startling rapidity as the depression of 1929 ran on into 1932, and Franklin D. Roosevelt emerged as a Presidential candidate with alternatives to offer.

It is a notable fact that most of the preliminary work necessary to such an expansion of government as would presently be undertaken had been done in the cities. The agricultural distresses of preceding years had not caused many governmental changes. The farmers had looked to Washington rather than to local government for relief. Even the Non-Partisan League, although it had for a time dominated several state governments, had left an astonishingly small residue of permanent reforms. And there were no such contributions to federal change from any of the agricultural agitations and revolts as resulted from the successive city scandals and reforms. Good government as a movement had its clear beginnings in the cities. The merit system came from there; so did the budget; and city planning was already an old movement before it began to be thought of as a national possibility.

Not all the New Dealers, assembling in Washington in 1933, were rich with city background, but many of them were. There was urgent need for agricultural

relief, and it would require the services of Henry A. Wallace, Mordecai Ezekiel, Louis Bean, and others who were to devise the Agricultural Adjustment Administration; of Henry Morgenthau and William T. Meyers in the field of farm credits; of George Peek, Chester Davis, and others who, like them, had for years worked to rehabilitate agriculture. But there were, numerically, many more who came from urban backgrounds and had had various experiences in the long fight against municipal corruption and for the establishment of better city government. Among these were Harold Ickes, Harry Hopkins, Raymond Moley, Frances Perkins, Jerome Frank, Frederick Delano, Charles E. Merriam, Wesley Mitchell, Louis Brownlow, Leonard D. White, Frederick C. Howe, Henry Hunt, Morris Cooke, and many others. Harold Ickes brought with him the breath of reform. He carried many scars from the old battles, none of which had diminished his zeal. Frances Perkins carried with her the tradition of governmental intervention on behalf of the weak and unprotected; Harry Hopkins brought to Washington the whole paraphernalia of social work in the cities. And Raymond Moley was a genuine expert in the better administration of justice. Some others, not destined for great public notice but very influential in their places, were the very ones who had been responsible for reforms and for the establishment of institutions to secure their permanence.

The whole apparatus of municipal improvement came to Washington in 1933. And it would have enormous effect there before the New Deal had run its course. The muckrakers had not lived in vain; neither had those other heroes who had borne the burden of battle. Tom Johnson, Brand Whitlock, John Puroy Mitchel, and old Blankenburgh had not been permanently defeated. Their spirits lived in successors who were now to have a sweet victory.

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NOTES

1. Werner Hegemann, *City Planning: Housing*, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen, with a Preface by Joseph Hudnut and a chapter by Elbert Peets (New York: Architectural Book Publishing Co., 1936–38), Vol. II.

2. Report and Map signed and sealed by Simon DeWitt in the presence of Gouverneur Morris, March 22, 1811.

3. Cf. Washington's idea in *City Planning: Housing*, Vol. I.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

5. Said F. C. Howe, *Confessions of a Reformer* (New York: C. Scribner's & Sons, 1925), p. 113: "The possibility of a free, orderly, and beautiful city became to me an absorbing passion." Howe was starry-eyed; so was his mayor, Tom Johnson. How quickly Cleveland reverted to type after Howe and Johnson were gone shows the strength of the competing forces.

6. Franklin D. Roosevelt felt very strongly that this was so—a feeling which was to have more serious consequences than most men's feelings have. In February, 1911, when he was a state senator in New York, he journeyed to New York to address the Columbia County Society and was interviewed by Virginia Tyler Hudson of the *New York Globe* (the interview was published in that paper on February 6, 1911). Part of what he said was the following:

"I fully believe we will have direct nomination before long and I would like to see us have the recall too; but I do not believe New York is ready for that yet. . . .

"I believe a new spirit is abroad in the land today—at least we call it new; but it is really nothing more than a return to the old idea of representative government. It is up to every man who thinks and reasons, who holds the good of his country and his fellow countrymen, at least to see that this spirit is fostered; that the law shall stand for social progress. Education has done much and the enlightening processes which are going forward today, especially in the country districts, will do more. In fact, I might almost say that the political salvation of the country lies with the country men and boys. Not because they are more honest or more patriotic than their brothers in the cities, but because they have more time to think and study for

themselves, to know what the country needs, and have the courage to stand for what they know is right in the face of organized opposition with the precedent of years behind it. Of our little band of twenty insurgents, eighteen are from the country [this refers to the famous insurgency, led by young Senator Roosevelt against Tammany's effort to elect "Blue-eyed Billy" Sheehan to the United States Senate which was in process at that time].

"Another reason that the man from the country makes a better and more honest politician . . . is that people in the country not only have time to think but are willing to think; and their fathers and mothers were thinkers, though they had not the advantages of education and enlightenment . . . possible today. . . . The lives of you city people are artificial. You don't breed exactly the same kind of people we breed in the country . . . and no matter how many jokes may be made about the countrymen who sit around the stove in the village postoffice and settle the affairs of the country, they are not jokes. From just such men who think and argue over national and political matters in their state comes the material that makes our best lawmakers and who in time will see that only the men that will serve the people wholeheartedly and unreservedly will be elected to office."

7. Even here reservation must be made. Police had been made blind to wrongdoing by graft; fire departments had been paid for favors in the way of easy inspection of dangerous premises; and even the streets were the prey of contractors. Nothing the city possessed was really immune from sale. These safety functions were maintained in public possession largely because no one was willing to trust competitors to manage them, and because it was not, after all, too difficult to arrange matters comfortably with officials.

8. *Autobiography* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 608.

9. Cf. John Chamberlain, *The American Stakes* (New York: Carrick & Evans, 1940), pp. 30 ff.

10. Cf. Howe, *op. cit.*, chap. xiii.

11. Brand Whitlock, *Forty Years of It* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1914), pp. 162–63. Whitlock furnishes one of the most interesting character studies to be found among American progressives. In the early Toledo days, under the influence of Jones and more remotely of Johnson, he tried to be a man of the people, sharing the luck of the poor, working with and for them, laboring for their political education, sweating over injustices and civic crime. It was a direct and honest man too, who wrote *Forty Years of It*. But when at last there came about a progressive national administration and his friend Baker got him appointed to the Belgian Ambassadorship, he became a literary dilettante who distrusted democracy. In the old days Steffens had been an admired friend and adviser. On the Riviera, when he read the *Autobiography*, he dismissed it with no more than a comment in a letter on the "poor writing." Mr. Allan Nevins, Whitlock's editor, quoted the observations of a visitor after a few years of Europe:

"In default of an economic philosophy he was apparently devoting himself to living, in a very debonair way. He had some beautiful dogs. His house was filled with honors from the Belgian government. About his tables were members of the aristocracy. . . . I saw him next some years later at an hotel on the Riviera. He was scrupulously dressed; careful in his habits; detached in his emotions. . . . Living was a thing to be finished off in a refined, artistic . . . way, possibly unsoiled by what was going on without."

It was perhaps ironical that the great depression should have shaken his detachment by threatening his inherited income. There was, as Mr. Nevins remarked, much truth in what Eugene Wood wrote him just after the election of 1909. "My dear friend —I wish I could say comrade—the axe must be laid at the foot of the tree, not at offending limbs . . . !" And Mr. Nevins went on to say: "The progressive movement, of which Whitlock was a part, was never really a radical movement; it never got at the root of the matter" (*Letters and Journals of Brand Whitlock*, ed. Allan Nevins [New York: D. Appleton–Century, 1936], Introduction, p. xlvi).

Whitlock died in the English hospital at Cannes, in May of 1934. The Provençal spring he loved was in full rush, the nightingales he wrote of so often to Albert Bigelow Paine, were mating; he was a long way from the cold, unfriendly wind which comes from across Lake Erie and seems to intensify all the problems the reformers (even the reformers who scorned reformers) left unsolved in Toledo.

12. Whitlock, *op. cit.*, pp. 165–66.

13. The division in the city would be as close as we shall come—at least down to the depression—to division into classes. Both Whitlock and Howe spoke of that. The following is from Howe:

"Before the expiration of the first two years of Mr. Johnson's term of mayoralty the city was divided into two camps along clearly defined economic lines. There was bitterness, hatred, abuse. Also social ostracism and business boycott. The press was unscrupulous in its attacks. On the one side were men of property and influence; on the other politicians, immigrants, workers, and persons of small means. This line of cleavage continued to the end.

"And I was not on the side where I would have chosen to be. The struggle brought me into conflict with friends, clients, my class. . . . I suffered from the gibes of men with whom I had once been intimate. I could not see why my opinions on municipal ownership should make me any less desirable socially than I had been while living at the settlement engaged in uplift work . . ." (*Confessions of a Reformer*, pp. 115–16). There was much more in this same vein.

In Whitlock's *Letters* there is one to Steffens in 1909 as he entered on a campaign for re-election

with the machine and all the "good people" allied against him, especially the "respectable big business men." After telling at some length the incidents of the previous weeks, he cries:

". . . What a bitter, wicked thing this class fight is . . . and these are but skirmishes to what is coming later."

It was to be no accident indeed that Mr. Roosevelt would inherit this same hatred multiplied a thousandfold. No attempt to recapture for government its lost powers could escape this division. No reformer who sought to reform "conditions" rather than people could remain respectable.

14. That would have been in 1910, the same year in which Franklin D. Roosevelt entered on the political scene in New York State.

15. Whitlock, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 212–13.

17. The names on the letterhead of the Municipal Government Association correspondence with the future President show the respectability of its membership. They included John K. Sague of Poughkeepsie, one of young Roosevelt's mentors, William H. Crosby, Dr. F. Park Lewis, and Charles Rohlfs of Buffalo, Arthur Schoellkopf and George W. Knox of Niagara Falls, and, from New York City, Charles A. Beard, J. W. Grubs, Dr. Albert Shaw, Sam A. Lewisohn, Richard S. Childs, and John Finley. These letters, concerning the Roosevelt connection with city reform, are among the unpublished papers at Hyde Park.

18. "Reminiscences" on the occasion of his retirement as Avery Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1951.

19. Cities, however, in his early regard, could be made tolerable by institutionalized links with the country. He said this, as a matter of fact, in an address to members of the Chamber of Commerce in Washington on November 11, 1913. Suburban farms ought to be provided for city dwellers, he suggested; and this would "make the city a place where people will be pretty proud to hail from." This, of course, is an interesting anticipation of the subsistence homesteads program of the New Deal. The reference here is to a manuscript still unclassified in the archives at Hyde Park.

20. Cf. Harold Ickes, *Back to Work* (New York: Macmillan, 1935), p. 55. This ought not to be credited to Hoover, perhaps, since it was the result of a long fight—from 1928 on—by a group of congressional progressives including Senators Wagner, La Follette, Costigan, Norris, Cutting, and Wheeler. Also, Hoover had vetoed the first version of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, finally accepting a revised version which was limited to "self-liquidating" projects. It was this act which provided 373 million for federal construction and 300 million for relief loans to the states, and increased the loan funds of the RFC by one-and-a-half billion. It was doubtless because of the reluctance of Hoover's approach that Mr. Ickes minimized in his *Back to Work* the preliminary beginnings by the Stabilization Board. There is much more about this matter in *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand Days*, ed. Jane D. Ickes (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953).

21. *The Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs:* Volume I, *The Graphic Regional Plan* (New York, 1929); Volume II, *The Building of the City* (New York, 1931). The committee responsible for these reports consisted of Frederick A. Delano, Chairman, Robert W. de Forest, John H. Finley, John M. Glenn, Henry James, George McAneny, Dwight W. Morrow, Frank L. Polk, Frederick B. Pratt, and Lawson Purdy. The general director of Plans and Surveys was Thomas Adams.

One of my more precious possessions is these volumes, inscribed to me by the then chairman, George McAneny, on the occasion of my becoming the chairman of the New York City Planning Commission in 1938.

22. The material quoted here is from Senate Document No. 422, Sixty-first Congress, second session. This was a hearing before the Committee on the District of Columbia: the papers of the First National Conference on City Planning were printed as part of the record.

23. "Civil Service Reform," *North American Review*, CIX (1869), 443–65.

24. In "A Study of Research in Public Administration" prepared for the Advisory Committee on Public Administration of the Social Science Research Council. Mimeographed, New York, 1930, p. 1.

25. This Norton and his son were to have a notable role in the fixing of planning in New York City's government and in protecting it from subversive attacks.

26. House Document No. 854, Sixty-second Congress, second session.

27. Cited by G. A. Weber, *Organized Efforts for the Improvement of Methods of Administration in the United States* (New York: Appleton, 1919), p. 89.

28. These matters are discussed in Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954). In fact Mr. Freidel gives a whole chapter to the subject at this point in Roosevelt's career. It is chapter ii in this second volume of his *Life*, called "Toward More Efficient Government." References to the various documents mentioned above will be found in this chapter.

29. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor C. H. Pritchett, for references concerning the history of public administration, mostly from certain of his, as yet, unpublished manuscripts.

30. In "The Decline of Government," *Western Political Quarterly*, June and September, 1951, pp. 295–312, 469–486.